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ABSTRACT
The Japanese construction industry has long been in recession, and the recession is
predicted to continue into the future because both national and local governments lack the
necessary resources. The "Private Finance Initiative" (PFI), which utilizes the private
sector's technical, financial, and managerial resources to deliver more efficient and
higher quality public facilities, has recently been launched in Japan with a special
enactment.
The PFI gives substantial opportunities to many Japanese industries, and especially to
major construction firms (MCFs), which have collective strength and experience in
developing technologies and projects. However, since participants in a PFI project must
invest in the project as a whole, only those who can evaluate, manage, and properly
assume the involved risks deserve the opportunity.
Based on the background of the Japanese construction industry and the findings from the
case studies relevant to the private toll road project or the Japanese PFI, this thesis
develops a framework for prospective toll road/bridge/tunnel projects utilizing the
Japanese PFI scheme. For the viable types of projects (such as bridges/tunnels or bypass
road projects with technically complicated structures and sufficient traffic volume
projections), this thesis identifies project structures that are desirable with regard to
government supports and risk sharing. A real public-private partnership, which implies
joint efforts and initiatives with eagerness to implement the Japanese PFI, is always
essential to the development of such a PFI project.
This thesis also proposes two strategies for an MCF to face the Japanese PFI.
Differentiation strategy may be attained through financial strength, special talent and
experiences, differentiated technologies and patents, and proper equipment. Under
certain conditions, such as if the project includes a large potential to develop innovative
construction means, MCFs should consider an equity contribution strategy to exploit
equitable returns. Simulations of a prospective toll bridge project are also applied in the
thesis to test the viability of the framework and the strategies.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Professor of Engineering Systems
Director, MIT Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. The Advent of the PFI in Japan's Construction Industry
The "Private Finance Initiative (PFI) " has recently been launched in Japan.
The PFI aims to encourage private entities to invest in a range of public-use projects in
order to supply public facilities despite limited government resources, to utilize the
private sector's efficiency, and thereby stimulate the Japanese economy. The preliminary
approach toward the PFI (not so named yet) was begun in the United Kingdom by the
Thatcher government, which adopted "small government" as its slogan. Under the Major
government in 1992, the PFI was first proposed and has been proven successful. The
Japanese PFI has the potential to greatly improve the efficiency of the Japanese
construction industry, to solve a variety of problems in the industry, and to meet
economic needs to help Japan recover from economic recession.
A substantial number of Japanese construction companies, or general contractors
(GCs), are ranked among the highest in the world in terms of level of sales. According to
ENR', five Japanese firms are ranked in the top 7 if sorted by the total revenues2, whereas
only three are in the top 30 (none in the top 10) sorted by international revenues. The
main reasons for the scale of Japan's major construction firms (MCFs) 3 are the fact that
the domestic construction market in Japan is very large and that there are invisible
barriers of entry for foreign GCs.
However, while the MCFs have contributed to Japan's economic growth through
the development of public infrastructure, they are now struggling with their financial
rehabilitation and the prospective decline of the domestic market. Japanese MCFs,
generally speaking, invested huge amounts in real estate during the "bubble" economy
ENR (2000). "2000 Top 225 International Contractors," August 14, 2000 issue of ENR
2 The five are Taisei (rank 1), Shirnizu (2), Kajima (3), Obayashi (6), and Takenaka (7).
3 The term "MCF" in this thesis is more specifically defined in Section 2.2.1.
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era of the late 1980s and early 1990s, expecting unlimited increases in the value of real
estate and buildings. After the collapse of the bubble, unutilized land and buildings and
huge debts have remained for most MCFs. It became apparent that the national and local
governments were also short of resources, once the Japanese economic recession
occurred, following the bubble's collapse. MCFs need financial restructuring and it is
obvious that public works' projects should decline substantially for the next couple of
decades. As expected, this is a nightmare for all Japanese MCFs. The MCFs' financial
malaise and Japan's reduced public works prospects heighten the MCFs' awareness of
the need to restructure their organizations and business strategies.
1.2. The Motivation for the Research
From the viewpoint of an MCF, the motivation for this research comes from a
question, "How can an MCF compete and remain profitable in the changing, challenging
environment of the Japanese construction industry?" Given the circumstance of the
resource deficiency of the national and local governments and economic recession in
Japan, the PFI scheme was introduced, being expected to stir the economy. Since the PFI
projects have to be profitable entities, or at least more efficient than the projects procured
by the traditional delivery method, the entire procedure of the PFI project needs to be
improved. The project procedure includes the following elements: grasp of project needs,
selection of the project, conceptual design, request for proposals from competitive
bidders, detail design, construction, financing, maintenance and operation, and
termination. In this integrated scheme, the MCF, with its sole main objective of
construction, at first glance seems unable to play a crucial role in the whole project.
However, many instances show the opposite result; the MCF often has tremendous
potential to make the PFI scheme valuable. To succeed in a PFI project, the MCF, as
well as other participants, must work more efficiently than in a conventional project
scheme. The experiences in comparable areas should be examined and the MCF's ideal
position in the project scheme to gain profits should be analyzed in order to realize the
MCF's potential.
16
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.3. The Objective of the Thesis
A premise of the PFI is that the construction cost of a project should be lowered
with the private sector's efficiency if the construction cost is substantial in the project.
Then, where should the difference of the construction cost between PFI projects and
conventional ones go? Of course, it should go to the people, or taxpayers, by reduced
government expense due to one of the PFI's objectives. At the same time, it should go to
the private sector, or the developer, as improved cash flows of the project. But, how
about the MCF? The MCF would have little incentive to be involved in the PFI project if
the MCF works for the project merely as a contractor because accepting squeezed
construction prices simply makes the project unprofitable for the MCF as a contractor.
Therefore, the MCF must be involved in the developer consortium, which can receive the
benefits from the PFI, as a function of the consortium. Then, how should the MCF be
involved in the PFI consortium? What kinds of risks should the MCF bear in the
consortium for the sake of the benefits?
To find possible answers to these questions, this thesis aims at identifying the
Japanese PFI framework and developing some MCF's strategies to face the PFI. In
identifying the Japanese PFI framework, toll road/bridge/tunnel projects are specifically
focused on throughout the thesis in order to make the framework meaningful rather than
generalizing the framework, while the PFI Act and relevant official guidelines have a
broad scope. To this end, the thesis proceeds with the following structure.
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1-1. The scope of the thesis is
mostly public works and civil infrastructure, and especially toll roads/bridges/tunnels.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1. Introduction: Chapter 1 introduces the advent of the Japanese PFI
with a brief description of the PFI, addresses the objectives of the thesis, and shows the
structure and the scope of the thesis.
Chapter 2. Background: Chapter 2 outlines the basic background of the thesis,
which is necessary for the discussion in later chapters. Items include the Japanese
construction industry, Japanese construction companies, and delivery systems abroad.
Some detailed or other background information is allocated in other chapters that discuss
relevant topics.
Chapter 3. Introduction of the Japanese PFI: Chapter 3 describes the PFI in
Japan and its general characteristics. The main points of the chapter include the purpose
for which the PFI was introduced in Japan, discussions surrounding the enactment and
issuance of the PFI Act and PFI Guidelines, and some lessons learned from pioneer PFI
cases in Japan.
Chapter 4. Case Studies: Chapter 4 examines actual cases procured by various
kinds of delivery systems in the PPP context. Analyzed issues in this chapter involve
project structures, financial schemes, risk profiles and allocation, and construction firms'
roles in each project. Examined cases include two Japanese projects procured under the
traditional method, the Confederation Bridge and Highway 407 in Canada, SR57 and
SR91 in California, the Sydney Harbour Tunnel in Australia, DBFO toll roads in the U.K.,
and two pioneer Japanese PFI projects.
Chapter 5. The Japanese PFI and Toll Road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects: Chapter 5
analyzes the PFI in Japan more closely by examining its characteristics in the context of
how the PFI works for toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in the Japanese construction
industry, utilizing the lessons learned in Chapter 4. Arguments in this chapter center on
if the PFI framework is applicable to toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in Japan and how
the risks should be allocated or mitigated in the framework.
Chapter 6. Generic Strategies for the Japanese Major Construction Firm:
Chapter 6 proposes two generic strategies for a Japanese MCF to face the PFI, together
with a simulation of a prospective project. The two generic strategies are differentiation
and equity contribution, which contain several fundamental elements. These strategies
address how the MCFs can be profitable enough by properly assuming risks surrounding
19
a project. A simulation for a prospective Japanese PFI project is presented to show the
viability of the framework and the strategies, developed in Chapter 5 and proposed in
Chapter 6, respectively.
Chapter 7. Conclusion: Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and concludes with four
primary lessons learned through the research.
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Chapter 2. Background
2.1. The Japanese construction industry'
2.1.1. Overview of the Japanese construction industry
Overview of the Current Construction Industry
Construction is one of Japan's largest industries, involving 600,000 firms and
6,500,000 workers (comprising some 10% of the total workforce). The construction
investment in Japan was V67.1 trillion in FY1999, which accounted for almost 15% of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is the largest percentage among developed
countries. 2 Although public infrastructure has developed intensively since the end of
World War II, highway length, park areas, sewage line length, etc. are still far below the
averages obtained in other developed countries, and this is one of the reasons why the
Japanese construction market has been so huge.
Public works account for about half of the construction investment and the rest is
private works. As for only civil engineering works (buildings excluded), public works
occupy nearly 80%. Although revenues from public works are less than from private
works for most large-scale construction firms, profits from public works are generally
more than those from private works: this tendency is more remarkable in civil
engineering projects than in buildings projects. 3 More important, most construction firms,
large or small, are involved in public works, and the ways they work in public works
Further information about the Japanese construction industry is described in Section 5.1, where how the
Japanese PFI works in the context of the Japanese construction industry is discussed.
2 Ministry of Construction (2000): Kensetsu Hakusho (Present Status of Land Construction - A
Construction White Paper)
3 For example, Kajima Corporation's gross profit margin in FY1999 was 13.7% for civil engineering
projects and 8.1 % for buildings projects. During the "Bubble" era, the early 1990s, however, private works
were more profitable than public works.
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influence the private sector owners. Therefore, public works are important for
construction companies, and Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are thus
discussed in this thesis. 4
The difference between the roles of national and local governments also needs to
be considered. While local governments are authorized to spend about 80% of public
works, or V25 trillion5 , large-scale GCs (general contractors) can and do rarely participate
in local works despite the huge scale of local construction market. This is because most
of the contract prices of local governments' construction orders are less than
V100,000,000 6 and the Kankoju-ho (Public Procurement Act) regulates that local small
to medium-sized firms are guaranteed in total to contract some 40% of the construction
investment in small projects of each local government,
Trends of the Industry Economy
The construction industry in Japan is currently in recession because of Japan's
current economically stagnant situation. The deficient budget of national and local
governments deteriorates the industry economy. The increase of social security expenses
due to aging population is said to prevent the industry's economic recovery as well as
needs for structural reform in public finance in the future.
Although enforcement of the Fiscal Structural Reform Law is currently being
suspended to prioritize counter-cyclical measures, needs for the reform remain the same.
Michikazu Ozawa, managing director of Research Institute of Construction and Economy,
forecasts that spending for public works, on which the construction industry is heavily
relying, will decline by 15% in five years and by another 15% in the next five years.7
Kajima, a major Japanese construction firm, estimates that total construction investments
will decline by 8% in three years. These anticipations urge GCs to renew their strategy,
although it has not necessarily been important for Japanese GCs to structure the business
strategy during the high economic growth period.
4 "PPP projects" are used in this thesis to express the comprehensive context of the private sector
involvement in public works, where the public and private sectors share the risks and responsibilities of the
Vroject.
The national government subsidizes almost half of the local projects, and thus influences local policies.
6 The average contract price would be less than V50 million, assumed from a couple of specific local
government's data.
' Nikkei BP (2000). "Interview," Nikkei Construction, April 28, 2000
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Among other recent issues relevant to the Japanese construction industry are
restructuring of government agencies (Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transport,
National Land Agency, and Hokkaido Development Agency merged into Ministry of
Land Infrastructure and Transport on January 6, 2001), accountability and transparency
movement, public works review, IT strategies, and so on, to which Section 5.1 refers in
the context of the introduction of the Japanese PFI.
Market Changes - Since there are few mega-projects in Japan after the
completion of the Honshu-Shikoku connecting bridges and the Tokyo Trans Bay project
(introduced as the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line project in Chapter 4) in 1998 and 1999
respectively, new and major segments of the market have become environmental and
renewal projects. Thus, these projects are among the main focus of PFI scheme. For
example, disposals treatment plants are always regarded as prospective PFI projects.
F
2.1.2. Delivery Systems
Traditional Bidding Method
In the traditional delivery system, the design-bid-build (DBB) process has been
adopted for most public works. The owner government first initiates a planned project
with its scope by selecting a design firm, then calls for bids on the project, and finally a
successful contractor builds it. In this system, both the design firm and the contractor are
selected as the lowest bidders by price only after the competitive bidding. It is mandatory
for Japanese governmental agencies, for both the national and local levels, to set an
estimated price (the engineer's budget), which works as the maximum price to accept,
and even the lowest bidder cannot be awarded the contract if its bid price is above the
engineer's budget.
In this bidding process, the public sector designates prospective contractors to
participate in the bidding according to their rank, which should match the project. Since
this designation includes subjective factors and the system has been criticized, it was
abandoned in 1993 for the national government's large-scale projects, but it still remains
in the local level and for small projects.
How the traditional delivery system has been working in the real world
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In the traditional DBB process, opaque and invisible cooperation among the
government, design firms (consultants), and GCs is a crucial characteristic for most
major public works projects in the Japanese system. Consultants are first supposed to
design on behalf of the owner (the public sector). GCs have helped consultants/owners in
many cases with or without the nominal fee, expecting to get a superior position in
bidding as is mentioned shortly. The GC's cooperation is ultimately for the GC's own
benefit with the consequence of being awarded the project. The cooperation works also
both for consultants because GCs know better how to build and then can design more
realistically, and for owners because if the GC is finally awarded the project, it relieves
the owner of annoying changes and the fear of an audit. Moreover, public agencies need
to develop and estimate construction means and costs without actual experiences. They
need GCs' help for both developing new technologies and estimating construction costs.
GCs help them with the expectation of being awarded the project in turn. "Dangou,"
called "Adjustment" in the industry, has been working as a reward system in many large-
scale project cases for major GCs in Japan.8 Adjustment has just nurtured the
environment in which the industry has been allowed to be inefficient. 9
GCs make their efforts for research and development (R&D) to accomplish some
development for public projects on their own R&D budget in general, while they try to
get paid or private customers pay GCs for the R&D costs. This is in compliance with the
procurement system, in which GCs don't expect real competition for public projects but
need it for private projects. Achievements of R&D usually contribute to efficiency or
cost reduction of construction projects, or make projects technically or financially
feasible, ultimately resulting in the GC's profit by being awarded the project. What is
important in the context of the industry structure is not only that major GCs have
technological expertise but also they have integrated skills for R&D, considering the
overall concept, design, construction procedure, environmental issues, and financial
consequences.
8 "Adjustment" differs from collusion, by which the awarded price is raised merely for the firms' profits.
Instead, Adjustment cannot raise the awarded price thanks to the engineer's budget, which public agencies
set both as the upper limit of the awarded price and as a reasonable price.
9 Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, ed. (1999). Nihon no Kensetsu Sangyo (The Japanese Construction Industry)
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If delivery systems change, who designs and who researches and develops new
technologies? The questions come from the fact that when some government agency
comes up with a large, somewhat technically difficult project, Japanese major GCs have
helped the government agency by designing it with consideration of construction
procedure, or by developing new tools or equipment, almost for free, expecting getting
awarded the project by Adjustments. If delivery systems change, since the government
might not be able to accomplish a feasible design, the new system should be design-build,
or a BOT kind of system that does not require the public sector to go into detail for
design or R&D.
Are construction works expensive in Japan due to the traditional system?
Construction works are said to be much more expensive in Japan (some argue
about 30% more) compared to the U.S. and European developed nations. This is
probably true, but the main reasons afe not only the inefficiency of the Japanese
construction industry, but also expensive transportation costs and expensive labor and
materials costs, which cannot be controlled by the self-effort of the construction industry.
Additionally, if the comparison is calculated based on national spending power, quite
different consequences are induced that public works prices would be almost same as
those of other developed nations. (Kanemoto, 1999)
Problems in the Industry Related to the Bidding System
The Japanese construction industry involves a lot of problematic aspects, which
closely and historically influence one another, including the traditional bidding system.
Among these are infestation of Adjustments, vague contracts, GCs' substitution for
consultants, GCs' other "free" services for the governments/consultants, the GC
evaluation and ranking system, the engineer's budget system, and so on. Watanabe et al.
analyze the Japanese delivery system by structuring the relations of those aspects with the
premise that every aspect is one of the following three in the implementation of public
works: a restriction, an objective, or a measure to conform with the restrictions or to
attain the objectives. They define that the engineer's budget system is the most important
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restriction among those aspects and one crucial source that generates the problems-
subsisting structure of the Japanese delivery system.' 0
The engineer's budget is a requirement for any public works provided by an old
act called Kaikei-rei (Accounting Act) not only as a budget for the public sector but also
as an upper limit price of an awarded bid. This system requires the public sector to
precisely estimate a project's construction cost performed by standard means and thereby
induces GC's cooperation when both the government and the consultant in charge lack
experiences or capabilities for the cost estimation, as is often the case in major public
works in Japan.
Longtime-adopted subjective designation has made the owner's power absolute
for GCs. GCs have not been able to even decline the bidding opportunity because if GCs
decline the opportunity despite the owner's designation, they may be eliminated from the
designation list of succeeding biddings. GCs have been accepting almost any additional
orders from the government, which are often not specified in the contract, because of the
fear of the absolute power. In turn, the government has usually agreed to pay for changes
that are not necessarily caused from unforeseeable events but otherwise would seriously
damage the GC, with strategically devised reasons. This Japanese-like collaborative
relationship has long prevented GCs from being exposed to associated risks and
managing them as well as from performing and structuring efficiently and effectively.
Value Engineering
Three kinds of value engineering (VE) procurement methods have been tried in
Japan since 1997 - VE in design, VE in bidding, and VE after contract, with which the
private sector may propose alternative designs or construction means. However, VE has
not been common for several reasons. In the Japanese contract system, VE tends to
benefit only the owners; the public sector owners dislike changes because the owners
need to explain the consequences to the audit, which they fear; VE wastes time of the
individuals in the public sector, who are not really rewarded personally in the Japanese
'0 Watanabe, Ozawa, and Kunishima (1996). "Structural Analysis on Implementation Process of Japanese
Public Works from the Viewpoints of Cost, Quality, and Technology Development," Proceedings of 141h
Conference on Construction Management Issues, Japan Society of Civil Engineers
" Most GCs, however, have been struggling with streamlining themselves in recent years and some have
achieved more efficient performance than ever.
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seniority system; and both GCs and site managers of GCs have been evaluated by the
revenues they obtain rather than the profits, while VE basically reduces construction
costs, or revenues for GCs. Nevertheless, some trial cases show advantages for cost
reduction or the improvement of value for money (VFM), particularly in VE in design
with up to 26% cost reduction. Also, VE in bidding with design-build proposals has the
potential to improve the value for money of the project, provided that the bidding GCs
have large enough incentive to intentionally examine various alternatives and ideas with
substantial costs to do so.' 2
2.1.3. Government's Role
There is a so-called iron triangle in the Japanese construction industry: Among
politicians, governments, and GCs including small firms, politicians control governments
with their personnel power, governments control GCs with their contract power, and
GCs/small firms have power over politicians with their potentials to collect votes (See
Figure 2-1).
Politicians
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Figure 2-1 "Iron Triangle" with Citizens (Source: Kanemoto ed. (1999))
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), as representative of the
national government for the construction industry, may seek for the industry's efficiency
12 Nikkei BP. "Special Feature - Requirements that Make Value Engineering Come up to Surface," Nikkei
Construction, August 11, 2000
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by restructuring the industry, such as reducing the number of construction-relating firms
and introducing alternative delivery methods. Only MLIT has the power to actually alter
the industry system. However, whenever it tries to change something of the delivery
systems, politicians intervenes to prevent it to protect construction firms' survival,
especially for small firms in their election district, from losing their jobs (not from losing
opportunities). So, the number of construction-relating firms has kept growing, and the
inefficiency of the industry has remained at the same level, even though large scale
companies has restructured themselves internally over the past few years.
The budgeting system is a repeatedly raised issue in the industry. Principles of
the fiscal-yearly order and of the complete consumption of annual budget should be
discussed in the context of the industry's inefficiency. The fiscal-yearly order forces the
national and local governments to divide a project into smaller phases so that each
construction contract of the phase can be accomplished within a budget of the fiscal year.
The complete consumption of annual budget represents the system in which the
bureaucrats tend to use up the budget in order to secure the next year's budget of their
field. The two restraints deprive both the public and private sectors of the incentive to
accelerate the construction work and to achieve the cost reduction.
MLIT, however, has recently introduced plenty of policies, such as the Public
Works Contract Act. Act for the Facilitation of the Fair Transaction of Public Works, the
Technology Utilization System for Public Works, and the Policies to Facilitate the
Restructuring of the Construction Industry, to cope with the changing circumstances of
the Japanese economy and the industry's needs. With those policies, MLIT is developing
a competitive environment of the industry to facilitate the GCs', especially major GCs',
efforts toward restructuring, so that the construction companies themselves accelerate the
"reformation of the management and organization" and "intensive alliances."' For
instance, the policies include prioritizing such companies that have technical capabilities,
allowing major GCs to build a joint venture (JV) with one another for non-large-scale
projects, giving advantages to merged or allied companies, and rooting out those firms
that do not have sufficient skills or managerial capabilities.
13 Ministry of Construction (2000): Kensetsu Hakusho (Present Status of Land Construction - A
Construction White Paper)
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2.2. Japanese Construction Companies
This section addresses the profile of the major Japanese construction firms, their
roles in the Japanese construction industry, and problems they face and strategies for the
future. These descriptions and arguments are important when influences of the
implementation of the Japanese PFI and major Japanese construction firms' business
strategies are discussed.
2.2.1. Major Construction Firms (MCFs)
Among more than 600,000 construction firms, only some 50 firms are considered
large-scale with annual sales of more than Y100 billion14 , and only five firms are called
the "Super-major Five" in Japan, which contain Kajima, Taisei, Obayashi, Shimizu, and
Takenaka Corporations (in order of the FY1999 revenue in civil engineering). Although
the Super-major Five comprise only 8% of the total national construction market (only
4% of the total civil engineering market), the first four firms of the five are referred as
major construction firms (MCFs) in many occasions in this thesis since they have been
playing significant roles in the industry and representing the industry well (Takenaka is
not included because it engages little in civil engineering projects or public works).
However, other large-scale GCs, such as Kumagai Gumi and foreign major GCs, are also
sometimes referred as "MCFs" as long as features described in following subsections are
applicable. Also, some features discussed throughout this thesis are not limited to MCFs
but applicable to other large-scale GCs even if "MCFs" is the subject.
Table 2-1 shows the financial data of the four Japanese MCFs. All of the four
companies have been aggressively streamlining their organizations and improving the
financial robustness for these five years. For example, Kajima decreased the number of
employees by 963 (8%) during FY1999 alone, and the others also have decreased the
number of employees by approximately 20 to 30% for the five-year period. Shimizu has
reduced the burden of interest-bearing liabilities by Y200 billion during FY1999 alone,
and Taisei has reduced interest-bearing liabilities by 38% for the five years and is
planning to further reduce them by another 30% in the next three years.
14 For the purpose of convenience, V100 = US$ 0.792, or US$1 = V126, as of March 31, 2001
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Table 2-1 Financial Data of the Four Japanese MCFs in FY1999 15
(Source: "Business Report," Nikkei Construction, June 23, 2000)
in millions of yen*'
Kajima Taisei Obayashi Shimizu
Revenues
Civil Engineering 355,934 303,720 301,851 232,496
Buildings 741,674 862,421 738,569 991,410
Total* 2  1,174,910 1,244,697 1,074,666 1,262,945
Gross Profit Margin
Civil Engineering 13.7% 11.0% 13.5% 9.9%
Buildings 8.1% 10.6% 8.8% 9.3%
Total in Construction 9.9% 10.5% 10.2% 9.4%
Selling, General and 77,921 96,404 84,495 80,769Administrative Expenses (6.6%) (7.7%) (7.9%) (6.4%)(SGA/Revenues)
Operating Income 39,361 35,691 24,884 36,046
Net Income (Loss)*3  7,632 (78,195) 4,941 8,110
Equity/Total Asset Ratio 10.7% 13.6% 18.3% 11.9%
Interest-bearing Liabilities 568,807 559,477 367,093 593,606
Consolidated Interest- 771,900 966,300 589,000 797,400
bearing Liabilities* 4  4720,000 4 840,000 -> 530,000 4 590,000
Liabilities on Guarantee 210,884 55,162 205,138 5,155
Net Interest Payment 4,590 6,140 (130) 4,030
Number of Employees 11,664 11,525 11,410 10,822
(Decrease from Last Year) (963) (574) (323) (f-)*f
US$1 = V126 as of March 31, 2001 (US$1 =V106 as of March 31, 2000).
*2 Total revenue includes revenue from real estate and other operations.
*3 For the net income, not only interest and taxes but also the write-down of real estate and other, the
valuation loss on investments in subsidiaries and affiliates, the provision for doubtful accounts, and
the provision for severance payments are subtracted from the operating income to a significant
amount. This reflects the changes of the accounting system toward the international accounting
system; however, the accounting policies are still different among companies. For example, Taisei
appropriated V28,073 million for the write-down of real estate and other and Y36,638 million for
the provision for severance payments, while Kajima set such adjustments in the previous years.
* Figures are cited from several newspapers and shown as of March 31, 2000 actual + March 31,
2001 forecast.
*5 less than 323
15 Figures in the table are from the non-consolidated financial statements of each company. Kajima,
Obayashi, and Shimizu are generally assumed financially robust because the Interest-bearing Liabilities/
Revenues ratios of consolidated data are roughly below 40%, while that of Taisei is about 48%.
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2.2.2. Major Construction Firms' Roles
MCFs are playing crucial roles in the Japanese construction industry. Each of
them has more than 10,000 employees, around Y10 billion R&D budget per annum, and
some 100 engineers in-house design divisions, even after the recent significant reduction
of those numbers. They are involved in all major domestic construction projects as main
contractors. Only MCFs have both knowledge and experiences of all of design,
construction, and R&D, and this makes MCFs possible to develop technically difficult
projects with capability to take completion risks in such projects.
MCFs have helped governments and consultants almost for free, yet with adding
part of the fee to their bidding price, where Adjustment works, as mentioned in the
foregoing section. In return, governments protect MCFs from exposing into real
competitions and risks. Some call this feature "Japanese partnering and VE" (Kanemoto
ed., 1999).16
2.2.3. Problems and Strategies of the GCs
Financial status of construction companies and corporate strategies
The financial status of some construction companies looks problematic with huge
long-term/short-term debt, while that of others seems quite robust. Many GCs invested a
lot of money in land and buildings in the "bubble" era, expecting that those land and
buildings would be developed and thereby produce much more value than the
investments. Sometimes they intended to develop the land and buildings for themselves
to get profits from the generated construction work. However, once the "bubble"
collapsed, those investments turned to doubtful accounts, which might not be returned.
Japanese construction companies are now trying to restructure their organization and
financial structure by reducing the number of the employees, by operating more
efficiently, by shedding unprofitable subsidiaries, and by carefully assessing risks
involved in development projects.
Stock prices of construction companies dropped significantly after the "bubble
collapse." The so-called financial "big bang" caused commercial banks to more strictly
16 Yet, it is not necessarily true in the current industry circumstance.
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select the companies in which they would continue to invest (more accurately, with
which they would continue to cooperate). Construction companies were the first and
main targets for them to stop investing because of their poor financial status and the low
growth expectations of the industry. As a result, several medium-sized firms went into
bankruptcy, causing further disinvestments in construction firms. Whether the stock
price of a construction firm has decreased a lot or only nominally is more dependent on
how much the company has invested in the bubble of land and buildings than on how
profitably it is operating its core construction business.
GC's international construction strategy
Since GCs are not efficient enough because they are not used to real competitions,
they mostly have lost "real" international competitive biddings. Although Japanese GCs
have undertaken a huge amount of construction work abroad, most of them have been
projects with Japanese government grant or invested facilities of Japan-based companies.
Also, they are still so conservative that they cannot help adding too much premium on
their bids because they have experienced losses in the past, although, of course, this
varies with the companies. Some have had successful experiences in overseas build-
operate-transfer (BOT) projects, which are to be also investigated in this thesis.
Why no M&A happens in the Industry
No major M&A (merger and acquisition) has happened in the Japanese
constiuction industry. M&A requires absolute efficiency of the business, which is the
weakness of the Japanese construction industry. In this industry, even if two major
companies merge or align, because indirect costs are mostly generated in each
construction site, those costs increase proportionally. Consequently, improvement of
efficiency cannot be expected as much as in other industries such as financial institutions
and manufacturers.
Another more characteristic reason exists for this regard. In the Japanese bidding
system, government agencies have designated some 5 to 10 preferred GCs depending
upon the project size, followed by those contractors' bidding. The designating procedure
is not apparent, but basically it aims to equalize opportunities within the same rank
groups defined by the scale, such as revenues and the number of employees. Hence, if
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two GCs in the same top category merge, the new GC would have half of the number of
the opportunities the two companies would otherwise obtain.17
17 To facilitate the restructuring of the industry, or M&As among GCs, MLIT will introduce a policy by
which those GCs with weak financial status need to meet additional restrictions to bid large-scale national
projects in the near future.
33
2.3. Delivery Systems and Project Finance Abroad
As the background of the development of this thesis, delivery systems and, in
particular, project finance outside Japan should be observed. While developing countries
have been eager to adopt privately financed project delivery system like the BOT scheme,
this section looks at those in the United States and the United Kingdom because of the
similarity of the risk profiles of projects with those in Japan.
2.3.1. Privately Financed Projects
Plenty of examples that are financed privately and packaged design-build-operate
altogether, that is, DBFO (design-build-finance-operate) or BOT experiences, exist
outside Japan. Some of those have been well organized and have succeeded; others have
not. Toll road/bridge/tunnel projects are the special interest of this thesis, and so are PPP
projects in general.18 Both in rapidly developing countries, such as Southeast Asian
countries, and in developed countries, such as in North American and European countries,
there are a substantial number of PPP projects including quite different kinds of risks,
from which various data are collected. It is important to analyze some of these projects
and to examine how public infrastructure delivery systems, among which this thesis
includes the American and the British ones, have been changed and expanded, just
advancing Japanese construction circumstance.
After the outlook of the trends in delivery systems in the U.S. and in the U.K.,
Chapter 4 describes case studies, which shed light on project scheme, project financing,
risk evaluation and allocation, and roles and the strategic position of construction
companies in project consortia. Cases include Canadian and Australian privately
financed projects as well as those in the U.S., in the U.K., and in Japan. For example, in
the Confederation Bridge project, which was delivered under DBFO method, the
Canadian government partially subsidized the project as payment equivalent to the ferry
service expenses, which was terminated upon the bridge's operation. A variety of risks
are well mitigated between the consortium and the government through various
agreements, insurances, bond terms, and all other contracts. The construction companies
18 PPP (public-private partnership) is briefly explained in footnote 4.
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in the consortium dramatically reduced its construction cost by their design-build
cooperation and R&D efforts, which had brought about the success.
2.3.2. Trends in Delivery Systems in the U.S.
America's infrastructure holdings are currently worth about 10 trillion dollars, of
which two-thirds are held by the private sector, and 85 % of the remaining one-third are
held by the state or local public.19 Construction market in 2000 in the U.S. was $819
billion (cf. Y67.1 trillion in Japan in FY1999, or $633 billion at the rate of V106/US$1).20
The trend of the market in the U.S. has been relatively steady and the market has
expanded for nine consecutive years. Residential construction is the largest market
(46%), and transportation work has increased due to a new federal legislation
(Transportation Equity Act for the 2 1 t Century) that increases funding for transportation
work by 44% over the six years.
The American public infrastructure delivery system has been changing over the
long (for two hundred years) and short (for a decade) time span. The traditional delivery
system in the U.S. is the Design-Bid-Build (DBB) method, just as in Japan. 2 It has been
working well and differently from Japan's in that contracts are very elaborate and
arbitration systems are well established, and that engineers (equivalent to Japan's
consultants) have a firm respected status as an independent profession. However, as
conflicts and lawsuits among the owner, the engineer, and the contractor become more
common, and as the owner's incentives become more diverse, new delivery methods
have come to be considered. Now construction management (CM), design-build (DB)
contracts, and BOT schemes are much more common than ever throughout the country.
Since those innovative delivery methods are still quite new for many owners, there
remain lively arguments about delivery systems in both academia and industry.
Miller found ten fundamental elements that must be incorporated into
infrastructure development to properly balance the respective interests of governments,
19 Miller, John B. (1999): Construction Project Delivery Systems, Public/Private Infrastructure, MIT
20 ENR (2000): "A Look at a $3.4-Trillion Market," ENR, Vol. 245 No. 22
2 ENR (1998): "A $3.2-Trillion World Market," ENR, Vol. 241, No. 21
22 The Japanese construction circumstance has lately been following the same trends with more rapid pace.
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taxpayers, users, and industry through his research and many case studies of significant
recent projects in North America where Design-Build-Operate and Design-Build-
Finance-Operate were used. The ten fundamental elements, which are also suggestive to
Japanese new infrastructure delivery system, are as follows (Miller, 1999):
- Government-Defined Scope
- Head-to-Head Competition
- Fair Treatment of Actual Competitors
- Transparency (or Fair Treatment of Potential Competitors)
- Safety Confirmed (or an Independent Engineering Peer Review)
- Open to Technological Change: strategies that permit and encourage new
technologies
- Financial Analysis over the Project Life Cycle
- Restoration of a Dual Track Strategy: simultaneous use of direct and indirect
financing strategies
- A Scenario Approach to Capital Programming, and
- Pace: a new focus upon the level of investment of governments
2.3.3. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the U.K.
Before the introduction of the PFI in the U.K., the delivery system in the U.K. had
been also the DBB type, namely, the public agency designates an architect/engineer, then
selects a contractor by a competitive bid, and after the completion, operates under the
responsibility of the public agency. The public facility was financed by the public funds.
The preliminary approach toward the PFI was begun (not so named yet) in the
United Kingdom by the Thatcher government, which adopted "small government" as its
slogan. The Major government, which succeeded the Thatcher government in 1990,
introduced the way of thinking of the Value for Money and first proposed the PFI in 1992.
The Blair government of the Labour Party has been trying to improve the PFI scheme.
For example, the Treasury Taskforce was established as one of the recommendations of
Bates review in 1997 and has roles such as providing guidelines for the PFI and
arrangements of projects. PFI projects now accounts for 20% of total public works in the
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U.K. Main driving forces of the PFI for the British government are 1) value for money
(VFM), 2) infrastructure needs, 3) risk mitigation, 4) debt saving, 5) reduction of
responsibilities of the government, 6) philosophical reasons, and 7) the innovation
expectation. Among the seven, 1) VFM and 5) & 6) Philosophy of "the small
Government" were crucial in the U.K.
The British PFI contains the following three types:
1) Services sold to the public sector type, in which the private sector finances, designs,
builds, operates, and provides services to the public sector such as hospitals,
prisons, and roads, for which the public sector pay to the private sector. To date
this type of PFI activity has been the primary focus.
2) Financiallyfree standing projects type, where the private sector supplier designs,
builds, finances and then operates an asset, recovering costs entirely through direct
charges on the private users of the asset (e.g. tolling) rather than from payments by
the public sector. Public sector involvement is limited to enabling the project to go
ahead through assistance with planning, licensing and other statutory procedures.
There is no government contribution or acceptance of risk beyond this point and
any government customer for the specific service is charged at the full commercial
rate, and
3) Joint ventures type, where the costs of the project are not met entirely through
charges on the end users but are subsidized from public funds. In many cases, the
public sector subsidy secures wider social benefits not reflected in project cash
flows (e.g. reduced congestion, economic regeneration). However, there could also
be service benefits (e.g. from a shared facility) or direct financial rewards. The
subsidy can take a number of forms, but the government role is limited to a
contribution to asset development. Operational control rests with the private sector.
The basic concept of the PFI is that the public sector sets the level of services and
the private sector provides the services and operates the necessary facilities. Different
from mere privatization, the public sector retains an important role in the PFI.
23 Japan Project-Industry Council (1998): Eikoku ovobi Osutoraria no PFI iigyo ni okeru Seifu to Minkan
-Jigyosha tono Kankei ni tsuite (Public-Private Relationship in British and Australian PFI Projects), JAPIC
24 The Treasury Taskforce, U.K. (1997): Partnerships for Prosperity
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2.4. Other Relevant Issues
This thesis describes some important issues as the background in different
sections as shown below in order to closely position the relevant background with the
topic of each section.
Public-Private Partnership Environment Section 3.1
The Japanese PFI Section 3.2
Risk Types (in Toll Road Projects) Section 4.1.2
Japan's Construction Industry Sections 2.1, 2.2, 5.1.1
Japan's Economy Section 5.1.2
Toll Road System in Japan Section 5.2
Utility Function Theory Section 6.1.3
Portfolio Management Theory Section 6.1.4
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Chapter 3. Introduction of the Japanese PFI
This chapter describes the PFI (Private Finance Initiative) in Japan and its
characteristics in general. The Japanese PFI was recently introduced to contribute to the
efficient and effective development of infrastructure and thereby to the robust
development of Japan's economy by means of encouragement to utilize the private
sector's financial, managerial, and technical capabilities for the construction,
maintenance, and operation of public facilities, including planning for them (The PFI Act,
1999). However, the national government represented by the MLIT (Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport) does not seem to be highly motivated, and in fact, there has
been no PFI project, except one, initiated by the national government despite the fact that
some local governments are eager to introduce the PFI scheme into their public facilities
procurement system. Also, there are several concerns and arguments anticipated or found
from some pioneer cases, such as governmental participation including financial supports,
time consuming preparation for the agreements, various regulatory restrictions, and so on.
This chapter is limited to the description of basic facts and characteristics of the Japanese
PFI, while further analyses, such as comparisons with many other delivery systems both
in Japan and abroad, risk arrangements, and financial structuring with the perspective of
the current Japanese construction industry, are discussed in Chapter 5.
3. 1. Public-Private Partnership Environment in Japan
Before entering into the Japanese PFI, it is useful to understand the environment
in which the PFI was introduced. Brief descriptions of public-private partnership and
project financing in Japan follow.
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3.1.1. Public-Private Partnership in Japan
PPP (public-private partnership), in a broad sense, has been well established in
Japanese culture. The public sector always controls and protects the private sector, and
the private sector always obeys the public sector through loosely worded contracts.
When PPP projects are defined as those projects that both the public and private
sectors are involved in planning and financing, the only type of delivery system is the
experiences of the third sector projects, where both public and private sectors capitalize
the "third sector" and cooperate together to plan, design, build, finance, and operate the
projects. The third sector projects in Japan are regarded as having failed in general, and
actually many of them went bankrupt for the following reasons: Contracts between the
two sectors were incomplete and neither sector identified cases of downside scenarios;
participants expected the government to be responsible for any financial deficit with no
written contract, and it actually was; and no one cared about potential risks, especially
market risks, and risk allocation. Accordingly, no party had incentives to keep within its
original budget and to establish a business plan for those projects.
Given this PPP situation, the Japanese PFI has been recently launched in order to,
among other aims, utilize the private sector's financial resources, managerial skills, and
technical capabilities. PFI originates in the U.K., as mentioned in Chapter 2, and has
been applied to public infrastruciures such as roads, bridges, hospitals, government
offices, jails, and also even systems design.
3.1.2. Project Finance in Japan
Characteristics of Project Finance
Definition of "projectfinance" is the finance for a specific project, whose sources
of repayment of capital and interest are limited to cash flows generated in the project, and
whose collaterals are limited to the assets of the project.' The non-recourse or limited-
recourse financing is one of the most significant characteristics of project finance with
which financing institutions are on the same boat, or the "project," with the project
company. In other words, the project company and, in general, the financiers cannot
1 Ohara, Katsuma (1997): Purojekuto Fainansu (Project Finance), Kin-zai
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require the parent companies to repay the debt. From the perspective of the parent
company, the project financing prevents the company from being exposed to the financial
risks that affect its balance sheet (i.e., off-balance), except for the initial equity
contribution to the project. The collateral of the project financing is, in practice, the
summation of cash flows of the project, that is, project financing is cash flow lending.
Project finance is also a structured finance, with which every participant
proactively structures the project through a variety of contracts, which properly allocate
surrounding risks. Throughout the negotiation process of risk sharing and conditioning
of a project, project financing is structured as a consequence of diverse and dynamic
process for sponsors and lenders, together with respective advisors, with tremendous
amendments of both project and financial structures. One of such structure requirements
is that a project company ("undertaker")2 should be a single purpose company (SPC) so
that the financed project does not include additional uncertainties of multiple projects.
Financial Institution 's Perspective
Lender's incentives for project financing are the following four: a requisite
function for international wholesale banks, clarification of risks (a borrower must be an
SPC and must report cash flows more strictly), high profitability, and a competitive
advantage in the marketplace. Terms and conditions of project financing schemes are set
partly as follows.
Finance Conditions: Interest rates are expressed as LIBOR (London Inter Bank
Offered Rate) plus spread or a rate of a specific national bond plus spread. The lender
sets a yield by adding upfront fees and agent fees to the interest spread in order to make
the finance more profitable and to invite other financial institutions attractively for the
syndicate. Pricing, or the yield, is dependent on the lender's expected return-on-equity
(ROE) and policy on risk management. Pricing experiences for past deals (same kind,
same scale projects) are the base indexes.
Legal Aspects and Agreements: A project company has some restrictions, such as
those about additional borrowing from other financial institutions but the lenders,
2 Terms, "project company" and "undertaker," are both used in this thesis for a private entity that is
responsible for the overall practical implementation of a public facility. "Undertaker" is especially used for
the term of the provision of the PFI Act, while "project company" is used in more general occasions.
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additional investment, production schedule, and a variety of covenants ("must do" and
"mustn't do"). The lender retains the right to control assets of the project in case of
default, which include not only fixed assets such as production plants but account
receivables, cash flows, the concession agreement in BOT projects, rights to use its
infrastructure, and so on. The lender may have senior position against a third party as
collateral, and control of sales agreement.
Project Financing in Japan
PPP projects are financed by several kinds of financial schemes in Japan.
However, none of the scheme is project financing except for few recent experiences, but
every financial scheme for the PPP project uses some sort of government budgets from
taxes or other resources. The so-called third sector project, e.g., the Trans Tokyo Bay
Highway, is one of the types of PPP financial schemes, but few projects of this type were
successful as mentioned a little earlier.
While Japanese financial institutions have experiences in project financing, few
major construction companies have ever been involved in project finance opportunities.
And both the financial institutions' and the few construction companies' experiences
were outside Japan. It is necessary to understand and address why project financing has
not been familiar in Japan and among Japanese construction firms, what lessons we have
learned from a number of failures in the third sector delivery method, and what real
trends of project financing exist in Japan. It might be helpful to take into consideration
financing for other projects than public infrastructure construction projects. Such
projects as establishments of factories/plants for automobile/chemical companies require
additional financing for their construction, where corporate finance rather than project
finance is always used in Japan. This might be related to the Japanese business tradition,
e.g., the inter-dependence of shareholding between the project company and its main
banks to keep a good relationship between the two. It is also necessary to recognize that
the public sector and many major private companies such as railroad companies and
electricity companies do project finance in some sense.
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3.2. The Japanese Private Finance Initiative
The PFI Act was promulgated in July 1999 and enforced in September 1999.
The main objective of this law was originally to promote new business in order to recover
from serious economic recession. The PFI in Japan is a new delivery method, by which
public facilities are built, maintained, and operated with the private sector's financial,
managerial, and technical capabilities. If a public service is provided more efficiently
and more effectively by utilizing the private finance, management, and technical
capabilities than by the public agency, then the PFI method will be adopted. With the
PFI, higher VFM is expected. The Basic Policies were determined and published by the
Prime Minister on March 13, 2000 as a framework to implement any individual PFI
project. "Guidelines," detailed implementation policies based on the Basic Policies, must
be established in compliance with the Act. "The Guideline for the Implementation
Process of the PFI Project" and "The Guideline for Risk Allocation of the PFI Project"
were published on January 22, 2001, although "The Guideline for the Evaluation of the
VFM (Value for Money) of the PFI Project," the last Guideline, has not yet published as
of April 30, 2001.
3.2.1. The PFI Act
The following is the outline of the PFI Act. 3 Numbers represent the actual article
number of the Act. More concrete, detail framework of the contents described in the Act
is included in the "Basic Policies" section. Distinctive features of the Act, compared to
current delivery systems in Japan, include the establishment of an independent committee,
the publication of the process throughout the selection of the project, the obligation of the
resolution of diets, risk allocations written in the contract, and the direct agreement
concept.
1. Objective: This Act aims to contribute to the efficient and effective development of
infrastructure and thereby to the robust development of Japan's economy by means of
encouragement to utilize the private sector's financial, managerial, and technical
3 Japan (1999): "Minkan Shikin tou no Katsuyo ni yoru Kokyo Shisetsu tou no Seibi tou no Sokushin ni
kansuru Horitsu (PFI Act)," Law 1999 No.117
Terms in English are not official. The government does not provide official translations into English.
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capabilities for the construction, maintenance, and operation of public facilities, including
planning for them.
2. Definition: Public facilities include the following: 1) infrastructures such as roads,
railways, ports, airports, rivers, parks, waterworks, sewerage, industrial water, and so on;
2) official facilities such as government office buildings, quarters, and so on; 3) facilities
for the public welfare such as public housing and educational or cultural facilities, waste
treatment plants, medical facilities, social welfare facilities, rehabilitation facilities and
asylums, public parking garages, underground shopping arcades, and so on; and 4)
telecommunication facilities, heat supply facilities, new energy facilities, recycling
facilities, tourist attractions, and research facilities.
The specific project is the development of public facilities (construction,
maintenance, operation, or planning for them, including services supplies) that can be
done efficiently and effectively by utilizing the private sector's financial, managerial, and
technical capabilities.
The managing agency is: 1) the minister who is the manager of the public
facility or the specified project, 2) the governor or mayor who is the manager of the
public facility or the specified project, or 3) the special corporation or the public
corporation that develops the public facility.
The PI project is the specific project selected in compliance with Article 6
The undertaker is the entity that is selected as the undertaker of the PFI project
in compliance with Article 7.
3. Basic Philosophy: Public facilities development projects should be commended to the
private sector entities as much as possible if the public facility is suitable to the private
sector because, for example, the cash flows of the project suffice for the cost, taking into
consideration the appropriate role sharing between the government and the private sector
and efficient use of financial resources.
For the specific projects, the national or local government and the private undertaker shall
clarify the responsibility allocation, and reasonable price and excellent services shall be
provided to the citizens with the private sector undertaker's full exercise of its technique,
managerial resources, and ideas by minimizing the government's participation.
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4. Basic Policies: The prime minister shall prescribe the Basic Policies for the
implementation of the specific projects in compliance with the Basic Philosophy. The
Basic Policies shall provide basic matters regarding the following topics: 1) the selection
of the specific projects, 2) the invitation and the selection of the private sector undertaker,
3) fair and certain implementation of the project, including the clarification of the
responsibilities of the private sector undertaker, and 4) the legal and taxation support and
the financial and monetary assistance provided to the undertaker.
5. Implementation Policies: The managing agency shall stipulate the Implementation
Policies in compliance with the Basic Policies in selecting a PFI project in Article 6 or a
private sector undertaker in Article 7.
Implementation Policies concretely stipulate: 1) the selection of the specific projects, 2)
the invitation and the selection of the private sector undertaker, 3) fair and certain
implementation of the project, including the clarification of the responsibilities of the
private sector undertaker, 4) location, scale, and distribution of public facilities, 5) the
resolution policy in the case of uncertainties about the business plan or agreements, 6) the
resolution policy in the case of difficulties to continue the project, and 7) the legal and
taxation support and the financial and monetary assistance
6. The Selection of the PFI Project: The managing agency may select the PFI project in
compliance with the Basic Policies and the Implementation Policies.
7. The Selection of the Private Undertaker: The managing agency selects the private
undertaker.
8. Objective Evaluation: The managing agency shall make an objective evaluation in
selecting the specific project and the undertaker, and announce the results.
9. Local Council's Vote: Local governments shall pass the local council's vote to contract a
specific project that meets the criteria stipulated in the government ordinance.
10. Implementation of the PI Project: PFI project shall be proceeded in compliance with
the business plan or the agreements prepared by the managing agency and the undertaker
based on the Basic Policies and the Implementation Policies.
When the undertaker is partially sponsored by a public agency, the business plan or the
agreement shall clarify the allocation of the responsibilities between the managing
agency and the undertaker.
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11. Debt Payment of the National Government: If the national government pays for debt of a
PFI project, the payment shall continue for no more than 30 years.
12. Use of Public Landfor Free of Charge: The national and local governments may lend
public land for the use of the PFI project for free or at a lower price than the market price.
13. Non-Interest Lending: The national government may lend money without charging
interest from the budget. It may utilize a governmental financial institution, such as the
Development Bank of Japan.
14. Reservation of Funds and Consideration of Local Bonds: The national and local
governments strive to reserve or accommodate necessary funds for the PFI projects, or to
specially consider local bonds.
15. Consideration of Acquisition: Proper consideration with regard to land acquisition for the
PFI project is given so that the undertaker can acquire and use the land without
difficulties.
16. Supports: The national and local governments shall provide the legal and taxation
support and the financial and monetary assistance as needed, reflecting the Basic Policies
and the Implementation Policies.
17. Deregulationi: The national and local governments shall encourage the deregulation in
order to facilitate the implementation of the PFI projects.
18. Cooperatioan: The national and local governments and the private undertaker shall
cooperate one another to facilitate the implementation of the PFI projects.
19. Enlightenment and Technical Assistance: The national and local governments promote
enlightenment activities for the public and consider the technical assistance for the
private sector such as the coordination of the use of patents.
20. Utilization of Collateral Real Estate: If the undertaker utilize a collateralized real estate,
and if the real estate incurs loss, the pertinent companies may capitalize the loss in the
equity part of the balance sheet, which shall be depreciated within ten years.
21. The PFI Committee: The PFI Committee investigates and deliberates on PFI projects.
The Committee may advise and hear from the governors and the mayors.
22. Organization of the Committee: The committee consists of nine members appointed by
the prime minister.
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23. Authorization to the Government Ordinance: The government ordinance stipulates other
requirements to give effect to the Act.
3.2.2. The Basic Policies4
The Basic Policies stipulate in the preamble that potential effects of the
implementation of the PFI and the objectives of the PFI Act are the following three points.
First, the PFI is expected to provide less expensive and quality public services. This
includes helping both the national and local governments restructure the financial status,
utilizing the private sector's managerial skills and technical capabilities for the public
facilities, managing risks efficiently, and combining some or all of the design-build-
maintain-operate steps and thereby easing the financial obligation of the projects.
Second, the public sector's style of involvement in the implementation of the
public services will be reformed. As private undertakers take over the roles of the public
agencies, a new public-private partnership formation is expected on the basis of the
proper role sharing.
Third, creating business opportunities for the private sector boosts Japan's
stagnant economy. The new business opportunities include the PFI projects themselves,
the combination with other profitable projects surrounding the PFI projects, and the new
financing market, which will be introduced by adopting project finance as the financing
method for the PFI projects. As a result, the creation of new businesses and the
promotion of economic structural reformation are also expected.
The Basic Policies articulate five fundamental rules and three basic principles of
the PFI projects to achieve the basic philosophy and the expected outcome. PFI projects
are required to have the following attributes:
1) The public use rule: making projects into public facilities;
2) The private resources utilization rule: utilizing the private sector's financial,
managerial, and technological resources;
3) The efficiency rule: making use of the private sector's autonomy and creativity;
4 Cabinet Office, Japan (2000): Minkan Shikin tou no Katsuyo ni yoru Kokyo Shisetsu tou no Seibi tou ni
kansuru Jigyo no Jisshi ni kansuru Kihon Hoshin (The PFI Basic Policies)
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4) The justice rule: ensuring fairness in selecting a project or an undertaker; and
5) The transparency rule: making the whole process visible to the public.
In implementing the projects, they should follow several principles:
1) The objectiveness principle: ensuring objectivity in the evaluations and
decisions for the implementation of the PFI;
2) The contract principle: providing explicit contracts to define roles and
responsibilities of the participants; and
3) The independence principle: Assuring the undertaker's independence of other
business contracts.
The managing agency is expected to try to procure as private projects any public
facilities that would contribute to the efficiency of the finance or the improvement of the
public services by implementing them privately. Figure 3-1 shows interactions among
the public agency, the private undertaker, and citizens in the Japanese PFI scheme.
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Figure 3-1 Interactions among Public Agency, Private Undertaker, and Citizens in the PFI Scheme
The Basic Policies also prescribe necessary concerns for each step of the process
of PFI projects as Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1 Prescriptions of the Basic Policies for Necessary Considerations
A. Selection of the Specific Project
Step Public Agency's Responsibilities
(1a. Proposal from a - Preparation for administration and evaluation of proposals from
Private Entity) private entities
1. Proposal of a Project - Examination of the project to implement as a PFI and adoption of
proposals from private entities
- Prioritization of the projects that fit better as PFIs and have more
potential needs of the citizens
2. Formulation and - Early formulation and announcement of the implementation
Announcement of the policies with fairness and transparency
Implementation Policies - Concreteness of the contents and acceptance of general progress
of the policies
- Clarifying the public agency's participation, potential risksr and
likely allocation of the risks
- Clarifying necessary approvals, the extent of the maintenance and
operation of the public facilities, and adaptable subsidies and
financing
3. Evaluation, Selection, - Minimum standard for the attainment of more efficient and more
and Announcement of the effective procurement of public services by the PFI
PFI Project - Evaluation of the public expenses with net present value in
calculating value for money
- Quantitative evaluation principle and qualitative evaluation with
objectiveness if the quantification is difficult
- Retaining transparency in announcing the selection
B. Invitation and Selection of the Private Undertaker
Step Public Agency's Responsibilities
4. Evaluation, Selection, - Guarantee of the competitive environment and ensured
and Announcement of the transparency of the process
Private Undertaker - Regard for the exertion of the private entity's ingenuity, regard for
sufficient time to prepare the proposal
- Securing objectivity of evaluation criteria for the "overall
judgment," if applied
- Consciousness of performance-based order
- Fair provision of information to private entity's questions
(Continue)
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(Continued)
Step Public Agency and PFI Undertaker's Responsibilities
5. Agreement - Abiding by the agreement and its disclosure
" Concrete and explicit arrangement of each party's rights
and obligations
* Provisions for the guarantee of adequate public services
" Surveillance of the level of public services
* Reports of the state of the operation and finance
" Independent experts' investigation and report
" Nominal participation of the public agency to secure safety
and preserve environment
" Clarification of the risk allocation with regard to
appropriate risk distribution and clarification of the
treatment of risk mitigation and hedging
" Concrete and explicit provisions about the termination of
the contract in case of difficulties
* Concrete and explicit provisions in case of problems arising
in interpreting the agreement
C. Implementation of the PFI Project
Step I Public Agency and PFI Undertaker's Responsibilities
6. Implementation of the - Implementation of the project in compliance with the agreement
Project, Surveillance 
- Surveillance of the level of the public services
7. Termination of the - Actual treatment in compliance with the agreement
Project
3.2.3. The PFI Guidelines
"The PFI Guidelines," detailed implementation policies of the PFI projects based
on the Basic Policies, must be established in compliance with the Act. The Guidelines
contain three parts: one for the implementation process, one for the risk allocation, and
one for the evaluation of the VFM. "The Guideline for the Implementation Process of the
PFI Project," which outlines the flow of the series of the implementation procedure and
addresses matters of concern in the process, and "The Guideline for Risk Allocation of
the PFI Project," which states points to beware of in arranging risk allocation for the PFI
project, were published on January 22, 2001. "The Guideline for the Evaluation of the
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VFM (Value for Money) of the PFI Project," which will explain the evaluation of the
VFM conducted in selecting the PFI project, is currently being prepared for the
publication as of April 30, 2001.
The PFI Guidelines are the practical guidelines, by which the national agencies
are supposed to implement PFI projects, in compliance with the PFI Act and the Basic
Policies. The Guidelines can also serve as the references for non-national public agencies.
Because PFI projects go into high gear from now, the guidelines may be amended.
The Guideline for the Implementation Process of the PFI Project5
As most features of the guideline are described in various sections of this thesis,
only characteristic contents of the guideline are introduced here. When either the
government or a private entity considers a PFI project, if the project contains purely
private, for-profit facilities, the private facilities should be separated from the PFI project.
Consultants or advisors for the financial, legal, and technical issues may be retained, but
in such cases, it is necessary to secure the credibility for confidentiality and fairness. In
inviting offers and evaluating them, public agencies need to consider reducing the burden
of the tenderers to prepare for the competition by, for example, limiting the final
proposals only to a few pre-qualified consortia. Clearly expressing evaluation criteria is
also important.
The Guideline for Risk Allocation of the PFH Project 6
"The Guideline for Risk Allocation of the PFI Project" describes basic concepts
and policies to manage risks that may occur in the course of the PFI project. The risk
management should proceed by first recognizing the potentials and the sources of the
risks, valuating the influence of the risk, identifying the risk taker for each risk, and
allocating the risk. Risks shall be identified and characterized as much as possible, and
shall be allocated on the basis of "Who could manage the risk best shall bear it."
The guideline is followed by the description of the types of risks and their
examples managed in each stage of the PFI project: investigation and design stage,
acquisition stage, construction stage, maintenance and operation stage, and termination
5 Cabinet Office, Japan (2001): "PFI Jigyo Jisshi Purosesu ni kansuru Gaidorain (The Guideline for the
Implementation Process of the PFI Project)," 6th PFI Committee
6 Cabinet Office, Japan (2001): "PFI Jigyo ni okeru Risuku Buntan tou ni kansuru Gaidorain (The
Guideline for Risk Allocation of the PFI Project)," 6th PFI Committee
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stage, together with common risks that may occur in any of those stages. In principle, the
guideline suggests that characterizing, allocating, and quantifying risks be arranged on
the case-by-case basis because each project has so different aspects in risk profiles that
risk allocation arrangements should be structured based on the attributes of each project.
Detailed discussions regarding each type of the risk and a variety of ways of risk
management, especially surrounding toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, are presented in
Chapters 4 and 5.
The Guideline for the Implementation Process Evaluation of the VFM of the PFI
Project
"The Guideline for the Evaluation of the VFM (Value for Money) of the PFI
Project" consists of following five sections according to a plan of the guideline provided
to the PFI Committee:
(a) The basic idea of VFM evaluation: The selection of the PFI project shall be
based on whether the project can be achieved efficiently and effectively by the private
sector. The VFM of the project is the measurement of the selection decision. That is, if a
privately managed project has higher value regarding its cost than the other project the
public sector would procure, it has higher VFM and is supposed to be implemented as a
PFI project. The evaluation of the VFM is, in essence, the comparison between the
public sector comparator (PSC) and the life cycle cost (LCC) of the prospective PFI
project, each of which is the net present value (NPV) of the financial cost the public
sector would spend for the project, publicly managed or privately managed, respectively.
The VFM should be primarily evaluated for the "Services sold to the public sector"
project, for which the public sector pays all the cost in compensation for the public
services provided. For the "Joint ventures" project and the "Financially free-standing
projects," for which the public sector pays part of or none of the cost of the project, the
evaluation should be based on the efficiency and the effectiveness of the project as a
PFI.
(b) Calculation of the PSC: The PSC is the NPV of the estimated public finance
cost of the project that the public sector is assumed to implement. PSC is calculated
7 The PFI Committee (2001): Materials for the 13th Subcommittee
8 For the description of the three types of the PFI projects, see Section 2.3.3.
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based on the appropriate cash flow projection for the lifetime of the project, and a
prospective formation (e.g., outsourcing) should be assumed. The calculation should
include all accrued costs in design, construction, maintenance, and operation stages.
Risks in these stages and indirect costs are also quantified and included in the PSC.
(c) Calculation of the LCC of the FI project: The PFI project is assumed to be a
single project combining design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the public
facilities. For the use of the comparison with the PSC, collateral facilities should be
excluded from the PFI cash flow. The calculation should be made on a clear basis
backed by the use of a consultant or by the investigation of the market or the similar
experiences.
(d) Instructionsfor the VFM valuation: When some risks of the project are
assigned to the private sector undertaker, these risks should be included in the PSC to
compare to the LCC of the PFI project. Risks that should be included in the PSC are
identified in accordance with "the Guideline for Risk Allocation of the PFI Project." As
a basic concept, risks can be quantified by multiplying the prospective financial cost of
the public sector in the occurrence of the risk and the probability of its occurrence.
Equitable adjustment should be considered both in the PSC and in the LCC of the
PFI project with respect to financial and monetary assistance (by adding it to the LCC of
the PFI project) and taxes (by deducting respective amounts from the PSC and from the
LCC of the PFI project). In converting the cash flow to the NPV, a risk free rate, such as
the rate of the long-term government bond, is applicable as the discount rate. In
summary, the PSC and the LCC of the PFI project are expressed as follows:
PSC = NPVBApsc + RISK - TAXpsc
LCC = NPVBAPFI + AID - TAXPFI
VFM =PSC - LCC
where, NPVBApsc: The net present value of the public financial cost before
adjustments for the publicly managed project
RISK: Costs of the risks that the private sector would assume
TAXpsc: Taxes incurred by outsourcing etc. in the publicly managed project
NPVBAPFI: The net present value of the public financial cost before
adjustments for the PFI project
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AID: Financial and monetary supports by the public agency, such as a
government subsidy
TAXPFI: Taxes incurred by the private sector undertaker in the PFI project
(e) The valuation of the level of public services: In selecting the PFI project,
calculations of the PSC and the LCC of the project should be based on the same level of
services in principle.
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3.3. Each Party's Attitude toward the PFI
The PFI is a new scheme of construction project delivery in Japan, and most
relevant Japanese parties, including the national and local governments, various
consultants, and general contractors, have not experienced the scheme and are shy to be
involved. However, they also recognize that the PFI is the current trend and it may grow
rapidly after some development period of the PFI's scheme as has happened in the U.K.
Though each party, or rather each individual, has different perceptions and different
expectations for the PFI, the general stance of each party could be described as follows.
3.3.1. The MLIT's Stance
The MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport) 9 has established the
"MLIT PFI Promotion Board," chaired by the Undersecretary, to expand the promotion
system in the ministry and has designated PFI consulting staffs in appropriate
departments to meet the needs of the private sector. Furthermore, it has studied four
prospective types of projects (redevelopment of an urban area, urban park facilities, toll
roads, and public housing) to examine the feasibility of the introduction of the PFI. The
MLIT has investigated the cases in light of the project scheme, the selection method of
the private undertaker, and so on.
However, apparently the MLIT wants to maintain its vested rights to control
every public project, so the PFI does not interest the MLIT particularly. For the officials
of the MLIT, promoting the PFI and letting the private sector take over the business of
planning public facilities mean losing their jobs in part. The establishment of the
"Guidelines," which will complement the Basic Policies and make PFI's procedure more
concrete, has been deferred. Although the Cabinet Office is in charge of the guidelines
and the MLIT has been promoting the PFI officially, as mentioned above, in compliance
with the national government's policy, the MLIT has never initiated any PFI project yet.
9 To avoid confusion, the MLIT refers to both the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT)
and the Ministry of Construction (MOC) in this thesis, though the MOC merged into the MLIT with the
Ministry of Transport, the National Land Agency, and the Hokkaido Development Agency on January 6,
2001 and it was the MOC that actually issued "the MLIT's guideline," mentioned shortly.
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The officials of the MLIT state that they are looking for target projects suitable as
model cases, but they are not successful in finding such projects except "road stations"
(service facilities for drivers) and parking garages. Highways are not appropriate to the
PFI or the private projects because highways constitute a tolled network system and a
single portion of the network is inappropriate as a PFI project. This statement seems to
reflect the bureaucrat's prejudice or the view that they could not share the planning
business of the large-scale infrastructure systems with the private sector. In actuality,
moreover, they require the private sector such as construction firms, which may benefit
from the PFI by new business opportunities, to propose target projects, rather than
looking for such projects.' 0
Before the PFI Act was enacted as a representatives' legislation, the MLIT made a
guideline for the prospective Japanese PFI ("MLIT's guideline"), which is obviously the
base of the Basic Policies. The MLIT's guideline emphasizes the effect of the
introduction of the Japanese PFI, which would enable more efficient public infrastructure
developments by utilizing the private sector's technological capabilities, financial
potentials, and managerial skills. It implies the participation of foreign companies,
assuming that Japanese firms are competitive enough. The MLIT's guideline also
addresses the samc three objectives as the Basic Policies, that is, 1) the development of
the public infrastructure with the national and local governments' limited resources by
promoting the private sector's initiative, 2) the reform of the administrative roles by
transferring what the public sector does to the private sector, by benefiting the people
with efficiency, and by being accountable to the people, and 3) the creation of business
opportunities such as the investment in the public infrastructure and project financing,
contributing to the reform of the economic structure in Japan."
Therefore, from the description of the MLIT's guideline and the Basic Policies,
the MLIT, at least officially, intended to stimulate the private sector to take part in the
public businesses and was supposed to transfer some parts of its obligation to the private
sector. Some of the officials are actually aggressive for the movement, by which the
Japanese construction industry can become fair, transparent, and efficient, and thereby
10 This information is derived, in part, from published materials of the PFI Committee.
" Ministry of Construction (1999): "Nihonban PFI no Gaidorain (A Guideline for the Japanese PFI)"
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competitive internationally and attractive to the public. While the MLIT had been trying
to prevent any middle- to large-scale construction firms from going into bankruptcy
because the influence would be larger than that of other industries, given the shrinking
(or slimmed) domestic construction market, the MLIT's current policy aims at the
circumstance where managerially, financially, and technologically robust firms can
appropriately grow in the future slimmed market.
3.3.2. Local Governments' Stance
According to the Nikkei Shimbun's survey of 59 prefectures and major cities, 47
respondents are "considering the possibility of introducing" PFI and 10 "wish to consider
it in the future." However, most of them cited difficulties in measuring costs as a major
factor that slows down the-PFI. Some expressed concerns over the ability of authorities
to handle difficult contract provisions such as risk sharing. One authority commented,
"We are unsure whether or not the national government will provide such projects with
subsidies."' 2
Nevertheless, Kanagawa Prefecture, for example, is aggressively promoting "PFI
like" projects while the national government has been struggling to settle the Guidelines.
Kanagawa Prefecture has set the evaluation committee, containing fixed professional
members, solely for the PFI evaluation. Tokyo Metropolitan Government and several
cities, including middle-sized to small cities, have already contracted with respective
consortia for their pioneer PFI projects. The capability problem of authorities has been
overcome by appropriately adopting financial, legal, and engineering advisory firms.
Many experts predict that when some prototype PFI projects turn out to be successful, the
PFI will obtain popularity as the public facilities delivery system. In the meantime,
however, unless the private sector initiates public facilities projects, most local
governments will be very slow to move towards this innovative system.
12 Nikkei Shimbun (Neewspaper), July 28, 2000
" Nikkei BP (1999): "Special Feature - Work of Civil Engineering 2010," Nikkei Construction, October 8,
1999
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3.3.3. MCFs' Stance
When the first few projects were announced, MCFs aggressively competed with
one another in order to gain the initiative in the future PFI market. They invested initial
costs for planning, design, and administrative issues in the projects and learned much
about the new scheme.
However, since they have little experience with project finance, risk sharing, and
elaborate contract documents, developing a project structure is very time-consuming
work and costs them much more than traditional DBB projects. Hence, they are not
eager to initiate PFI projects by themselves. Their generic stance seems that if a PFI
project appears, they will try it. Also, most MCFs cannot afford to literally invest much
in PFI projects because their first priority is to reinforce the financial strength. Some of
them seek to just participate in the construction portion of PFI projects as they are doing
in the ordinal projects, financially investing up to the project's profit margin.
In around 1999, most Japanese MCFs established the special purpose division for
the PFI within the organization, with some (Taisei, Kumagai) making alliance with
overseas experienced professional consulting companies. The roles of those special
purpose divisions vary depending on the company. For example, Kajima's PFI
Management Office is responsible for collecting information of nationwide PFI projects,
supporting project teams at the branches, and encouraging and instructing other offices
and branches to be aware of the information. In Kajima, project teams at the branches
play main roles for prospective PFI projects as they face the local governments, which
actually make concepts of the projects and initiate them.
Senior management of MCFs, as well as many economists, expects that PFI
projects will substitute for other traditional DBB projects, to some extent, provided the
PFI system will have been developed and stabilized. It seems, however, that current
discussions on the PFI are focusing on the basic problems, such as who may want to
participate in a project, what are the existing alternatives of financing schemes, and what
changes will be expected in terms of legal aspects, rather than managerial and financial
consideration about risk-return management. Some MCFs are very risk-averse because
they had experienced huge financial loss by investing in real estate development projects
about a decade ago and a substantial amount of debt still remains on their balance sheet
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as noted in Chapter 2. Because of this financial weakness, some MCFs seek for such PFI
projects that cost less and are repaid earlier than large scale, long time-span projects.
3.3.4. Consultants' Stance
Generally, consultants have a feeling of crisis for their position in the future
marketplace when the general evaluation method, with which MCFs solely propose both
design and construction means to the public (or private) owners, is broadly adopted in the
delivery system and MCFs supplant them. Some consultants look at the PFI as a new
business opportunity and have researched a lot about the British PFI. Many of the
consultant firms published instructive guidance books for the PFI as sales resources for
the local governments, and some have been successfully involved in the PFI as an
independent engineering advisor for the owner (government).
Consultants may play important roles in the PFI scheme not only as the
independent advisor for the public sector but also as a service provider for the project
company, for the Design-Build contractor, and for the financial syndicate. For instance,
consultants may advise on the feasibility of projects as a PFI and the implementation
process of the project for the public sector, especially for the local governments.
Financial syndicates also need some service providers that evaluate the project risks on
technical matters.
3.3.5. Financial institutions' Stance
Major financial institutions such as commercial banks have enough experiences
and expertise with respect to project finance, risk management, and elaborate contract
documents overseas. They could just apply their knowledge to newly introduced
Japanese PFI projects and actually have already played main roles in current PFI projects.
An investigation shows some opinions of financial institutions1:
1) A PFI project should be assumed profitable enough such that 10 to 15% ROE will be
achieved in 20 years after the commencement.
14 KRI International (1999): O&A Nihonban PFI no Subete (Japanese PFI Everything)
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2) Reasonable scale of investment for the PFI project is from billions of yen to tens of
billions of yen.
3) The number of the sponsor companies should be limited so that each sponsor is truly
responsible for the management.
4) It is recommended to begin with and to accumulate experiences by small-scale projects,
which are relatively easy to estimate the risks.
Despite some doubts of the expectation of the PFI's popularity, major banks have
begun the business of loans for PFI projects.' 5 Although the loans for PFI projects
involve substantial risks because they are on a non-recourse basis in principle and the
terms are 15 to 30 year long, the banks assume the benefits may cover the risks. The
banks are interested in the PFI business because of the prospective large spread for the
PFI projects. While the spread for local governments' bond, which the governments may
utilize to procure a public facilities, is 10 to 20 basis points, that for a PFI project is
estimated more than 100 basis points. Therefore, financial institutions have the
expectations of PFI projects to become a trigger of the business growth.
Also, the Osaka Securities Exchange has established the PFI market. Prospective
special purpose companies undertaking PFI projects can apply for the listing of its
securiti-s. 6 It is expected that other institutional investors become interested in the PFI
business as the alternative of their investment tools, as is described in Section 5.4.2.
15 Nikkei Shimbun, Aug.16, 2000
16 Although the OSE has the policy to accept SPCs to develop a public facility, which is not limited to
official "PFI" projects, there is no listing as of December 10, 2000.
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3.4. Lessons Learned from the Pioneer Japanese PFI Projects
3.4.1. Pioneer Japanese PFI Projects
A number of projects that local governments initiated as the managing agency and
that utilized the PFI scheme have been developed over the past couple of years.
Although the number of PFI projects is growing and stages of the development vary
project-by-project, outlines of many of those projects are shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2 Summary of the Pioneer PFI Projects in Japan
(a) Projects with Implementation Policies already Issued (including non-official PFI):
Name (Managing Agency) Outline
Kanamachi Co-generation Plant BOO of the co-generation system, Provide Tokyo
(Tokyo Metropolitan Government) with electricity and steam, Tokyo pays for them for
20 year term, Y25 billion, Detail in Chapter 4
Kanagawa Prefectural University of BTO of the university with 40,000 rr floor area, Pref.
Health and Welfare (Kanagawa pays by installments for it for 30 year term, Y 18
Prefecture) billion, Detail in Chapter 4
Kimizu Wastes Treatment Plant (Cities BOO of the wastes interim treatment plant with
of Kisarazu, Kimizu, Futtsu, Sodegaura) capacity of 500t/day, 20 year term, Y31 billion,
Divided into two phases
Hitachi-naka Port, Kita Pier Public Financially free-standing type project, 30,000
Container Terminal Facilities (Ibaraki (initial)-250,000 (final) TEU/yr, Shipping agents pay
Prefecture) for the facilities and services, 20 year term
Chiba Consumers and Measure BOT, 2,500 m? floor area plus privately used
Inspection Center (Chiba City) facilities, City pays for the construction and
operation, 30 year term
Fukuoka Retained Heat Utilization Joint venture type BOT, City provides with
Facility (Fukuoka City) electricity utilizing retained heat from a wastes
incineration plant, 3,000 rr floor area, 15 year term,
Kanagawa Sanitary Research Institute Build and maintenance of the renewal project,
(Kanagawa Prefecture) Prefecture pays for it for 30 year term, Y8 billion
Hibiki Container Terminal (Kitakyushu Financially free-standing type project, 700m -15m
City) berth and 340m -10m berth, Shipping agents pay for
the facilities and services, 25 year term
Kanagawa Modern Art Museum BOT, 6,000, nf floor area, Y5.5 billion
(Kanagawa Prefecture)
Maya Lodge Development (Kobe City) BOT, 20 year term, 2,323, M floor area, Y500 million
Odate Area Wastes Treatment Facilities BOO, 15 year term, 100t/day treatment
(Odate City and surrounding Cities and
Towns)
Kinan Communication Center (Mie Joint venture type, 20 year term, 150ha, Y17 billion
Prefecture)
(Continue)
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(Continued)
Asaka-Misono Co-generation Plant BOO of a co-generation plant (ordinary power,
(Tokyo Metropolitan Government) steam, and sodium hypochlorite) with excavated soil
utilization, 20 year term
Chowa Elementary School ,(Chofu City) The detail is unknown.
Omuta Recycle Power Plant (Omuta City) The detail is unknown.
Saitama SKIP City Project (Saitama Next generation visual industry stronghold BOT
Prefecture) project for 30 year term, 75,000 nM floor area, Y28
billion
Hari TRS (Teatime Rest Station) Project BOT of a "Road Station," 30 year term, Y5 billion
(Tsuge Town)
Fujisawa General Disaster Prevention 20 year term, 3,600 nr floor area, Y6 billion
Center (Fujisawa City)
Matsugahama Redevelopment Building 30 year term, Y300 million
(Izumi-Otsu City)
Fureai Hiroba and Parking (Sabae City) BOT, 6 year term, Y50 million
Joetsu City Plaza (Joetsu City) Joint venture type, 9,472 nr, Y1.1 billion
High Quality Compost Production Plant BOO, 6t/day compost production, 30t/day wastes
(Kanagasaki Town) treatment, 15 year term, Y480 million
(b) Projects in the Implementation Planning Stage:
Name (Managing Agency)
Shonan Seaside Park Development (Kanagawa Prefecture)
Esaka Station Multi-floor Parking Garage (Osaka Prefecture)
Mobile Telecommunication Experimental (Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs,
Facilities Post and Telecommunications)
Kawamata Town Hall (Kawamata Town)
Koga Green Park (Ka City)
New Recycle Center (Tawara Town)
Nagai Urninote Park (Yokosuka City)
Recycle Plaza I (Settsu City)
General Cultural Center (Hirakata City)
Dream Island Plan (Retained Heat (Koto Ward, Tokyo)
Utilization)
Multi-floor Parking Garage (Suita City)
Techno Green Center (Office and Hotel (Saitama Prefecture)
Complex)
Kure City Hall (Kure City)
Owada Complex (Yachiyo City)
Dai-ni Funeral Hall (Sapporo City)
Fowl Ecology Park (Osaka City)
Garbage Composting Plant (Towns of Shiroyama, Tsukui, Sagamiko, and
Fujino)
Omihachiman City Hospital (Omihachiman City)
Public Housing (Yokkaichi City)
Metropolitan Youth Plaza (Tokyo Metropolitan Government)
Osaka Prefectural Office Building (Osaka Prefecture)
Kobe Airport Terminal Building (Kobe City)
Kihoku Community Center (Mie Prefecture)
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As shown in the table, the overwhelming majority is the building type project
such as environmental preservation related plants, community centers, public schools,
hospitals, and office buildings, with few exceptions of container terminals. A more
notable fact is that it is local governments that initiated all but only one exception
(Mobile Telecommunication Experimental Facilities). The national government gives
subsidies for some of the projects, in which the government is indirectly participating, but
the government should not be approved to participate as an equity holder or to make a
single year contract with the private sector so as not to assume the project risk eventually
infinitely.
3.4.2. Lessons Learned from the Pioneer Projects
The pioneer PFI projects in Japan shown in the last subsection have given
substantial findings in terms of concerns for the full-dress introduction of the PFI, namely,
the evaluation of VFM, the allocation of risks, and the process of the PFI implementation.
The following are only characteristic examples of the findings for the sake of better
understanding of the Japanese PFI, and details of the primary projects are examined in
Chapter 4 with explicit matters. 17
Value for Money
Calculation of the VFM is required in a couple of stages: feasibility study stage of
the PFI or the implementation policies setting stage, private undertaker selection stage,
and agreement negotiation stage. As the calculation of the VFM is difficult for the public
agencies, it has not been a reliable number and should be assumed with some variability.
In comparing the PSC (public sector comparator) to the LCC (life cycle cost) of
the PFI, some agencies were confused due to the inconsistency of the specifications of
the two proposals, especially when the private tenderers proposed to include their original
ideas in the quality. Since private tenderers try to increase the value of the project or
sometimes decrease the specification of the facilities within the extent to which necessary
17 Experiences introduced in this subsection are referred to from the minutes of the PFI Committee.
63
functions are guaranteed, or to improve the VFM, it tends to become more and more
difficult for the managing agency to set appropriate PSC for the comparison. Some
managing agencies also claimed that there were various ways to estimate governmental
subsidies and taxes from the undertaker, so the equal footing was not achieved properly.
Moreover, quantification methods of relevant risks vary. Representatives of the
managing agencies commented in the hearings of a PFI Committee that it would be
helpful if "The Guideline for the Evaluation of the VFM (Value for Money) of the PFI
Project" provided some rates as guidelines. Suggestions from these instances are
substantially, but not completely, reflected and included in the PFI Guidelines.
Risk Allocation
Some misunderstand PFI as simply meaning the transfer of risks involved in the
project to the private undertaker in exchange for the opportunity of profitability. As a
matter of fact, some public managing agencies have transferred force majeure risks to the
private undertakers beyond nominal extent despite this, in return, costs more to the public
agencies and reduces the VFM of the project.
Since it is very complicated to identify and to quantify the risks involved in a PFI
project, together with the fact that no statistical datum of the influence of possible risks is
available for public agencies in Japan, one of the most challenging arrangements for a
PFI project is financing. Given that financing a PFI project is not satisfactory for the
private sector undertaker, sponsors such as construction firms tend to accept excessive
equity investment or guarantee, where equitable returns are not necessarily secured and
the chance of failure is higher than other projects.
The Process of the PFI Implementation
Almost all of the pioneer PFI projects were in the highly competitive environment
because most potential participants strategically placed the projects higher priority to take
advantage of early experiences. As a result, many bidding consortia spent extremely
expensive cost (up to some Y200 million) to just prepare for the tender without any
compensation. A multi-stage bidding system with pre-qualification, or making short list,
and more tangible quantification system of the evaluation are suggested so that
unnecessary efforts can be eliminated.
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The undertaker selection was problematic in some cases. An instant evaluation
committee set an instant criterion for the selection that included subjective measurement
without quantification in one of such cases. Even though the evaluation process and the
criteria have been released, the result of the selection is still controversial. Pre-authorized
and explicitly published evaluation criteria should be essential for the undertaker
selection.
3.5. Issues Surrounding the PFI
In addition to the matters raised in the previous section, a number of concerns and
arguments surround the Japanese PFI. After the examination of case studies in Chapter 4
and with the analyses of the PFI framework, Chapter 5 presents possible solutions,
suggestions, or remaining concerns for most of the following issues.
Implementation and Process Issues
" How can Japan, where long-term credibility is put importance, successfully adapt
the PFI borne in the U.K., where the contract documents are of paramount
importance and claiming based on the contract is quite common?
* Government supports in legal, taxation, financial, and monetary aspects are
addressed and encouraged in the PFI Act, but the movement of the deregulation and
the adaptation to the PFI is slow.
" There may be few prospective projects in the large-scale infrastructure area to suit
for the PFI, including roads and bridges/tunnels.
* There are several trends that require further examinations because of insufficient
experiences: overall evaluation system, design-build-maintenance-operate
combined delivery method, and performance specification orders.
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* The improvement of the VFM may be also achieved by another innovative delivery
method, such as bid with VE proposals, performance specification order, a larger-
lot and multi-year contract, or the combination of those, rather than the PFI, which
costs more for the administration and interest on debt services.
* Government subsidies are paid annually to local governments for some of
prospective PFI projects, so the incentive for the local governments to finish the
project early is deprived in order to receive the subsidy every year.
" Why is the technological innovation the outcome of the PFI, in which brand-new
technology should be avoided in order not to bear the risk to adopt unproven
technology?
Risk Allocation Issues
" If a managing agency proceeds to a PFI project without closely identifying risks and
analyzing them, the project would fail and the credibility of the PFI system in the
eyes of the people would be lost. Making use of financial institutions is desirable
because they would seriously and strictly inspect the assets and debts.
* It is very difficult to quantify the influences of the risks such as demand, time or
cost overruns. Time or cost overruns are common in the real world of construction
projects and the influences are relatively large. It is necessary to accumulate data of
the probabilities and influences of the risks.
Project Evaluation Issues
* Accuracy of the VFM for long lifetime projects is very doubtful.
* Calculation of the PSC is less meaningful if the project is based on the performance
specification order.
* It is imperative to quantify qualitative aspects (design, environmental consciousness,
level of services, and so on) of projects. Otherwise, the level of services for the
public projects may be lowered by the PFI because of invisibility.
* The discount rate is one of the most sensitive factors in calculating the VFM, but
always controversial to set. The Guideline suggests the discount rate be set as risk-
free long-term national bond rate, but in theory, a risk premium should be added to
it for the risky project unless the cash flows are on a risk-adjusted basis, estimating
the certainty equivalent with a risk-free scenario.
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Chapter 4. Case Studies
Chapter 4 examines actual cases procured by various kinds of delivery systems in
the PPP (Public-Private Partnership) context. Issues analyzed in this chapter involve
organizational structure of the project, financial schemes, risk profiles and allocation, and
roles and contributions of the MCFs'. Examined cases include Japanese traditional and
privatized projects, the Confederation Bridge and Highway 407 in Canada, SR57 and
SR91 in California, the Sydney Harbour Tunnel in Australia, DBFO (Design-
Build-Finance-Operate) roads in the U.K., and two primary Japanese PFI projects. Most of
the cases are of toll roads, bridges, and tunnels, so that the analyses in this Chapter can be
extended in the following chapters on these topics.
Although the description formats of the case studies are not necessarily consistent
with one another due to incomplete information of the cases, some important features are
listed in tables and comparative analyses are made in Section 4.3.
4.1. Introductory Remarks
4.1.1. Objectives of the Case Studies
The two objectives of the thesis are to provide a PFI framework for Japan's toll
road/bridge/tunnel project as an example and to propose some strategies of a MCF to face
the Japanese PFI. A toll road/bridge/tunnel project following the PFI scheme, which has
the four elements ("in Japan," "toll road/bridge/tunnel," "private," and more specifically,
"Major Construction Firms" is defined in Section 2.2.1.
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"Japanese PFI") has not yet occurred in Japan. In this regard, this chapter tries to capture
the proxy model of Japanese toll road PFI projects by filling in the surrounding moat.2
Toll road! .
Kurushima Kaikyo bidge/tunnel
Bridge: '
- Japanese Traditional
Tokyo Bay Delivery System
Aqua-Line: (Toll road/bridge) Highway 407:
I Japan Japanese Third Hgw 4ol : ra
Sector Project DB T
(Toll road! Project Abroad
bridge/tunnel) - - - (Canada)
TARGET: Confederation Bridge,Kanamnachl, KPC: Sde abu
Japanese PFI Toll Ja aese PFI Tunnel, SR57, SR91:
Plants, Colleges Toll road/bridge/ DBFO (BOT)
- tunnel Projects Toll road/bridge/tunnel
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d R. TEPCO: PFI Road 1
Japanese Private Cas. Studies
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(Railwiy, Power plant) DBFO Roads:
British PFI
(Roads with
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Figure 4-1 Image of the Objective of the Case Studies
Figure 4-1 illustrates the concepts, or the objective of the various case studies.
That is to say, understanding traditional Japanese projects, represented here by the case
study of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge, is important to analyze the trends and issues of the
domestic delivery system toward the PFI; Cases abroad (examples depicted outside of "In
Japan" circle, such as Highway 407, Confederation Bridge, and DBFO roads) may suggest
2 In addition to the case study analyses, Chapters 5 and 6 establish a framework and strategies with a
theoretical approach and apply them to a prospective case in order to demonstrate their viability.
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many insights that can be adapted in Japan; Japanese private sector projects, such as ones
of Japan Railway and Tokyo Electric Power Company, may provide some restrictions of
the PFI scheme due to the public purpose of the PFI; and pioneer Japanese PFI projects
(Kanamachi Co-generation Plant and Kanagawa Prefectural College) may raises
difficulties or improvements for introduction of the PFI scheme.
In Figure 4-1, the four elements that comprise the target project type, toll road/
bridge/tunnel projects by the Japanese PFI scheme, is shown by different ovals, within
which pertinent cases are located.
4.1.2. Risk Profiles of the Toll road/bridge/tunnel Project
In order to study risk management, project financing, organizational structures, and
roles of construction firms in various PPP projects for a toll road/bridge/tunnel in the
world's developed countries, this subsection surveys general risk profiles of the toll road/
bridge/tunnel project. Main risks include pre-construction, completion (construction),
demand (traffic volume), force majeure, tort liability, political, and financial risks. 3
Pre-construction Risk. Right-of-way acquisition, environmental compliance,
regulatory permissions, and other project requirements before the construction period may
cause delays and cost overruns during project development. While the public sector often
takes the responsibility for acquiring the right-of-way, the private sector tends to be
responsible for the others in many privatized projects. Pre-construction risk may involve
objection from the residential circumstances.
Completion (Construction) Risk. During the construction period, design changes,
unforeseen geological and weather conditions, the difficulty of adapting an innovative
technology, and the unavailability of materials and labor can cause delays and cost
overruns. The private sector typically takes primary responsibility for cost overruns and
delays during the construction period and allocates the risk to the contractor through a
fixed price contract except for in the case of force majeure. The public sector also takes
some responsibility for completion risks associated with public control, such as the
development of the connecting road network or those that cannot be completely attributed
3 Fisher and Babbar (1996). "Private Financing of Toll Roads," The World Bank RMC Discussion Paper
Series 117
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to the private sector, such as unforeseen geological conditions. Construction risks may be
lower for extensions, expansions, or rehabilitations than for new projects.
Demand (traffic volume) Risk. Demand risks may be the greatest risk for toll road
projects (Completion risks may also be great as well for bridge/tunnel projects). These
risks are associated with insufficient traffic levels and toll rates too low to generate
expected revenues. The private sector assumes the risk to the full extent in some projects,
while the government provides a minimum traffic or revenue guarantee in others. To
mitigate the risk, some relatively new projects adopt the congestion pricing system, or the
government gives incentives for the quality of services such as high occupancy rate and
safety improvements.
Force Majeure Risk. Force majeure involves risks beyond the control of a project's
public and private partners such as earthquakes, floods, storms, or war. These impair the
facility's ability to generate earnings. Since neither the public sector nor the private sector
can control the risk, they often jointly assume it. For example, the public sector may
extend the concession to allow the private sector to recover from the event. When a private
insurance is available, and it is usually the case for earthquakes, the private sector may
purchase (or be required to purchase) the insurance to transfer the risk.
Tort Liability Risk. Tort liability relates to the risk of having to pay substantial
legal awards as a result of accidents on the toll road/bridge/tunnel. This risk rarely seems
to be large in Japan.
Political Risk. Political risk concerns government actions or policy changes that
could impair a facility's ability to generate earnings. The government may change laws
that govern the concession or taxes or regulations on the project that severely damage its
value. The change of powers may suspend the government supports and may not allow the
private sector to charge and collect tolls as specified under the agreement or to settle
contract disputes fairly under a neutral resolution system. Governments generally agree to
compensate the project company for termination of the concession and violation of the
concession agreement, including agreed toll rates. However, private concessionaires
generally assume the risk associated with dispute resolution and the ability to obtain
compensation in the event of a government violation of the concession agreement.
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Financial Risk. Financial risk is defined as the risk that project cash flows may be
insufficient to pay an adequate return on the private debt and equity invested in the project.
Financial risk stems generally from the project itself due to the inadequate structuring;
however, it may involve an economic risk, such as changes of consumer price or interest or
a partner's default. It may also include the operation risk, or inefficient operations. The
private sector is generally responsible for financial risk, although in some cases
governments may provide debt guarantees. Governments also may provide cash grants,
equity, and return on private capital invested.
In the following case studies, risk profiles and allocation from the perspective of
the project company are most stressed in terms of financial schemes. Roles of the
construction firms in the projects are also examined in some cases.
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4.2. Case studies
4.2.1. Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge
This subsection introduces the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge project, which the author
engaged in for a substructure construction, together with the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge
Authority's other projects, as an example of the traditional Japanese delivery system of
construction projects for a basis of comparison with other cases in this chapter.
1) Project Outline
The Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge consists of three successive suspension bridges, the
First, Second, and Third Kurushima Kaikyo Bridges, comprising the Nishi-Seto
Expressway, the connecting route between Onomichi and Imabari Cities, which is one of
the three Honshu-Shikoku (Japan's main islands) connecting routes in Western Japan. The
Bridge has a total length of 4,105m (center spans are 6 1Gm, 1020m, and 1030m) and is the
world's first three-successive suspension bridge. (See Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3.)
1st Bridge 960.0 30.0 2nd Bri dge 1 ,51.O 30.0 3rd Bridge 1,570.0
30.0 14tD.( 000.1 0 10. 2!60.0 L 0301.0 8
Oh±r ni I~i koku
PROFILE
Figure 4-2 Profile of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge (Unit: m, Source: HSBA)
Figure 4-3 The Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge seen from Shikoku side (Photo, Source: HSBA)
4 For the case studies, a currency rate chart, as of March 31, 2001, is provided in Appendix A for the sole
purpose of convenience.
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The Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority (HSBA), one of Japan's special public
corporations, has been responsible for the delivery of the project together with other
Honshu-Shikoku Bridges, which include the Seto-Ohashi Bridge and the world's longest
bridge, the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge. The HSBA opened the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge, the
last major project of the Authority, on May 1, 1999 after a construction duration of some 11
years. Table 4-1 shows the outline of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge.
Table 4-1 Outline of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge Project
Location Between Honshu and Shikoku Main Islands, Western Japan
Authority Concerned Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority (HSBA)
Structure Large-scale 3-successive suspension bridge, some foundations in the
strong strait
Scale 4,105m, 4 lanes
Design Speed 80 km/h
Delivery System Design-Bid-Build
Construction Period May 15, 1988 - May 1, 1999 (Date of Opening)
Construction contracts were divided into some 20 joint ventures.
Total Project Cost Y 280 billion (Y 53.6 billion/km)5
Materials Volume and Towers (6): 21,700 tons, V 27 billion
Construction Cost6 Cables (2): 16,840 tons, V 44 billion
(with numbers in Stiffening Girders: 46,060 tons, Y 44 billion
parentheses) Substructures (10): 438,450 M3 , y 100 billion
Tolls for Cars Y 2,500 (5 years only, 20% discount rate)
2) Project Structure
Project organizational structure is as shown in Figure 4-4. The HSBA shows
characteristics of both the public agency and the project company in the PFI scheme. Some
of the differences between the HSBA and a private project company are that the HSBA
does not seek profits and that the HSBA is neither a design, finance, construction, nor
operation arm and it works with those firms separately, while a private project company is
usually the aggregation of those.
Table 4-2, the procedure of the implement of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge project,
demonstrates the essential roles of the HSBA.
- US$]= Y126 as of March 31, 2001.
6 Nikkei BP (1997): Big Project, Nikkei Construction Special Issue
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(Note) Construction contracts consisted of some 20 main JVs.
Figure 4-4 Organizational Structure of the HSBA Project
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Table 4-2 The Procedure of the Implementation of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge Project
(Source: HSBA Brochure)
Date Procedure
Investigation of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges by Ministry of
1955-1970 Construction, Japan National Railways, and Japan Railway
Construction Public Corporation
May 1969 Settlement of the three routes of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges
July 1, 1970 Establishment of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority
(HSBA) Surveys and Initial design, Detailed design,
Financial arrangement, and Right-of-way acquisition
September 21, 1973 Order of generic construction plan by Ministers 
of
Construction and Transport
October 26, 1973 Approval of construction implementation plan by Ministers
of Construction and Transport
November 20, 1973 Suspension of the ground-breaking as a part of aggregatedemand-control policy
(HSBA) Additional surveys, Detailed redesign, Financial
rearrangement, and Right-of-way acquisition
Agreement of the implementation of the Kurushima Bridge
December 27, 1987 among the National Land Agency, the Ministry of Transport,
and the Ministry of Construction
(HSBA) Preparation of contracts
May 15, 1988 Ground-breaking of the Kurushima Bridge project
(HSBA) Supervision of the construction, Financial
arrangement, and Additional right-of-way acquisition
May 1, 1999 Opening
(HSBA) Maintenance and Operation
3) Financing Scheme
The toll road system in Japan, including the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges, is financed
by debt and the government investment, which are repaid by tolls from users. The account
of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges is combined and the tolls are pooled together. The
financing structure is similar to that of other toll road systems, such as those operated by
Japan Highway Public Corporation.7 Therefore, the Agency's financial scheme, instead of
the single project, is discussed in the following. The toll rate is set according to two basic
concepts as described below: redemption and benefit principles.
7 The toll road financing system in Japan is introduced in Section 5.2.1 in great detail.
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Redemption principle. Tolls are set such that the total revenues from tolls redeem
total costs (construction, operation and maintenance, and interest of debts) of the toll road
system during a certain redemption period.8
Benefit principle. Tolls are set such that users' total costs to use the
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge, taking into account the effect of time saving by doing so, do not
exceed those to use the conventional transportation services, such as ferry service.
The HSBA's balance sheet and income statement of FY1999 9 are shown in Table
4-3 and Table 4-4.10 In principle, new construction of the motorways is financed by debt
and government investment and the costs for operations and interest on the debt are paid
from user tolls. In 2000, however, while all three routes of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges
had been completed, the revenue from the tolls was insufficient even to repay the interest
alone, and accumulated debt service and carryover deficit reached Y3,866 billion and V923
billion, respectively, as of March 31, 2000.11 Since the toll revenue cannot solely pay the
debt service, the government still invested Y80 billion and the Treasury Loan and
Investment12 was utilized for the issuance of the HSBA bonds and loans of V284 billion in
FY2000. Two-thirds of the total investment is funded by the national government and the
rest is divided and funded by local governments that benefit from the bridge project.
(Table 4-5 shows the sources and uses of the HSBA's funds during FY2000.) The
investment of the governments will continue until FY2012. More than half of the fixed
liabilities of V3,839 billion are funded by the Treasury Loan and Investment Program',
and other fixed liabilities issued by private financial institutions may also be supported by
the same program indirectly. Construction firms have never invested in public works.
* The term was revised and prolonged to 50 years for the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges.
9 A fiscal year (FY) starts April 1 of the year and ends March 31 of the next year in Japan. Namely, the end of
FY1999 is March 31, 2000.
10 According to the special laws for toll road operating agencies, the accounting formats are made differently
from those of commercial companies.
" The level of toll revenues are some 70% of the projection.
12 The Treasury Loan and Investment is a fund from government-operated businesses, such as Postal Savings
and Postal Life Insurance.
13 TLIP has funded Y2,160 billion out of the total liabilities of V3,839 billion.
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Table 4-3 HSBA's Balance Sheet as of March 31, 2000 (Source: HSBA)
in V billion
Assets
Current assets 9 0.2%
Fixed assets, Motorways 3,538 98.1%
Motorways, construction in progress 22 0.6%
Other fixed assets 24 0.7%
Deferred assets 15 0.4%
Total 3,608 100%
Liabilities and Capital
Liabilities
Current liabilities 27 0.7%
Fixed liabilities
HSBA Bonds 3,549 98.4%
Long-term Loans 284 7.9%
Others 6 0.2%
C Subtotal 3,839 70.3%
Total Liabilities 3,866 106.4%
Capital
Government investment 665 18.4%
(Deficit) (923) (25.6%)
Total Capital (259) (7.2%)
Total 3,608 100%
Table 4-4 HSBA's Income Statement for the Year Ended March
in V billion
31, 2000 (Source: HSBA)
Revenues
Toll revenues 86 91.3%
Others 1 0.3%
Deficit during FYI999 85
Total 173 100%
Expenses
Operating expenses 15 14.1%
General administrative expenses 9 4.6%
Non-operating expenses
Interest on bonds and borrowings 147 37.3%
Others 2 2.7%
Total 173 100%
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Table 4-5 HSBA's Budget for FY2000 (Source: HSBA)
in V billion
Sources
Investment from governments 80.0 17.2%
Debt 284.2 61.3%
Revenue from Operation 89.9 19.4%
Other Revenues 9.7 2.1%
Total 463.8 100%
Uses
Operation of Roads 21.7 4.7%
General, Administrative Costs 13.0 2.8%
Debt Service Payments, etc. 428.0 92.3%
Construction and Investigation 0.1 0.0%
Total 463.8 100%
4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
In the traditional Japanese project scheme, the public sector basically takes all the
risks involved. The following items in Table 4-6 are characteristics of risks involved and
the allocation in both traditional Japanese projects in general and the Kurushima Kaikyo
Bridge project specifically. In the table, 0 denotes the main responsibility and A denotes
the secondary or partial responsibility for the risk. These denotations are consistent
through the case studies.
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Table 4-6 Risk Description and Allocation for the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge
and the Traditional Delivery System
Risk Type Description Public MCFs
Pre-construction Right-of-way acquisition, environmental compliance,R s i regulatory permissions, and other project requirements before 0
Risk the construction period are all public sector's responsibility.
Construction firms contract a project basically on a lump-sum
basis. They rarely claim changes because of uncertainties or
incompleteness of the contract, and they work in a very
Completion responsible manner. However, the owner has the ultimate
Risk responsibility for the completion and, if the owner is a 0 A
national-level agency, often accepts change claims from the
contractor that is about to overrun the cost. In terms of the
construction durations, the contractor always makes the best
efforts to avoid delay.
Demand risk is always borne by the public owner, or the
taxpayers, in the traditional Japanese project because the owner
Market Risk operates the project such as toll roads. However, if actual
traffic volume is less than anticipated, the public agency may 0
(Demand Risk) increase the tolls or the government may financially support the
project by utilizing additional taxes, and the users or taxpayers
may ultimately pay for the risk.
Force Majeure This risk is eventually assumed by the public sector except forthe case of minor incidents.
Political Risk Once a contract is made, a suspension and cancellation 
had
rarely taken place in the past.
The public owner always bears the operation risk because
government agencies exclusively operate bridges and toll roads
Financial Risk, in Japan. Even in the PPP projects, the ownership is kept in the
Operation Risk public sector. The government budgets for maintaining and
constructing the bridges and roads and cannot default, at least in
a general sense, in Japan.
5) MCF's Roles
From the contractor's viewpoint, MCFs' technical inputs are greatly necessary for,
but not limited to, the HSBA, in particular when the project is challenging, in order not to
overlook important, but unusual matters. For example, the installation of a caisson in the
middle of the strait was a technically critical task for the project. A "guide pile," a target to
install the caisson, was designed in order to ease the location of the caisson and to shorten
the installation time. However, the guide pile setting was another difficulty because of the
site conditions: the strong current, the stiffness of the seabed, and heavy pile weight.
Kajima, an MCF in Japan, developed a construction method to utilize its self-elevating
platform (SEP) "KAJIMA," which can load all necessary equipment such as a crane and
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materials, coupled with careful, detailed schedule planning. This proposal eventually
made the project technically feasible.
Non-segregating underwater concrete was another requirement for the success of
the project. MCFs had just developed the concrete and utilized it for the Kurushima project
as well as a precedent project, the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge.
The author proposed, from a perspective of a contractor, a new analytical method
that enabled reasonable evaluation of the stability of a caisson, which is a prefabricated
steel form (sometimes concrete form) to set on the seabed as a component of the foundation.
When the caisson was installed in a strong current, since the caisson is not heavy enough to
resist the current, it is sensitive to the current force to rotate if its shape is not circular. The
result of this analysis was one of the important reasons why only one caisson's shape was
determined to be circular among five undersea foundations of the Kurushima Kaikyo
Bridge. For a contractor, such a voluntary examination was an effort to prepare for the
actual construction work and to feel comfortable if the contractor eventually gets awarded
the bid.
Example in Other Traditional Japanese Public Projects
Examples in which MCFs played important roles other than those in mere
construction works as specified in tender drawings have taken place on a number of
occasions for technically complicated public (and private) projects.1 4 For instance, Kajima
recently resolved a complicated problem in the Ujigawa Bridge project, where the MLIT
managed the entire project. The severe construction time limit, due to the availability
restriction of the site to the only 8-month dry season, had been the most serious problem
from the outset, when Kajima got awarded the project. Kajima proposed to the MLIT
various design changes to adapt Kajima's cutting-edge technologies, such as New-SRC
Structure for a pier and AQ Form, precast concrete forms, so that the construction work on
site could be drastically facilitated.1 5 In this case, Kajima provided a detailed design of the
proposal, although it was not obligated to, even though its original drawings were
unrealistic in terms of constructability with the time restriction.
1 Chapter 2 introduced more this issue.
15 Kajima (2001): "Expeditious construction by precast 'AC Form'," Kajima200103
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4.2.2. Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line16
1) Project Outline
Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line is a toll road across the Tokyo Bay connecting Kawasaki
City in Kanagawa Prefecture and Kisarazu City in Chiba Prefecture with a length of 15.1
km. It consists of both tunnel and bridge sections. The western portion is a 10 km shield
tunnel, while the eastern portion is an approximately 5 km bridge. There are two
man-made islands: Kawasaki Man-made Island, which stands at the center of the tunnel
section, both as a ventilation shaft and as a starting shaft of the shield tunneling, and
Kisarazu Man-made Island, which is located between tunnel and bridge sections. (Figure
4-5)
This project, which is the largest marine civil engineering project ever attempted,
incorporates the most advanced technology at every stage of design and construction.
Table 4-7 shows the outline of the Toky o Bay Aqua-Line.
Figure 4-5 Location and Overview of the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line (Source: www.aqua-line.com)
16 Before its completion, the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line was known as "Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway," which is
also the official name of this toll road.
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Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line Project (Source: TTB, "Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway")
Location Between Kawasaki, Kanagawa and Kisarazu, Chiba, Japan
Authority Concerned Construction: Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Corporation (TTB)
Operation & Administration: Japan Highway Public Corporation (JH)
Scale 10km tunnel, 4.4km bridge, 4 lanes (6 lanes in the future)
Structure Four 13.9m diameter shield tunnels (14.14m diameter machine), 4.4km
continuous bridge, two man-made islands in the middle of Tokyo Bay
Design Speed 80 km/h
Delivery System Design-Bid-Build (Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) for TTB)
Project Company Trans Tokyo Bay Highway Corporation (TTB)
Construction Period May 1989 - December 1997
Construction contracts were divided into 61 joint ventures.
Total Project Cost V 1,482 billion (Y 920 billion for construction)
TTB: Y1,266 billion, JH: Y216 billion
Tolls for Cars Y 3,000 (Since July 20, 2000 until March 31, 2008) 11
2) Project Structure
Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Corporation (TTB) is the third sector, that is, it is
capitalized by equity from Japan Highway Public Corporation (JH), local governments,
and the private sector. Responsibilities of the project are allocated between TTB and JH as
shown in Figure 4-6. That is, upon the completion of the construction, the ownership is
transferred to JH, which is obliged to repay the construction cost to TTB, including the
increase of the cost. Other administrative responsibilities, such as those for obtaining the
permission and acquisition and compensation, all lie with JH.
17 Tolls had been set at Y 4,000 for cars for the first 5 years and Y 4,900 for cars from 6th year on at the
beginning. But they have been discounted due to the serious deficiency of the traffic volume.
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Table 4-7 Outline of the
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MLIT Local Private
(Government) Governments Companies
Finan g
Toll Road Permi sion Permissi nEq yPerm'ssin ty Financial
App val Eq ty Institutions
Con truction
Japan Highway Agreement Trans-Tokyo D
Public Bay Highway De Consult
Corporation Corporation
(JH) Equity 4 (TTB)
<-Operation truction
Construction
- Decision of basic matters - Construction of Firms (JVs)
- Coordination roads in the sea
- Acquisition, 
- Operation of Const ction
Compensation surrounding Construction
- Construction of roads on projects
land Firms (JVs)
- Ownership
Figure 4-6 Organizational Structure of the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line Project
(Source: TTB. "Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway," amended)
3) Financing Scheme
The financing scheme for TTB is shown in Table 4-8.
Table 4-8 Financing Scheme for TTB (Source: TTB, "Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway")
Costs
Project Costs V 1,104 billion 87.2%
Interest during Construction V 162 billion 12.8%
Total Project Cost V 1,266 billion 100%
Sources
Equity V 90 billion*' 7.1%
Government Guaranteed Bond V 584 billion 46.1%
Debts from Private Banks Y 217 billion 17.2%
Road Development Fund*2  Y 375 billion 29.6%
Total Sources V 1,266 billion 100%
*'Includes V30 billion of investments from private companies
*2 A loan program, which both the public and private sectors fund evenly, and
which is run by a public agency
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Although the project is called the third sector project, or PPP project, private
companies invested in the project as equity contribution less than 3% of the total cost.18
The national government, together with several local governments, provided most of the
sources by means of equity, guarantees, the road development fund, and the loan from the
Development Bank of Japan (a governmental financial institution). 19
Debts and bonds are repaid from user tolls of the road for a redemption term of 40
years. However, the traffic volume from the commencement has been approximately
10,000 vehicles per day, while the projected one is 25,000 vehicles per day, so the revenue
in 1998 is merely Y14.8 billion, while the operation cost is Y5.6 billion and interest is Y41.2
billion.20 JH has restructured the redemption plan and the redemption term has been reset
to 50 years, together with other changes in the financial scheme.
4) Risk Profiles and Allocations
For the Aqua-Line project; completion risk and demand risk are the two most
critical risks. There is a Y290 billion cost overrun and a couple of month time overrun
besides everyday traffic volume inadequacy of about 15,000 vehicles per day.' 8 These
have obviously caused the extreme difficulty to repay the debt of the project. Major risks
involved in the Aqua-Line project and their allocation are described in Table 4-9.
18 Bridge and Offshore Engineering Association (1998): "Finance and Project Structure of Large-Scale
Projects in Japan," Working Group Report
19 The amount of the loan is included in "Debts from Private Banks."
2 TTB: "Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway," Pamphlet
In 1987, the construction cost was estimated at Y 1,150 billion, which would be redeemed in 30 years.
Traffic volume at the commencement was originally projected at 33,000 vehicles per day at the toll of V4,900
for cars.
84
Chapter 4. Case Studies
Table 4-9 Risk Description and Allocation for Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line Project
Risk Type Description JH TTB MCFs
Right-of-way acquisition, environmental compliance,
Pre-construction regulatory permissions, and other project requirements A
Risk before the construction period are all public sector's
responsibility.
Construction firms contract a project on a lump-sum basis.
Though they work in a very responsible manner, and even
though the contractors are contributing as equity providers,
they may try to get change orders for the increase of the total
contract price so that the profit from the construction work
will more likely generate the margin that will cover the
Completion Risk equity contribution. However, TTB had the ultimate
responsibility for the completion and often accepted change
claims from the contractor because the claims were
reasonable in spite of the previous cooperation from the same
contractors. In terms of the construction durations, the
contractor always made the best efforts to avoid delay, but
the limit was deferred due to an incident without explicit
penalty to the contractor in TTB project.
As JH owns and operates the Aqua-Line, as illustrated in
Figure 4-6, the demand risk, or traffic volume risk, is
primarily assumed by JH. If traffic volume is less than
expected, JH would borrow the deficit additionally from the
Governmental sources and repay the principal and interest of
Market Risk the debts. As long as the Government permits, JH could
(Demand Risk) finance the deficit by some Governmental sources, and 0therefore the taxpayers ultimately cover the demand risk. In
reality, the traffic volume has been far below the expected
amount, so the financial scheme was revised such that toll
revenue stream during 50 years will repay the debt. This
means that future generation will pay for the project in return
for the benefits they will obtain.
Force Majeure This risk is eventually assumed by the public sector except 0 Afor the case of minor incidents.
Political Risk Once a contract is made, a suspension and cancellation are 0 A
unlikely to take place.
Financial Risk, Even in the PPP projects like the Aqua-Line project, the
Operation Risk ownership is kept in JH, or the public sector.
5) MCFs' Roles
As always in major, complicated public infrastructure projects, almost all Japanese
MCFs had researched and developed cutting-edge technologies solely for the project such
as various shield technologies (full automated system, underground docking, and so on) for
the extremely large, deep, and long Kawasaki Tunnels, the 4.4 km Kisarazu Bridge
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structure, and huge soil improvement for Kawasaki Man-made Island.2 Even though the
state-of-the-art technologies are extremely expensive, they are still essential for the project.
Under this circumstance, and because only the MCFs have the capabilities for the
innovation, MCFs are involved in the project from planning stages, explicitly and
implicitly.
MCFs also contribute equity for TTB, but the amount they invest is small enough
(Y30 billion from 351 firms, supposedly less than Y100 million at the most) to be covered
with the profits they may earn from the construction contracts. Even as the owner of TTB,
MCFs do not have to consider the profitability of the project itself, and, in fact, they claim
for changes, which deteriorated the profitability.
6) Problems of the Third Sector Model
The Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line project, then Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway, is
implemented as the third sector project and cannot be assumed successful due to the Y290
billion construction cost overrun and the serious shortfall of the traffic. The third sector
projects, in general, as well as the Aqua-Line project, have following inherent problems:
- As the public sector is, by nature, expected to exercise the leadership from the
outset, the third sector does not usually take into account the utilization of the private
sector's creativity and originality.
- Because the public sector is usually responsible for the project planning,
management, and operation control, the project tends to be inefficient in the absence
of competition.
- The revenue projection tends to be optimistic because the primary objective of
the third sector is often to implement the project, expecting governmental backup if
the project fails or becomes serious situation.
- It tends to be unclear who takes risks and responsibilities between the public and
private sectors in the project.
21 TTB: Technical Pamphlets
The tunnels have 13.9m diameters and locate 40m below the seabed. Eight shield machines were used to
make the two alignments with Kawasaki Man-made Island in the middle as the starting shaft. Kawasaki
Man-made Island is a cylindrical structure, with 98m diameter and 74m heights, and with a 114m deep
diaphragm wall.
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4.2.3. The Confederation Bridge in Canada 22
The Confederation Bridge23 (Figure 4-7) has replaced the ferry by spanning the
Northumberland Strait at its narrowest point, a distance of some 13 km. The C$840
million24 project was the first major infrastructure project undertaken by the government of
Canada using a Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) process.
Figure 4-7 The Confederation Bridge (Photo, Source: SCDI)
1) Project Background and Outline
The 12.9-kilometer Confederation Bridge, which opened on May 31, 1997,
connected Prince Edward Island (PEI) and New Brunswick in Atlantic Canada, and was
the longest bridge over ice-covered waters in the world. (Figure 4-8) The Bridge was
privately financed, designed, built, maintained and operated by Strait Crossing
Development Inc. (SCDI) and its subsidiary companies.
PEI became a part of the Canadian confederation in 1873. Under the terms of its
entry into the confederation, the Government of Canada agreed to provide a continuous
and efficient year-round transportation facility for goods, services, and people between the
island and the mainland. Operating subsidized ferry services between the island and two
points of the mainland was discharging this responsibility. Over the years, there had been a
22 Much information in this subsection is cited from Feltham (1994): "The Northumberland Strait Crossing
Project," Strait Crossings 94; Pirie (1994): "The Northumberland Strait Crossing Project, Financing Options
and Solutions," Developments in Short and Medium Span Bridge Engineering '94; and Pirie (1997): "The
Confederation Bridge: project structure and risk," Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, Vol.24, 6
23 It was better known as the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project (NSCP) during the construction
?eriods.
4 For the convenience purpose, US$1= C$1.58 as of March 31, 2001.
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modest annual growth of around 3 to 4% in the traffic carried. Operation of the ferries had
been an expensive proposition for the government with the future projections being of
increased government spending on the aging fleet, which required repairs and
modernization. In 1992, the Government spent approximately C$ 42 million subsidizing
these ferry operations, and these subsidies rose at a rate approximately 15-20 % higher than
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The magnitude of future expenses and continuing
subsidies was of concern to the Government.
Figure 4-8 Location of the Confederation Bridge (Source: SCDI)
Table 4-10 Outline of the Confederation Bridge Project
Location Between Prince Edward Island (PEI) and New
Brunswick in Atlantic Canada
Authority Concerned The Government of Canada
Structure Continuous precast concrete bridge with foundations in
the ice-covered sea
Scale 12.9 km, with maximum 250m spans, 2 lanes
Design speed 80 km/h
Delivery System Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO)
Project Company Strait Crossing Development Inc. (SCDI)
Construction Period 42 months (November 1993 - May 1997)
Concession Period 35 years
Total Project Cost C$840 million (in 1992 Dollars)
Design Life Time 100 years
Tolls for Cars C$37.00 for round trip
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In the Confederation Bridge project, the Canadian government partially subsidized
the project, by means of a payment equivalent to the ferry service expenses, since the ferry
service was terminated upon the bridge's operation. Table 4-10 shows the outline of the
project.
2) Project Structure
Procurement Process
Procurement process consisted of six stages as follows.
(a) First Call, Stage I (1987). The Government of Canada decided to use the
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach and invited the private sector to design, construct,
finance, and operate a fixed crossing. Out of 12 submissions, seven proposals were
selected for the second call.
(b) Second Call, Stage II (1988). Out of the seven, three proposals were evaluated by
the stated criteria in the five main categories of requirements: technol6gy (the built work);
management; environmental planning; maximization of regional benefits; and financing,
including the security package.
(c) Environmental Assessment Stage (1987-1992). In January 1987, the Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) established an environmental
assessment of the fixed-link project. This assessment turned out to be a long-term process,
which ultimately caused a substantial delay in the final contract.
(d) Financial Call, Stage III (1992-1993). This process followed the Environmental
Assessment Stage and ended at the Closing Day, which was settled as the day when the
contract was set. The government had set a price cap for the bid of no more than C$42
million in 1992 Canadian dollars. SCDI was the only bidder that submitted the bid under
the cap. Basic financial agreements were also set in the contract.
The final award was made in this Stage. First, it was based on the compliance with
the previous requirements and the additional recommendation by the environmental panel,
and second, the pricing. In fact, awarded was the only consortium that met the
government's financial requirement, which limited its subsidy no more than the ferry
operating cost.
(e) Construction Stage (1993-1997). This stage commenced on contracting closing
day (Oct. 7, 1993) and ended on the date of final completion (May 31, 1997). SCDI agreed
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to complete the construction within four years at a total cost of no more than C$739 million.
The Construction stage was funded in the following steps:
- First, Strait Crossing Financing Inc. (SCFI) issued a subsidy bond of C$41.9
million annually with the escalation calculated by the CPI for three years.
- Second, approximately C$660 million was placed into trusts at Closing. This
fund and the interest earned during the construction stage were to fund the
construction cost.
(f) Operation Stage (1997-2032). This stage started on Completion Day (5/31/1997)
and ended on Revision Day. SCDI had the right and obligation to operate the project for 35
years. Important agreements included Source of Funds, Maintenance Assurance,
Operating Insurance, Non-Competition Clause, Utility Corridor, and Fisheries
Compensation Obligation.
Project Structure
The project structure is depicted in Figure 4-9. SCDI (Strait Crossing
Development Inc.) is the concessionaire of the project, incorporated to act as project owner
and operator of the Confederation Bridge during the 35-year concession period. Initially,
in 1992, it consisted of: Strait Crossing Inc., Northern Construction Company Limited (the
Canadian subsidiary of Morrison Knudsen Corporation), and G.T.M.I. (Canada) Inc. (the
Canadian subsidiary of GTM International and later Dumez-GTM Group). Later, in 1994,
Ballast Nedam Canada Inc. (the Canadian subsidiary of Ballast Nedam Interational B.V.)
joined the consortium. Then, in 1996, Northern Construction Company Limited left the
consortium. Strait Crossing Financing Inc. (SCFI) was formed by the same group as
SCDI to receive the annual subsidy from the Government and to transfer the funds to a
trustee for bondholder payments. Strait Crossing Joint Venture (SCJV) was established
by Strait Crossing Inc. to undertake the development and ultimate design and construction
of the project.
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Figure 4-9 Project Structure of the Confederation Bridge
3) Financing Scheme
Figure 4-9 also shows the financing structure of the Confederation Bridge project.
In short, SCFI issued the bonds, whose proceeds would be sufficient for the construction of
the bridge, and the bonds would be redeemed with tolls and the government subsidy during
the concession period.
Bonds and Subsidy
A total anticipated project cost of C$840 million, including 10% contingency, was
funded basically by the real rate bond of C$661 million proceeds. The balance was filled
in with the interest to be earned during construction and parent companies' letter of credit
for the contingency. The bond was fully indexed to inflation with a guaranteed rate of
return. SCFI, to which the government subsidy is paid under the Subsidy Agreement,
issued the bond. The government subsidy forms annual subsidy payments that commenced
on the Date Certain, May 31, 1997, whether the bridge was completed on time or not.
Payments are indexed 100% to increases in the consumer price index (CPI) from the bid
date of May 27, 1992. The annual payment of C$41.9 million, which was exactly the same
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amount paid by the government to subsidize the ferry operation, was the only public
funding to the project.
The bond discounted the future value of the 35-year stream of annual indexed
payments made by the government. The structure of the bond was to pay a yield equal to
4.5% plus the annual increase in inflation. The bonds were free from construction, demand,
or operation risk, and with a deflation protect, amortization of principal, and a security
irrespective of any default. These allowed the SCFI bond to be rated AAA, together with
the sovereign credit rating of the Government of Canada and to be issued at a rate of
approximately 15 to 20 basis points above the government's own real rate bond program.
This was an extremely efficient and well-priced financing instrument and ultimately
enabled this project to proceed.
Tolls
Another financing mechanism was by way of a minimum floor level of toll revenue.
Toll rates, together with the traffic on the ferry service of the year before the bridge opened,
determined a minimum floor level of the toll revenue. This floor level was indexed 100%
to increases in CPI during the 35-year concession period. If the annual increase of the toll
revenue was not sufficient to equal the minimum floor level, SCDI was entitled to increase
the toll rates to recapture the deficiency in the following year.
On the other hand, SCDI was allowed to increase tolls on an annual basis by a
factor of only 75% of the annual increase in CPI. This would mean that toll rates would
come down in real terms over the life of the agreement. There was no ceiling on the
revenues SCDI could earn. The underlying assumption and expectation was that the
profitability of SCDI might be huge if they operated efficiently and increased toll revenues
by attracting additional traffic.
Ferry Cost Reimbursement Obligation
The government agreed to discontinue the ferry service on the date of substantial
completion. If the date of substantial completion did not occur by May31, 1997, SCDI was
required to reimburse the government for the government's cost of operating the ferry
service.
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4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
A variety of risks were well mitigated between the consortium and the government
through various agreements, insurances, bond terms, and all contracts. Basically, the
project company, or SCDI, bore all risks except force majeure risk for the project. The
agreements about financing structure between the project company and the government
were very thoughtful as shown in Table 4-11.
Table 4-11 Risk Description and Allocation for the Confederation Bridge Project
Risk Type Description Gov't SCDI
Both the government and SCDI shared responsibilities for fishery
Pre-construction right compensation, environmental compliance, regulatory 0
Risk permissions, and other project requirements before the construction
period.
The completion risk was huge because the construction method,
equipment, and the structure were very unique and the site condition
was very severe due to the long period of ice covering. Since the site
work in the strait was restricted for four months every year, a small
Completion trouble could delay the completion for a long time (at least four
Risk months). Cost overruns, if any, were the responsibility of the project
company. A very extensive security packages, comprising joint and
several parent company guarantees, a C$200 million performance
bond, and a C$20 million labor and material payment bond, were
supplied to protect the government.
Sales revenue was the only source of the cash flow of the project
company, for all the government subsidy went to the real rate
bondholders. Market risk nearly equaled to the risk of the traffic
Market Risk volume in the project. This demand risk was wisely mitigated for I 0
(Demand Risk) each party by setting the minimum floor level. In addition,
according to the non-competition clause, the government stopped
the ferry service and would not provide any financial assistance to
anyone to run a crossing service within 25 km of the bridge.
SCDI should deposit all toll revenues to a toll revenue segregated
account to be used for certain express purposes, including the
Operation Risk settlement of funds in a maintenance trust. Also, SCDI should have 0
a C$5 million maintenance assurance by way of a letter of credit to
secure SCDI's undertaking of the required maintenance.
Acts of the Queen's enemies, nuclear events, government action,
environmental injunction, and, sabotage and terrorism were
Force Majeure described in the agreement as force majeure risks, which the 0 A
government took. SCDI took the risk up to the amount of C$200
million, which was transferred by the insurance coverage.
Political Risk The government basically assumed political risks. 0 A
The project company's repayment obligation was secured by
priority charges on certain project assets and distribution of toll
Financial Risk revenue, certain financing proceeds, and by parent guarantees,together with several insurance and bonds to mitigate risks. The
government also required a separate letter of credit for C$73 million
to be set aside as extra protection against cost overruns.
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5) MCFs' Roles
The project company contained four construction firms only. Therefore, the MCFs
were fully responsible for the whole project. As described above, the construction firms
bore nearly all of the completion, operation, and financial risks, and most of the demand
risk.
The MCFs contributed to this project to an extremely large extent in order to
overcome the severe construction condition. For example, the design of the bridge utilized
a multi-span concrete box girder structure. Comprehensive design criteria for the
Confederation Bridge were developed by a number of world renowned consultants
specializing in areas such as wind, ice, earthquake, ship impact, load factor calibration,
corrosion, geo-technical engineering and durability. Specific characteristics were, among
others, as follows:
(a) For both the main bridge and the approach bridges, identical structures were
adopted for as many spans as possible for the sake of cost and schedule reduction;
(b) A conical shaped ice shield was adopted to minimize the ice forces on the structure,
while at the same time, facilitating the normal process of ice-out in the strait;
(c) The main bridge was made of four pre-cast concrete components, so that over 80%
of the project was performed on land in order to reduce weather dependency associated
with marine work, to maximize local labor skills, and to minimize disturbance to the
marine environment; and
(d) To build this innovative structure
as four pre-cast components, the floating
crane "Svanen" (Figure 4-10) was
upgraded and adapted to install the world
heaviest lifted components.
Without these various innovative
approaches made by the MCFs, no
consortium would have met the
government's criteria.
Figure 4-10 Floating Crane, "Svanen" (Source: SCDI)
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4.2.4. Highway 407 in Canada 25
This case, Highway 407 in Canada, provides insights for the PFI scheme in light of
the private investment and the type of project by the unique procurement process, even
though the project failed to establish a public-private partnership. Also, this project finally
adopted the world's first multi-lane, fully electronic state-of-the-art toll system, which was
expensive but not specified in the requestfor proposal (RFP). Therefore, this subsection
focuses on the process with the attitudes of both the government and the private companies,
rather than describing financial scheme, risk allocation, or MCFs' roles.
1) Project Outline
In 1993, the Province of Ontario decided to invite the private sector to design, build,
operate, and finance the Highway 407 ETR project (HW407), which was located across
northern part of Metro Toronto as an alternative route of congested Highway 401.
Nonetheless, as described below, a public-private partnership was not established in this
69-kilometer project. Table 4-12 shows the final outline of the project.
Table 4-12 Outline of the Highway 407 ETR Project
Location Across northern part of Metro Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Authority Concerned Ministry of Transportation, Ontario (MTO)
Scale 69km, 4-6 initial lanes
Structure Roads with some structures, fully electronic tolling system
Delivery System Design-Build, Two packages (for highway itself and for operation
system), Later, concession to a private entity
Project Company 407 International Inc. (Since May 1999)
Concession Period 99 years
Total Project Cost C$1 billion2 6
Tolls for Cars Vary, fully electronic toll system, adopting congestion pricing, etc.
2) Project Process
Request for Proposals
Two consortia were pre-qualified after the issuance of the Request for
Qualifications of May 1993. In September 1993, based upon "value engineering
25 Much information in this subsection is cited from Office of the Provincial Auditor, Ontario, Canada
(1996): "Highway 407 Central Project," 1996 Annual Report; and MIT (1997): "Highway 407 ETR,
Toronto," Infrastructure Development Systems IDS-97-T-013
26 For the convenience purpose, US$1= C$1.58 as of March 31, 2001.
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assessment reports" submitted by the two consortia according to independent C$1,500,000
each contracts, the Ministry of Transportation, Ontario (MTO) issued the RFP to the two
consortia. In order to give the two respondents full opportunity to display their originality
and creativity, the RFP did not specify such basic requirements as the highway
classification, design speed in KPH, widths of pavement, shoulders, and median, the
number of lanes, the type of pavement, and means of toll collection. The RFP described its
policy in its objectives clause:
"The Crown is providing the respondents with a considerable degree of latitude to
propose innovative approaches with respect to the project. The full extent of the
opportunities available to the respondents will be determined primarily by the
experience, creativity and initiative of the respondents."
The RFP requested detailed proposals with financing, design, construction,
maintenance, and operation plans of the expected toll highway 407 for 30year term.
However, the RFP was vague not only as to the specification but also as to the requirement
or expectation of financing and the level of service.
Business Arrangements
Business arrangements specified in the RFP included some basic principles, but the
principles were implicit in terms of how MTO would put the importance on each of the
principles in evaluating the proposals. The items of criteria were numerous and not limited
without prioritizing. The following exemplify the principles.
(a) Forecasted traffic volume was provided, and the respondents were to base their
proposals on the provided forecast, but "the risks relating to the Project must be assumed
by the Respondent."
(b) The financial commitment of the government would be minimized.
(c) The proposal should include an analysis of the business plan, which contained a
guaranteed maximum price for design and construction of the facility as well as a detailed
cash flow model of the project.
(d) One of the evaluation criteria was the amount of equity committed at the time of
submission of the proposal.
Proposals from the two Consortia
As a result, the two consortia proposed different project to a huge extent. Table
4-13 summarizes the proposals.
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Table 4-13 Summary of the Proposals from the two Consortia
Item Group 1 Tender Group 2 Tender
Road Lanes 4-6 initial lanes, expandable to 6-10 4 initial lanes, expandable to 8 lanes
lanes
Lighting 58 km fully illuminated, 11 km Certain interchanges illuminated
partially illuminated
Pavement Concrete pavement (30 year Asphalt 7-10 year design life,
estimated design life) Rehabilitation begins in 2003
ETC Mixed toll collection system, with Fully electronic tolling system with
automatic vehicle ID and manual video-tracking (Hughes/Bell)
toll booths (MFS Technologies)
Schedule Complete by 1999 Complete by 1997
Project Finance Primarily Debt Primarily Debt
Nominal Equity Contribution Nominal Equity Contribution
Substantial Government Subsidy Substantial Government Subsidy
3) Project Structure
After the evaluation of the two proposals, the government surprisingly unbundled
the consortia, rearranged the package, and selected Group 1 as the Design-Build contractor
for the road portion with replacing its operation team with the counterpart team from
Group 2. The project was finally divided into three packages: Financing the project by the
Government, Design-Build by the road team from Group 1, and Design-Build-Operate by
the toll system team from Group 2. The organizational structure of the project at the time is
shown in Figure 4-11.
The intentions of the government were that because both of the two consortia
offered little equity contribution, relying almost exclusively on interest-bearing debt, it
could finance the same debt less expensively than the private sector and decided to take
higher quality proposals for both road and toll system portions for the sake of the
Province's benefits. Especially, the Ontario government sought a state-of-the-art
technology for the toll collection system.
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Ministry of Transportation,
Ontario (MTO)
Finance the Project Ontario Transportation
Through Capital Corporation (OTCC)
407 ETR Concession
Company Limited
C$930 million
Design, Highway Consortium
Build
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itself
Canadian Highways
International Corp. (CHIC)
(Comprised of four Ontario
companies)
Lateu, 407 International Inc.
takes over.
*GMP: Guaranteed Maximum Price
a Crown agency of the
Province of Ontario
C$72 million contrac
Toll Collection System Desigr
Consortium Build,
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Bell Sygma, Inc., Bell
Canada, GM-Hughes, and
Mark IV Industries
(Later, Advanced Toll
Management Corp.)
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Figure 4-11 Organizational Structure of the 407 Project
4) Lessons Learned from the Project
The 1996 Annual Report issued by the Office of the Provincial Auditor made
recommendations for the future projects as lessons learned from the Highway 407 project.
Areas to need considerations for the Ministry of Transportation were following issues:
(a) The minimum number of bidders and design and construction alternatives needed
to provide an adequate basis for decision-making. In the case of Highway 407, only two
consortia submitted two design and construction proposals;
(b) The level of specific design criteria should be provided to bidders. For example,
the number of lanes, type of pavement and type of illumination were not specified. MTO
needed to weigh the benefits gained from providing the private sector with the flexibility to
be innovative against the cost of having bids which might not be price-comparable because
they were so different;
(c) The clarity of the RFP in conveying to the bidders MTO's intentions and
expectations regarding the sharing of risks and rewards; and
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(d) Whether components of a project that became separated or "unbundled" from the
original RFP needed to be rendered separately. The removal of private financing from the
project meant that MTO would be responsible for financing the project and would assume
operating and ownership risks. It would have been feasible to separately tender both the
highway maintenance and tolling system contracts.
Clear advantage of this procurement also appeared. Canadian Highway
International Corp., the road portion contractor, claimed that it reduced C$300 million off
the Province's estimate for the first 36 kilometers of the project and "much of the saving
came from efficiencies like a precast plant that was set up to fabricate sections of the
highway.,27 This was not the benefit from a public-private partnership but from the large
packaging of Design and Build contract with Operate and Maintenance.
5) Present Status
On April 12, 1999, 407 International Inc., owned by a consortium comprised of a
Spanish company and two Canadian companies28 , entered into a purchase agreement with
the Province to acquire from the Province all of the shares of 407 ETR Concession
Company Limited (the company established by the Province to hold the concession rights
in respect of Highway 407 ETR). The acquisition (99 year concession lease) was
completed on May 5, 1999 at a purchase price of approximately C$3.1 billion.29 Advanced
Toll Management Corp., a joint venture between Raytheon (merged with Hughes
Transportation Management Systems) and Bell Canada (merged with Bell Sygma), is
currently responsible for the toll collection system under the contract to 407ETR to supply
operation and maintenance services.
The 69 km central portion of the highway has been in operation since June 1997,
and construction of the expansions is expected to complete 108 km in total length. A 24
km western extension and a 15 km eastern extension are both scheduled to open in 2001.
2 ENR (1997): "Toll Roads, Smart Highway Set for IQ Test," ENR, Vol. 238, No. 4
28 Spanish company Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte (100% owned by Grupo Ferrovial,
2,645 million Euro sales MCF), SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., a Canadian engineering and construction company,
and Capital d'Ameique CDPQ, a subsidiary of Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec (CDP Capital, $125
billion assets fund management financial institution)
29 Ontario Securities Commission (1997): "407 International Inc. and Nesbitt Burns Inc., RBC Dominion
Securities Inc., et al., October 7, 1999" Orders and Rulings
30 407 International Inc.: "407 ETR History," Website, www.407etr.com
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Average workday number of trips in 2000 was 263,774 (10.5% increase from
1999), almost triple of the estimation at the time of the completion of the construction,
which was 90,000-100,000 vehicles a day by 2000. Income from operations in 2000 was
C$125 million, also well above the projection, C$ 100 million.3 '
4.2.5. SR91 and SR57 in California32
California enacted Assembly Bill 680 (AB680) in 1989, which aimed to encourage
the development of highways in the state with permission to private developers to collect
tolls for up to a 35-year concession period. AB680 formed an early public-private
partnership scheme in the U.S., and was a good example to show how PPP highways, or
toll roads run by the private sector, were introduced in the U.S., where construction and
operation of highways had been financed by public funds, i.e., dedicated gasoline taxes,
motor vehicle registration fees, and direct federal aid. This subsection introduces two of
the highways procured according to the AB680, State Route 91 (SR91) Express Lane
project and Santa Ana Viaduct Express, State Route 57 (SR57) project. In actuality, SR57
project did not proceed further due to the Orange County bankruptcy, which caused the
failure of a $25 million required funding to complete the environmental process on this
ploject; however, the case still gives some insights for the framework of the Japanese PFI.
(1) AB680
Outline of AB680
With the difficulties to raise taxes in the state and tremendous needs to increase the
capacity and to maintain the quality of highways and roads across the state, AB680 was
introduced to stimulate the private sector's investment in one of the public infrastructure
projects. The bill allows the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to
award up to four highway projects franchises to private developers as demonstration
projects, in which ownership should be transferred to Caltrans upon completion of the
construction. Once selected, the private franchisee had exclusive rights to design, build,
3 407 International Inc.: "News Release," Website, www.407etr.com
32 Much information in this subsection is cited from Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1991): "Private Toll Roads in
the United States, The Early Experience of Virginia and California," Harvard University Report; Public
Works Financing, Vol. 91, December 1995; and Public Works Financing, Vol. 65, July/August 1993
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finance, and operate the toll roads, collect tolls to repay the project debt, and earn a
reasonable return on investment. Franchise agreements for all four were signed in January
1991. These projects were the following: Mid-State Toll Road northeast of San Francisco,
SR125/San Diego Tollway, SR91 Express Lanes, and Santa Ana Viaduct Express (SR57)
To balance between filling public requirements and interesting the private
developers, the bill had following features:
(a) Design and construction of the highways must comply with state environmental
regulations and Caltrans standards.
(b) Out of four possibly awarded projects, at least one must be selected from
Northern California and one from Southern California.
(c) Each of the demonstration projects must be a supplement of existing
transportation services.
(d) Each of the demonstration projects must be financially self-standing.
(e) Excess toll revenues must be used to repay the project's debt or paid into a State
Highway Account.
Project Selection Process of Caltrans
Immediately after the legislation of AB680, Caltrans issued Requests for
Qualifications (RFQs), mailed them to more than 500 private firms, public agencies, and
individuals, and then pre-qualified 10 groups based on the criteria shown in Table 4-14.
Table 4-14 Evaluation Criteria for Pre-Qualification of Caltrans Projects
Evaluation Criteria Weight
Experience of the principal organization and consortium members 30 %
Record of financial strength to commit to a major transportation facility 30 %
Ability to work cooperatively with a broad range of governmental agencies and 20 %
the public
Individual qualifications of key project team personnel 10 %
Organizational and management approach for project company or consortium 5 %
Familiarity and experience with automated traffic operations, Automatic 5%
Vehicle Identification (AVI) and Electronic Toll Collection systems
Source: Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1991)
Caltrans, in the next stage, requested each pre-qualified consortium for Conceptual
Proposals. To minimize the state expenditure for the selection of the projects, Caltrans
gave the consortia the opportunity to choose a transportation project. The final evaluation
101
criteria were established as Table 4-15. Identifying the project and preparing the proposal
cost each consortia $1 million or more. The leading members of the consortia financed the
development of the proposal in most cases.
Table 4-15 Evaluation Criteria for the Final Selection of Caltrans Projects
Evaluation Criteria Points
Transportation service provided as a result of the proposal 20
Degree to which proposal encourages economic prosperity and makes overall 10good business sense
Degree of local support for proposal 15
Relative ease of proposal implementation 15
Relative experience and expertise of the proposal sponsors and their support 15
team on similar projects
Degree to which the proposal supports the State's environment quality and 10
energy conservation goals 10
Degree to which non toll revenues support proposal costs 5
Degree of technical innovation associated with the proposal 10
Degree of proposal's support for achieving the civil rights objectives of the 10State regarding the utilization of Minority and Women Business Enterprise
Source: Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1991)
Franchise negotiations followed the selection. After the intensive negotiation
period, the winners completed the environmental review process and the final design and
right-of-way acquisition for their projects.
(2) SR91 Express Lane Project
1) Project Outline
The SR91 freeway had experienced phenomenal traffic growth since it opened in
1968. SR91 passed through the Santa Ana Canyon and serves as the primary east-west link
between the coastal and inland areas in southern California. SR9 I's traffic increased at an
average annual rate of 8 percent throughout the 1980s, growing from 91,000 vehicles in
1980 to 188,000 in 1989. As AB680 passed, the CRSS Commercial Group began to form
its development team to evaluate alternatives to relieve SR91 's congestion.
The California Private Transportation Company (CPTC), a subsidiary of the
CRSS Commercial Group, which was a large design and construction management firm,
proposed the construction of four lanes in the median of the SR91 freeway for 10 miles
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between the SR55 freeway near Anaheim in Orange County and the border with Riverside
County. Table 4-16 outlines the SR91 project.
Table 4-16 Outline of the SR91 Project
Location California, Los Angels County through Orange County to Riverside
County
Authority Concerned California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
Structure Roads in mountainous area, in the median of the existing 8 lane
east-west inter-state highway
Scale 10 miles, 4 lanes
Project Company California Private Transportation Company (CPTC)
Design Speed 65 mph
Delivery System Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO)
Construction Period (Contract) January 1991, (Open) December, 1995
Concession Period 35 years
Total Project Cost $126 million ($88 million for construction)
Tolls for Cars $0.25 -$2.50 (Congestion Pricing), Free for HOV3 (high occupancy
vehicle); Cars with a transponder only
2) Project Structure
Organizational structure of the project is depicted in Figure 4-12. Once Caltrans
gave the project company (CPTC) necessary permissions and approvals, CPTC was
responsible for all of financing, design, construction, operation, and toll collection. Kiewit
and Cofiroute had the CM (construction management) contracts.
The selected developer, CPTC, was a limited partnership between the following
private companies3:
Kiewit Diversified Group was the major investor in CPTC and provided financial services
for the project as well as construction management.
Cofiroute Corporation was the California subsidiary of Cofiroute, the world's largest
private toll road operator, provided assistance and advice in the areas of operations,
electronic toll collection, and traffic management for the SR91 project.
Granite Construction Inc., a large transportation contractor, was the primary civil works
construction contractor for the project. A 25% limited equity partner in CPTC and the
holder of the $56.9 million, 29-month construction contract.
3 CRSS Commercial Group, a large and diversified engineering, design and construction services firm, was
the original, sole company of this consortium.
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MFS Communications Company Inc. (MFS) provided Automatic Vehicle Identification
tolling equipment for the project. MFS was a subsidiary of Kiewit.
Federal Approvals
Highway Caltrans
Administration
Permits, Facility
Approvals, Fees, Excess of
Right-of-way, Toll Revenues
Sponsors Maintenance+ Subordinate Local Authority
Kiewit Diversified Equity Debt Orange County
Group, Cofiroute CPTC Transportation
Corp., Granite 4 (Project epayment
Construction Investment Company)
Service CM
Agreeme Contract Loans
Kiewit Diversified
Group, Repaymen
Cofiroute Corp. Kiewit SR91 Lenders
Tolls CorpCofiouteCiticorp, Banque
Corporation Nationale de Paris,
Societe Generale
ETTM Contract Design/Build
Toll road Contract
Users 
rnt
MFS Network Construction
Technologies, Inc. Company
Source: Public Works Financing, Vol. 65
Figure 4-12 Project Structure of SR91
3) Financing Scheme
$126 million project cost was funded as shown in Table 4-17. 85% of the total
project cost was from taxable debt markets. Both the bank loans and the institutional debt
carried "favorable" rates because of the quality of the project and the long gestation period,
which gave the lenders enough time to understand the risks.
CPTC was free to set toll rates, but the maximum return rate the project company
might earn was set in the agreement. The maximum allowable rates of return on investment
included two elements: a basic rate of return plus some incentive returns if the project
achieved certain public objectives, such as increasing vehicle occupancy or reducing
accident rates. Any excess over the maximum allowed returns would be used to retire
project debt early or transferred to the state's highway account, as the AB680 legislation
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required. The base return rate was 17% and the incentive return rate was 12% for the SR91
project. The incentive return should be shared equally with Caltrans, and CPTC's portion
should be shared equally with Orange and Riverside Counties. 34
Exclusivity is guaranteed to the developer, that is, no similar projects would be
permitted within an "Absolute Protection Zone."
Table 4-17 Sources to Fund the SR91 Project
Source $ millions
Funded Equity from Sponsors 19
Senior Debt: 14-year term loans from Citicorp, Banque Nationale de Paris 65
and Societe Generale
Senior Debt: 25.5-year institutional debt underwritten by Kiewit 35
Diversified Group
Subordinated Debt: 8.5-year term, 3-year post-completion subordinated 7
loan at 9% from Orange County Transportation Agency
Total 126
Source: Public Works Financing, Vol. 65
4) Major Risk Profiles and Allocation
Major risk profiles and allocation of the SR91 project are shown in Table 4-18.
3 50 % of available cash flow could be retained by CPTC as incentive return and remaining 50 % to be paid
to Caltrans as variable franchise fee whenever Base NPV > 0 and Total NPV < 0. When Total NPV > 0, i.e.,
when available cash flows excessed the permissible Return on Investment, the excess toll revenues must be
paid into a State Highway Account.
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Table 4-18 Risk Profiles and Allocation of the SR91 Project
Cal-Risk Type Description tans CPTC
trans
Pre-construction CPTC was responsible for securing the necessary environmental
Risk and land use permits, with no compensation if it was A 0Risk unsuccessful.
The completion risk was minor. As the project was constructed
between the existing lanes, the site condition was apparent. One
Completion impediment to the completion was the necessity to handle heavy
Risk traffic flows. Acquisition was not a problem because the use of
the median of SR91 was an advantage of CPTC.35 Granite
Construction Company ultimately assumed the risk.
Traffic demand risk was completely assumed by the project
Market Risk companies, but it was in part mitigated with Non-compete Zones
(Demand Risk) Clause, which refrained Caltrans from building competitive
transportation facility within ten miles of the proposed project.
Caltrans would assume the normal tort liability for accidents and
Operation Risk fatalities associated with a highway owned by the state and 0
designed to state standards.
Force majeure risk was also assumed by CPTC, even though the
Force Majeure public sector assumed the main responsibility for the risk in most 0
of the other PPP project cases.
Caltrans would compensate CPTC if the state legislature, a state
agency, or the state's voters passed a law or regulation that
Political Risk substantially reduced the value of the developer's right under the 0 A
franchise agreement. Caltrans could only promise to make its
"best efforts" to prevent this risk.
Financial Risk
CPTC wais obviously responsible for the financial risk. As one
measure to mitigate the risk for CPTC, Caltrans gave the project
companies the right to lease state-owned land within the
right-of-way or the air space above it for the development of
service stations or other projects for up to 99 years.
0
5) MCF's Roles
CRSS Commercial Group was the sole, original consortium of CPTC, and it
evaluated over 75 projects before selecting the 91 Express Lanes. During the process,
CPTC had gradually put stress on the relative ease of the implementation of the project,
rather than the potential profitability with larger uncertainties. Therefore, in terms of the
innovative thoughts to overcome the complexity of a project, this project required the
MCFs less than the other seven competitive projects, or more potential projects, although
the workload for the selection of the project was, of course, huge.
3 In the criterion of 'Relative ease of proposal implementation,' one of the eight evaluation criteria for the
final selection, CPTC's proposal received exceptional appraisal.
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In SR91 case, Kiewit, which had the construction management function, did not
participate in the project as a contractor, but as the main investor and a construction
manager. Granite was the main contractor, shared 25% responsibility as a sponsor by
equity holding, and took part in the $88 million construction. Because the equity portion
of Granite was assumingly some $5 million, the equity investment would be within
Granite's profit margin from the construction contract.
(3) SR57, The Santa Ana Viaduct Express (SAVE) Project
1) Project Outline
Although the project was not realized, the proposed outline of the project is
outlined in Table 4-19. As the top ranked proposal among all the proposals, The Santa
Ana Viaduct Express project was selected by Caltrans as one of the four demonstration
projects under the AB680. This project was aimed to add another alternative to the route
from the Disneyland/Anaheim Stadium area to John Wayne Airport, perhaps the most
congested set of roadways in all of Southern California.
Table 4-19 Outline of the SR57 Project
Location Alternative to the route from the Disneyland/Anaheim Stadium area to
John Wayne Airport, California
Authority Concerned California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
Scale 11.7 miles, 4 lanes
Structure 8.3-mile viaduct in an existing channel. The rest is along other freeways.
Project Company The Perot Group
Design Speed
Delivery System Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO)
Concession Period 35 years
Total Project Cost $702 million (later raised to $750 million)
Tolls for Cars $0.25 -$5.00 for AVI charge and $3.00 -$5.00 for Cash charge
(Congestion Pricing)
A characteristic feature of the project was the utilization of the existing Santa Ana
River channel owned by US Army Corps of Engineers as part of the flood control system.
This 8.3-mile utilization, along with 3.4 miles of the rest being located along 1-405 or
Route 73 in the existing right of way, significantly reduced the burden of right of way
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requirements and costs of the 11.7-mile project. Figure 4-13 shows the typical section of
the channel utilization.
The project included exclusive toll collection lanes as well as manual lanes, special
rates for high occupancy vehicles, and used congestion pricing concepts ($5 per car during
the rush hours and $1 per car in the off peak). The estimated total construction cost was
over $700 million, which was much smaller than previous studies, thanks to using an
innovative bridge construction technique.
BICYLE TAIL 1 VEOUESTRIAN TRAL
180' Typical
330.* Typical ROWI
Figure 4-13 Typical Section of the Santa Ana Viaduct Express Project (SR57)
Source: National Toll Road Corporation
2) Project Structure
Since Caltrans tried to be consistent in the framework of the concession agreements
with four selected consortia, the basic project structure was intended to be the same as that
of the SR91 project, which is described in Figure 4-12.
The selected consortium comprised the following private companies. The
consortium spent four months evaluating over 40 alternative projects with the cost of $1.5
million.
The Perot Group, a large land developer and the main investor
Greiner Engineering Inc., the engineering consultant
Keiwit Pacific Company, the construction contractor except toll plaza and communication
Amtech Systems Corporation, the electronic toll equipment supplier
The First Boston Corporation, the investment bank
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Traffic Consultants Inc., the consultant engaged in the planning and development of
transportation infrastructure
URS/Coverdale & Colpitts, the consulting engineers to project traffic volumes
Nossaman, Gunther, Knox & Elliot, the law firm
Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett Inc., the economic and management consulting firm
3) Financing Scheme
Within some $700 million total cost for the project, costs for the pre-construction
phase, estimated some $47 million, were mainly funded by consortium members as the
equity contribution. Orange County also provided subsidy of $225,000 to this project in
the pre-construction phase.
Construction phase costs were first made by equity, but mostly by debt, though the
figures are not known. The consortium made every effort to minimize interest costs by
taking advantage of the design-build scheme, which included the merit of close interface
between design and construction teams and fast track construction.
The take-out financing would be composed of, from senior tiers, revenue bonds, the
replacement and renewals fund, the general reserve fund, subordinated debts, and
contributions of equity from the consortium. The replacement and renewals fund and the
general reserve fund were used also as a mitigation of the financing risk for Caltrans and
financiers. The highest base rate of return among the four AB680 projects, 20.25%, was
allowed by Caltrans, reflecting the riskiness of the project, in particular the uncertainty in
toll revenues. Also, a series of Area Development Projects and Commercial Property
Developments were permitted by AB680, so supplemental revenues could be raised.
4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
Risk profiles were quite different from the SR91 project in pre-construction
environmental issues, completion risk (cost overrun), and traffic volume uncertainty. The
viaduct design might not be enough to eliminate neighborhood opposition to the SR57
project. The most likely concern was the height and visual impact of the viaduct. The
viaduct would be 30 or more feet above the top of the embankment in order to clear the
bridges that cross the Santa Ana River. Construction cost was also quite uncertain because
of the adoption of an unproven technique. The environmental issue was the actual cause of
the non-realization of the project.
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Risk allocation of the SR57 project agreed between Caltrans and the Perot Group
was basically same as that of the SR91 project, which is shown in Table 4-18.
5) MCF's Roles
The consortium was considering innovative methods for building the viaducts that
might significantly reduce construction costs. The estimated total construction cost was
over $700 million, which was much smaller than previous studies, thanks to using the
innovative technique. Actually, when Caltrans first studied the same alignment in late
1960s, the option was so much more costly than others that it was not given very serious
consideration at the time. Moreover, two other consortia considering the same project
thought the construction cost would be too high to be repaid by toll revenues alone.
Therefore, if the project were successful, the magnitude of the MCF that developed the
innovative technique would have been huge.
4.2.6. Sydney Harbour Tunnel in Australia36
The Sydney Harbour Tunnel project is an Australian BOT project initiated by two
construction companies, Australian and Japanese, and has been completed successfully.
This project saggests various issues with respect to the roles of construction firms, project
fmnanc, 3,tructuring, and so on.
1) Project Outline
The Sydney Harbour Tunnel was constructed to relieve the serious congestion of
the Sydney Harbour Bridge. The Bridge, used for both railroad and road with 8-lane width,
opened in 1932 and have served as the only crossing between north and south sides of the
Sydney Bay, large residential districts and political and economic center (the Central
Business District), respectively. Since 1970s, traffic congestion had gradually become a
chronic problem. While the Government of New South Wales (NSW) requested for
proposals for a second crossing, none of the responses was feasible due to the difficulties of
the right-of-way acquisition, environmental issues, or construction costs.
In February 1986, a team of Transfield, an Australian construction firm, Kumagai
Gumi, a Japanese construction firm, and a domestic consultant together examined the
36 Most information in this subsection is cited from Arioka, Masaki (1995): "The Construction of the Sydney
Harbour Tunnel by BOT," Kaikyo Oudan Vol.3
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project and proposed a BOT plan to the State. The Government of NSW then authorized
the preparation of a detailed feasibility study by the Transfield Kumagai Joint Venture to
further develop the proposal. The Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company (SHTC), formed by
the Joint Venture to design, construct, finance, operate, and maintain the tunnel, entered
into the agreement with the Government in June 1987, and the project commenced. The
proposal resolved the problems such as environmental and landscape concerns, land
acquisitions, and the construction cost as well as matched the State's 20-year road system
development plan. Table 4-20 outlines the project.
Table 4-20 Outline of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Project
Location Between north and south sides of the Sydney Bay, NSW, Australia
Authority Concerned Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), NSW, Australia
Scale 2,280 meters, 4 lanes
Structure Main Tunnel: 8 reinforced concrete immersed tube units, each 120 m long
(960 m), Maximum Depth: 27 meters below mean sea level
(base of tube)
Land Tunnel: 870 meters on North shore and 390 meters on South shore
Ventilation Building: 60 meters long, Utilization of a pylon (90 m above
the ground) of the Sydney Harbour Bridge
Project Company Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company (SHTC), sponsored by Transfield
(50%) and Kumagai Gumi (50%)
Design Speed 70 km/h
Delivery System BOT
Construction Period June 29, 1987 - August 31, 1992 (Approx. 5 years)
Concession Period 30 years (September 1, 1992 - August 31, 2022)
Design Life 100 years
Total Project Cost A$ 750 million: A$ 550 million for investigation, design, and construction,
and A$ 200 million for finance cost during construction37
Tolls for Cars A$1 (A$0.50/one-way equivalent)
37 For the convenience purpose, US$1= A$2.06 as of March 31, 2001.
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Figure 4-14 Towing a Immersed Tube Figure 4-15 Route of the Tunnel (Upper Line)
Source: www.kumagaigumi.co.jp/product/knowO2O
2) Project Structure
The project structure of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel project is shown in Figure
4-16.As in most BOT yrojects, the private project company, SHTC, was given the
concession rights, and it designed and built the tunnel. Two MCFs, Transfield and
Kumagai Gumi, are the equity holders of the Tunnel Holding Company. After the 30-year
concession period, tunnel ownership is transferred to the Government of NSW free of
charge. Upon the transfer, the government will have an asset worth subsidizing the project.
NSW Government
RTA
Engineering
Agreement
k AL
Concession L
Agreement,
Loan
Agreement
Y
Independent Engineer
Design/Build Monitoring
Sponsor
Transfield/Kumagai
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Tunnel Holdings
Pry Ltd. (THPL)
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H TC Loans
Company Project
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Investment in
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institutional Investors
Figure 4-16 Project Structure of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Project
(Source: Kumagai Gumi)
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3) Financing Scheme
Sources of funds of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel project are, as Table 4-21 shows,
non-interest bearing debt from the government, bonds issued by the SHTC, and funds from
sponsors.
Table 4-21 Sources of Funds of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Project
Sources of Fund
Non-interest Debt from the Government A$ 223 million 29.7%
Bonds issued by SHTC A$ 463 million 61.7%
Other Loans (35 year term) A$ 57 million 7.6%
Equity from Sponsors A$ 7 million 0.9%
Total A$ 750 million 100%
The non-interest bearing debt from the NSW Government is a subsidy funded by
raising the tolls of the Harbour Bridge from A$0.20 to A$ 1. The bonds issued by the
SHTC have adjustable rates that are tied to the CPI, with 30-year maturity. To redeem the
bonds, toll rates are also related to the CPI. The equity, tolls from the tunnel, and the
government subsidy from the Bridge tolls are used for bond repayment and tunnel
operation.
Based on the conservative estimation of the traffic volume, the government gave
SHTC a guaranteed level of the revenue from passengers. In return, the government
retained the right to set the toll rates and to receive any surplus toll revenue. The
construction cost was guaranteed by the contract with the construction Joint Venture on the
turnkey basis.
4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
Major risk profiles and allocation are described in Table 4-22. Compared to other
BOT-kind projects, the government assumes more substantial risks, in particular, of the
demand (traffic volume) risk.
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Table 4-22 Risk Profiles and Allocation of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Project
Risk Type Description Gov't SHTC
Pre-construction Transfield and Kumagai jointly made significant efforts to
r s t investigate the project with no guarantee that the project would A 0Risk be realized.
There are numerous restrictions to be applied to various
construction stages as well as uncertainties about innovative
Completion construction methods and ground conditions. Completion risks,
Risk both cost and time overruns, are thus quite large. SHTC assumed
the risk by means of transferring to the construction JV with a
full-turnkey lump-sum contract.
The government conservatively forecasted future traffic volumes
using a consultant. Although there was a growing demand for
traffic, the demand risk of a long, 30-year forecast was
Market Risk substantial in the project. The Government guaranteed the
(Demand Risk) revenue from tolls, both from the Bridge and from the Tunnel,
and the revenue wais used for bond repayment and the tunnel
operation. Therefore, either surplus or deficient revenues would
be attributed to the Government.
The project company was responsible for the operation of the
Tunnel, which included collecting tolls, operating and
maintaining the facilities, and responding to emergencies, within
Operation Risk the agreed operation budget. The mutual agreement ensured the 0
risk assumption (The project company would not be paid back
for the investment without efficient operation and maintenance).
The Government monitored the operation.
Force Majeure The Government basically assumed force majeure risk. 0 A
Political Risk The Government basically assumed this risk. 0 A
The financial institutions issued the bonds, which were the main
source of the project funds and whose rates were related to the
CPI, and were responsible for the redemption. Creditworthiness
Financial Risk of the project, or the project structure, was the crucial concern for 0
the syndicate. The project company contributed an equity
portion, even though it was relatively small. Therefore, this risk
was mostly allocated to the financial institutions in actuality.
5) MCFs' Roles
The construction Joint Venture not only exercised their potential technological
expertise for the complicated project based on their experiences but also developed
innovative construction methods and soft tools such as financial schemes and
environmental solutions. Without their contributions, this project could not been
completed. They played a number of valuable roles in the planning, design, and
construction stages:
(a) Identifying the route of the tunnel with such restrictions that 1) there was no need to
acquire private property, 2) influences to the landscape should be minimized during
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and after the construction, and 3) the route should be identical with the road plan for
the 2 1" century,
(b) Putting ventilation facilities underground and restoring the surface to its present state,
(c) Solving two propositions: preventing air pollution caused by the exhaust and
protecting the scenery, by utilizing the 90m-high hollow pylon of the Harbour Bridge
as the ventilation tower,
(d) Establishing an innovative means to tow the immersed tunnel tubes 70 kilometers in
the outer sea so that the environment of the resident district would be protected, and
(e) Preserving the scenery of the forecourt of the Opera House by working underground.
4.2.7. DBFO roads in the U.K. (British PFI)38
The British PFI was the model for the Japanese PFI. Thus studying road projects
developed by the British PFI helps to establish a framework for the Japanese PFI for the
toll road project. This subsection examines the first eight "DBFO roads" procured by the
British PFI collectively.
1) Project Outline
The Eight DBFO Roads
After the Department of Transport announced that the private sector would be
invited to tender for DBFO roads in November 1992, contracts for the eight DBFO projects
were awarded with a combined capital value approaching E600 million to private consortia
as PFI projects by the Highways Agency, an executive agency of the Department, between
January and October 1996.39 The list and distribution of the eight projects are shown in
Table 4-23 and Figure 4-17. Because the DBFO roads adopt "shadow tolls" as described
shortly, there is no significant operational feature for the road users to distinguish a DBFO
road from the rest of the trunk road network.
Objectives of the DBFO Road Projects
The Highway Agency procured the eight DBFO roads as PFI projects with
following objectives:
38 Most information in this subsection is cited from Highway Agency, U.K. (1997): DBFO - Value in roads
- For the convenience purpose, US$1 = EO.7061=Y 126.25 = EUR1.1494 as of March 31, 2001.
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(a) To ensure that the road is designed, maintained and operated safely so as to
minimize any adverse impact on the environment and maximize benefit to road
users;
(b) To transfer the appropriate level of risk to the private sector;
(c) To promote innovation, not only in technical and operational matters, but also in
financial and commercial arrangements;
(d) To foster the development of a private sector road-operating industry in the U.K.;
and
(e) To minimize the financial contribution required from the public sector.
Transferring responsibilities for design, construction, finance, and operation of a
road and allocating appropriate risks to the private sector lead to efficient service and a
lower whole-life cost for the Agency. One objective of DBFO procurement was to
minimize claims. According to a National Audit Office report, claims contributed to a
28 % average increase of the construction from the tender price, attributing to the separate
contracts (design, construction, and operation). The first eight DBFO road projects
achieved 15% average cost savings compared with the PSC (public sector comparator).
(DBFO - Value in roads)
Table 4-23 List of DBFO Road Projects (Source: DBFO - Value in roads)
Miles Estimate of capital
value (Em)
Tranche 1
A69 Newcastle to Carlisle 52 9.4
M1-Al Motorway Link, Leeds 18 214
A 1(M) Alconbury to Peterborough 13 128
A417/A419 Swindon to Gloucester 32 49
Tranche 1A
A50/A564 Stoke to Derby Link 35 20.6
A30/A35 Exeter to Bere Regis 63 75.7
M40 Junctions 1-15 76 37.1
A168/A19 Dishforth to Tyne Tunnel 73 29.4
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Figure 4-17 Distribution of DBFO Road Projects (Source: DBFO - Value in roads)
Although the eight projects include both improvement to existing roads and new
construction and therefore differ in the treatment of certain provisions of the contract,
descriptions in this subsection are generally common to all the projects. For example, the
DBFO contract periods of the projects are all for 30 years from commencement dates, with
some possible adjustments, partly to encourage financial innovation of exceeding
conventional 10 to 15-year debt terms.
Project Company Selection Procedure
In order to help ensure that bidders make good efforts to win a contract, the Agency
requested pre-qualifications. The Agency took the view that four was the optimum number
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of bidders to promote healthy competition. The criteria for evaluation were technical,
financial, and economic track-record of the bidding consortium on similar infrastructure
projects involving construction, maintenance, operation, and financing responsibilities.
Once the approved bidders were selected, the Agency issued the tender documents
and asked the bidders to return their bids by a set date. After the clarification of each bid,
the initial negotiation took place, focusing on how risks were allocated and whether good
value for money was offered. Shortlisted bidders were selected, and after the second round
of negotiation, they were asked to return their Best and Final Offer (BAFO), which the
Agency evaluated to select the provisional preferred bidder (PPB). Following final, more
detailed, and lengthy negotiations, contract would be completed.
2) Project Structure
The typical contractual structure of DBFO road projects is depicted in Figure 4-18.
Shareholders in the figure are usually either an MCF, an engineering firm, or an investment
firm that comprise the project company (shown as "DBFO Co").
SherahcIders Sheareold Shareholder
G~uarantees
Direct Agreement
Hiys DBFO Contrca Pro-ct tac1ibes
Constuction C ontrat Conrs 0 & M
Constru on Co. Wintenance Contract
Maintainance
Su-taor
Figure 4-18 Typical Contractual Structure of DBFO Road Projects
(Source: DBFO - Value in roads)
3) Financing Scheme
Equity and Debt Financing
The eight DBFO roads were funded by both equity and debt, though the ratio varied
project-to-project. The consortia, or the project companies, were the sole contributors of
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the equity to date. Some use so-called "quasi-equity" in the form of subordinated debt in
order to seek a less expensive source of financing and the third party investors. Equity
contributions from third parties and the transferability of equity are the emerging issues of
the British PFI.
Debt financing was raised through commercial bank loans, funding from the
European Investment Bank (EIB), and the proceeds of bond issues. The debt usually had a
repayment period of 15 to 20 years and margins of between 120 and 140 basis points, with
limited recourse. EIB is non-profit making and therefore can offer smaller margin than
commercial banks, but it does not take risks in the construction stage. Hence, in practice,
some form of guarantee was required for debt financing during the construction phase. For
instance, a f165 million secured bond was issued to fund the construction costs of two
DBFO road projects (the Al (M) and A417/419) both awarded to RMG, a project company.
Since the bond was supported by an unconditional guarantee, it received an AAA rating,
and the coupon on the bond was relatively small 9.18%.
Shadow Tolls
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the British DBFO roads was the
payment mechanism for the provision of the road service. Instead of real tolls, paid by the
road users, "shadow tolls" were paid to the project company by the Agency based on the
number and type of vehicles using the road.
Bidders were asked to bid the parameters of traffic levels for a maximum of four
bands, with the top band set a zero toll to ensure that the maximum liability of the Agency
was capped. Typical bidders set the lowest band with a cautious view such that they would
cover the debt service (but not a return on equity). Shadow toll payments generally
increased over time according to an indexation formula.
For the project of the improvement of an existing road, 80% of the full level of
traffic payment was made representing the availability once the Permit to Use was issued.
The toll payments stepped down, in most cases, when the third party debt was fully repaid.
Revenue in excess of operating and maintenance costs would be used to provide a return on
equity. There were two other adjustments to payments: safety performance payments as a
bonus and lane closure charges as penalties.
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National Audit Office's Report
The National Audit Office (NAO) continuously examined the efficiency of PFI
projects in the U.K. For the first four DBFO projects (Tranche 1), introduced in the
foregoing, the NAO issued a report, "The Private Finance Initiative: The First Four Design,
Build, Finance and Operate Roads Contracts." In the report, the NAO stated that the
projects had produced better value for money with a net financial saving of E99 million
(13 %) even though this figure is less than the Agency's original estimate of E168 million.
This reduction in savings was a result of the different discount rates used. The Highways
Agency used a discount rate of 6 %, but the NAO raised the problem of the uncertainty and
sensitivity of the rate and calculated by using an 8 % discount rate, which was
recommended by the Treasury's published guide for financed projects.
4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
Under a British PFI contract, the private sector was generally assumed to take the
following risks: construction and operational cost overruns, delay in delivery of service,
design of the underlying asset, not delivering the agreed service, and changes of law.
Changes of law included tax law changes, which imposed additional or increased costs on
the operator. There are some other risks to be taken into account for DBFO road projects:
traffic risk, protestor risk, and latent defect risk.
Traffic forecasting was one of the responsibilities private consortia had to take, and
the demand risk was to be assumed by the project company. Although the Agency made its
forecasts for each of the DBFO projects, they were kept confidential to encourage the
bidders to make their own traffic growth projections.
Protestor risk, the increase in direct action to delay construction of new roads, and
latent defect risk, structural problems on the road that could not be detected during
pre-contract investigations, were responsibilities of the project company. Once the
detailed design/construction phase took place, the project company best suited to
managing these risks.
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Table 4-24 summarizes the risk allocation agreed in the contracts of first four
DBFO road projects.40
Table 4-24 Risk Profiles and Allocation of the DBFO Road Projects
Risk Type Description Public Private
Pre-construction The public sector assumed all the risk in the development
Risk stage, while pre-qualified limited numbers of private consortia 0 0bore the risk in preparing for bids.
After provided the "existing design," the private sector needed
to develop their own design and built the facilities. The private
Completion sector was solely responsible for the detailed design and
Risk construction. Neither availability fees nor the shadow toll was
paid to the private sector until the required services were
available.
If the traffic volume was less than expected, the project
company would earn the less revenue than expected and the
Market Risk public sector would pay a more expensive average toll rate to
(Demand Risk) the company. If the traffic volume was more than expected, 0 0the public sector would need to pay more shadow tolls to the
company but the company would earn the lower rate tolls with
a ceiling.
Operation Risk The private sector assumed the risk. Lane closure would
reduce the revenues.
The public sector basically assumed the force majeure risk.
Force Majeure However, the definition of the force majeure was limited (e.g., A
abnormal weather conditions are excluded), and some
unfavorable influences would be inevitable.
Risks to the changes of laws were borne by the private sector,
Political Risk even though the public sector was recommended, in a NAO 0 0
report, to assume the political risk in general.
The private sector, together with financial institutions and
Financial Risk other investors, assumed the financial risk. The private sector 0
transferred the risk in part through some insurance.
5) MCFs' Roles
To give bidders the opportunity to exercise their potential creativity, the Agency
provided only the fundamental requirements for design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the project road (core requirements), together with the Agency's own
design proposals (existing design), in the Invitation to Tender. As this scheme requires,
MCFs' proactive roles were essential for a consortium to offer a good bid. In fact, every
40 National Audit Office, U.K. (1998): The Private Finance Initiative: The First Four Design, Build, Finance
and Operate Roads Contracts; and National Audit Office, U.K. (1999): Examining the Value for Money of
Deals under the Private Finance Initiative
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consortium running the DBFO project was led by a major construction or engineering firm,
followed by an experienced operations firm.
However, the Agency expects still more demanding tasks of the private sector in
the future projects. The Agency's stance is that, the private sector should be involved in
the initial design of the road scheme and should assume some planning risks. The MCF's
role would become more and more important when the consortium is more involved in the
planning stage.
4.2.8. Kanamachi Co-generation System Project (Japanese PFI)4 1
Kanamachi Co-generation System project, installed in the Kanamachi Water
Purification Plant, is a significant example of the pioneer PFI-type projects in Japan. This
and the following subsections introduce practical experiences of the Japanese PFI.
1) Project Outline
In the Kanamachi Co-generation System project, the private undertaker installs,
owns, and operates the co-generation system and provides the Bureau of Waterworks
(BOW) of Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) with electric power and steam, which
TMG purchases. The electric power is used both in ordinary condition and in emergencies
such as if the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) stops power supply in the cases of
earthquake. The steam is used for humidification of sludge in the drainage treatment
facility and for heat drying the generated soils. Table 4-25 shows other basic facts of the
project.
41 Much information in this subsection is cited from TMG, Bureau of Waterworks: "Kanamachi Water
Purification Plant, Co-generation System, PFI Model Project," Pamphlet; and TMG, Bureau of Waterworks
(1999): Kanamachi Water Purification Plant, Co-generation System, PFI Model Project, Request for
Proposals.
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Table 4-25 Outline of the Kanamachi Co-generation System Project
Location Kanamachi Water Purification Plant, Kanamachi, Katsushika-ku, Tokyo,
Japan
Authority Concerned The Bureau of Waterworks (BOW), Tokyo Metropolitan Government
(TMG)
Capacity of the Plant 7,OOOkW-cogeneration power plant, which will be capable of outputting
10,000kW in an emergency
Type of Project Service Purchasing Type (The public sector purchases a service.)
BOO (Build Own Operate)
Project Company Kanamachi Water Purification Plant Energy Service Co.
Investing Company IHI, Shimizu Corp., and Electric Power Development Corp. (EPDC)
Concession Period 1999.10 - 2030.10 (Operation from 2000.10, until dismantle)
Project Cost V25.3 billion, 20 year payment to the project company and TEPCO
Project Procedure
Project procedure until the selection of the private undertaker was shown in Table
4-26.
Table 4-26 Project Procedure of the Kanamachi Co-generation Plant Project
January 27, 1999 Distribution of the Tender Open to the public
Documents
February 15, 1999 Pre-bid Meeting on Site 100 firms attended.
March 29, 1999 Submission of Proposals 11 groups submitted.
April 21, 1999 Announcement of the Passed were those groups that
Result of Evaluation Step 1 satisfy the criteria Bureau of
Waterworks had determined. 5
out of 11 proposals passed
June 16, 1999 Request for 2nd Step
Proposals
July 15, 1999 Submission of Proposals
July 23, 1999 Announcement of the Passed was the group whose
Result of Evaluation Step 2 proposal showed the lowest cost
for Bureau of Waterworks.
2) Project Structure
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), Shimizu Corporation, and Electric
Power Development Corporation (EPDC) established Kanamachi Water Purification
Plant Energy Service Corporation (KESCO), an SPC (special purpose company) for this
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project. KESCO and the TMG reached 20-year concession agreement for the
co-generation service. Figure 4-19 shows the structure of the project.
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Think- tank PGoenetBuauPower Co.
,of Waterworks
Direct AgreemenM - Payment for Contract for Provide Power
-0 -- Power and Business and Steam
Steam P
Financial Loan KESCO Gas Service
Institutions Payment Project Company Tokyo Gas Co.
HI, Shimizu, EPDC
Investment Construction, Delivery of
Plant, Maintenance,
ividend Operation, Accounting
Shareholders Plant-maker,(Sheh uders C Construction companies(IHI, Shimizu, EPDC) (IHI, Shimizu, EPDC)
Figure 4-19 Project Structure for the Kanamachi Co-generation System Project (Source: IHI, Kesco)
4) Financing Scheme
"Project financing" is used to fund the project, that is, the lenders invested in the
project itself rather than the sponsoring companies because the project structure is
creditworthy enough for project financing. Total financing amounts to approximately V1. 1
billion. Additionally a loan from New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization (NEDO) for FY2000 of approximately V411 million was paid as a subsidy
from TMG. The loans are repaid by the service payments of TMG during the 30-year
concession period. The equity contributed by the sponsors are Y60 million in total, of
which IHI provides 60%, and Shimizu and EDPC provides 20% each. The sponsors will
raise the equity stake to V240 million in the future.4 2
5) Risk Profiles and Allocation
Risk profiles and allocation are shown in Table 4-27. In addition to the allocation
described in the Table, KESCO utilizes an insurance broker and employs a total package of
42 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (IHI): Website, www.ihi.co.jp
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insurance coverage such as fire, earthquake, completion, and penaltiesfor both the SPC and
the EPC contractors.
Table 4-27 Risk Profiles and Allocation of the Kanamachi Project (Source: IHI, Kesco)
Risk Type Description TMG KESCO
Pre-construction TMG assumes all the risk in the development stage, while 0 0Risk KESCO bear the risk in preparing for bids.
Completion KESCO needs to complete the project within the budget and
time, meeting performance criteria. KESCO shall pay the
penalty to TMG if the commencement delays, while TMG is 0
responsible for the operation and availability of the pertinent
facilities.
Fuel Gas and water as fuel shall be provided. If gas or water supply
stops, KESCO is indemnified for providing power and steam to 0
TMG.
Operation The facility shall be operated stably, and power and steam shall
be provided properly. If the system stops in an accident, 0
KESCO shall pay the penalty.
Inflation The fluctuation of prices during 20 year long period may cause
cost increase. Electric power and steam prices are adjusted by
the index formula that identifies costs such as fuel, personnel,
and materials.
Force Majeure Force majeure such as earthquake and flood may cause damages
of facilities or impossibility of the trade. KESCO shall keep
supplying electric power on and after an earthquake of no more 0 A
than 0.6G horizontally and 0.3G vertically. Otherwise, TMG is
responsible for the risk with the deduction of V1 million.
6) MCFs' Roles
In this particular case, IHI should be assumed to be an MCF because this is a
plant-engineering project. IHI, together with other participants, plays a significant role in
the course of the PFI procurement in the following areas:
(a) Minimization of the project costs: Efficiency of the plant, Construction cost,
Finance cost, Maintenance cost, Labor cost, Insurance cost,
(b) Technical proposal: Electric power supply plan, Steam supply plan, Curtailment of
power supply from TEPCO,
(c) Earthquake-proof facilities with design horizontal seismic coefficient of no less
than 0.6,
(d) Operation and management system of the plant, and
(e) Credibility of the plant and maintenance management system.
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4.2.9. Kanagawa Hoken-Iryo-Fukushi Daigaku (Japanese PFI)
Kanagawa Hoken-Iryo-Fukushi Daigaku (Kanagawa Prefectural College, KPC) is
procured concurrently with the development of the Japanese PFI scheme and becomes one
of the PFI model projects.
Figure 4-20 Images of the KPC Project (Source: www.obayashi.co.jp)
1) Project Outline
Kanagawa Prefecture has a unique procurement scheme: to pay a private
undertaker for loans to design and construct public facilities. In the KPC project, to adapt
the Japanese PFI scheme, the Prefecture includes operation and maintenance in the project
scope. Upon the completion of the college, the Prefecture owns it and pays the operation
fees to the private undertaker for a 30-year term. Table 4-28 shows other basic facts about
the KPC project.
Table 4-28 Outline of the Kanagawa Prefectural College (KPC) Project
Location Yokosuka-city, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan
Authority Concerned Kanagawa Prefecture
Specifications No more than 40,000m 2 total floor area, with administration offices,
lecture rooms, experiment facilities, an auditorium, a library, a
gymnasium, outside sport facilities
Type of Project Installment Lease (Kanagawa-type PFI)
BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate)
Project Company "SPC PFI Kanagawa 1"
Investing Company Obayashi Corporation
Contract Period 2000.6.3 - 2003.1 for Design and Construction
2003.4 - 2033.3 for Operation/Maintenance
Project Cost Approx. 21.5 billion Yen (PV, NPV= $200 million)
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Evaluations of Proposals4 3
In December 1999, Kanagawa Prefecture received applications from seven
consortia, which contained MCFs and trading, real estate, and lease companies. The
Prefecture then requested the seven consortia to submit detailed proposals due on February
10, 2000. The proposals were evaluated in two steps as follows.
Evaluation Step 1: Evaluated with respect to performance and function, 3 proposals
out of 7 were selected on March 30, 2000. The criteria of performance and function and
their weights are shown in Table 4-29.
Table 4-29 Criteria of Performance and Function and the Weights
Category Criteria Weight
Performance/ Function Clearance of Criteria 20 %
(Subtotal 60%) Functionality/ Amenity 10 %
Safety 10 %
Environmental Considerations 10 %
Practicability 10 %
Maintenance/ Operation Basic Policy 3 %
(Subtotal 20%) Administrative System 3 %
Level of Service 6 %
Economical Efficiency 8 %
Comprehensive Evaluation Appearance/ Design/ Ingenuity 20 %
(Subtotal 20%)
Source: KPC Proposal Evaluation Committee (amended)
Evaluation Step 2: The Evaluation Committee evaluated the three superior
proposals again. In this step, the Committee included as evaluation criteria the cost factor
(cost comparison and long-term viability of the proposals) and consortia's answers to
Committee's additional inquiries, as well as the performance and function factors. Each
member voted and the proposals were valuated with points of 2, 1, or 0 for each vote,
which were then summed. The result was announced on April 7, 2000. Even though the
cost of Obayashi's proposal was 4 th out of the seven total proposals and 2 nd out of the
selected three proposals, other factors were better evaluated. The cost factor contained the
following three components:
43 KPC Proposal Evaluation Committee (2000): "Evaluation Comments on the Proposals for KPC Project,"
5'h PFI Subcommittee
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(a) Project funding (financial viability): financial robustness and credibility of the
company, design and construction experiences, viability and security of financing;
(b) Amortization charge: interest (base rate + spread), capital (construction, design and
supervision, and administrative); and
(c) Operation and maintenance costs: operation and maintenance costs, prices increase.
2) Project Structure
Obayashi Corporation, an MCF in Japan, established an SPC, the project company,
and is the sole sponsor of the KPC project. The project structure is shown in Figure 4-21.
When the construction is completed, the ownership of the property is transferred to the
Prefecture, and the project company operates and maintains the college. The Prefecture
makes the installment payments for the 30-year contract period.
Private Advisory Kanagawa
Think- tank Prefecture Direct
Agreement
Contract for
TBusiness PlanFnnca
L oa n Syndicate
Shareholders Investment SPC by Obayashi roject
- Obayashi - - Finance
Corporation (Project Company)
Isurance
Design, Construction, Property
Advisory Maintenance, Operation, Insurance
Contract Accounting Company
Financial and Construction,
Legal Design, O&M
Advisors companies (Source: www.obayashi.co.jp,
(Obayashi, etc.) - amended)
Figure 4-21 Project Structure of KPC Project
3) Financing Scheme
Total costs of the project are as follows: 44
Construction cost: VI 1,880 million,
Interest of Installment during 30 years: Y5,550 million, and
4 Nihon Kogyo Shimbun (Newspaper), July 24, 2000
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Maintenance and Operation: V16,450 million.
As with the Kanamachi Co-generation Plant project, the financing scheme of the
KPC project is basically project finance, in which the financial syndicate relies only on the
revenue from the project (i.e., installment payments of the Prefecture). Since this financing
scheme has a long-term structure for 30 years, it is stable financing for the project company
without the refinancing risk. Moreover, the project company prepares a separate reserve
fund for the repayment. In addition, Obayashi Corporation, a sole sponsor, provides the
equity of Y790 million.
4) Risk Profiles and Allocation
Kanagawa Prefecture expresses its basic concept of risk allocation in the request
for proposals: While responsibilities for design, construction, operation and maintenance
for the college are allocated to the project company in principle, the Prefecture may assume
the responsibilities when reasonable. This project aims to be less expensive with higher
quality services employing proper risk allocation. Table 4-30 is the risk allocation list
extracted from the Implementation Policies. The project company was given the
opportunity to structure the risk allocation and to negotiate with the Prefecture.
Table 4-30 Risk Allocation of the KPC Project (Extraction from the Implementation Policies)
Risk Type Description Public Private
.t Errors in the Implementation Policies, Objections to the
Ris establishment of the college, Changes of specifications
Delay of permissions, Preparation costs 0
Completion Liabilities to the third party, Cost overrun, Delay of the
Risk completion, Inadequacy of the performance
Fluctuation of the consumer price, Changes of specifications,
Loss caused by fires and accidents, Preservation of the 0
Operation Risk environment and safety
Increase of O&M costs 0
Force Majeure Changes, suspension, and delay caused by natural disasters and A 0
riots
Changes of laws relevant to the PFI and school operations, 0
Political Risk Direction of the Prefecture, Denial of the Assembly
Changes of laws in general, e.g., taxation 0
Delay of the payment, Fluctuation of interest 0
Other financial risks 0
(Newspaper), August 4, 2000
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4 Kensetsu Tsushin
4.2.10. Japan's Private Sector Projects
This subsection introduces relatively new procurement methods adopted in public
facility projects managed by the private sector. The owners in the examples are East Japan
Railway Company (JR East) and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). JR East is
a privatized (denationalized) and divided agency established in 1987 and will be fully
privatized in the near future. TEPCO was established in 1951 as a private company. The
objective of this subsection is to demonstrate the private sector's advantage in efficient
procurement of infrastructure facilities with innovative delivery systems. Although a
detail or specific description of the projects is omitted, project structures and risk allocation
are basically same as public sector procurement, i.e., the owner companies are generally
responsible for everything. Financing a project is also the owner's responsibility.
East Japan Railway Company (JR East) sometimes employs "designated
competitive bidding with proposal evaluation" system to select contractors. In this system,
JR East provides the performance requirement, together with an original design, so that
potential competitors can propose their plans, designs, and specifications to meet the
requirement and improve on the value for money. For the Numakunai Bridge project, one
of the Shinkansen (bullet train lines) projects that followed the procedure, Kajima
proposed the adoption of newly developed "high-performance, light-weight concrete" and
the external cable systsm for its superstructure. Kajima offered 10% cost reduction
(compared to the estimation based on JR East's original design) because not only were the
spans lengthened but also the substructures were diminished. By this procurement system,
JR East not only exploited the MCF's hot technologies, but also significantly reduced the
construction cost.46
TEPCO has a unique procurement system of construction projects. It encourages
contractors to offer value-engineering proposals by giving "points" to the contractor who
has achieved effective value-engineering proposals depending on the peoposals'
advantages. When a contractor's points reach a certain criterion, TEPCO gives the
contractor a special appointment contract as a "bonus order." This system has had a
46 Yanai, Shuji and Sakata, Noboru (2000): "Kouseino Keiryo Konkurito no Genba Tekiyo (Application of
the High Performance Lightweight Concrete)," Technical Report, No.201, Kajima Technical Research
Institute
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significant effect for TEPCO. For instance, the average ratio of the cost reduction by
means of "request for technical proposals" is about 7%.47
Other than the foregoing characteristic methods, both JR East (and other JR Group
companies) and TEPCO always employ competitive environments in their procurement
process. They usually designate 3-5 MCFs and let them compete one another. Even when
they adopt a special appointment contract, they are careful enough not to lose the
competitive environment. For example, owners monitor carefully the achievements of the
contractors during design and construction stages.
Flexibility that has allowed owners to make use of MCFs' potential has apparently
brought about the efficiency gains for construction projects. The public sector, in contrast,
has substantial limitations imposed on it, which reduces its ability to be flexible.
Nikkei BP (2000): "Requirements that Make Value Engineering Come up to Surface," Nikkei Construction
2000.8.11
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4.3. Comparisons and Analyses of the Case Studies
This section compares and analyzes the cases studied in the previous section, with
regard to the project structure, financial scheme, risk allocation, and MCFs' roles and
contributions, putting stress on the perspective of the participating MCFs. Table 4-31
summarizes the cases studied.
Table 4-31 Summary of the Cases Studied
Project Scope Scale Structure Total Remarks
_______________ cost"
Kurushima New bridge, Procured 4,105m, Large scale 3-succes- V280B V53.6B/km
Kaikyo by HSBA (public 4 lanes sive suspension bridge, (2,220M) ($425M/km)
Bridge agency), Some foundations in 6,000 vs./day inDesign-Bid-Build the strong current strait the 1st year
New facilities, "Third 10km 4-13.9m dia. shield V1,266B Y81.1B/km
sector" project, D-B-B tunnel, tunnels, 4.4 km conti- (10,030 ($642M/km)
Toko Bay with detail design by 4.4km nuous bridge, two man M) 10,000vs./day
the private sector bridge, 4 -made islands in the (25,000 in
lanes middle of Tokyo Bay projection)
Confederati New bridge, F-B-O-T 12.9km, Continuous precast C$840M C$65M/km
on Bridge, 2 lanes concrete bridge with (530M) ($41M/km)
Canada foundations in theice-covered sea
Highway New facilities, Bypass 69km, Roads with some struc- C$1,000M C$14M/km
407 in of HW401, Procured 4-6 tures, Fully electronic (640M) ($9.2M/km)
Toronto by Province of Ontario lanes tolling system 264,000vs./d.
SR91 in New lanes in the 16km, Roads in mountainous $126M $7.9M/kmSR9finia median of an existing 4 lanes arca 37,000vs./dayCalifornia facility in projection
New facilities, 18.7km 8.3mile viaduct in an $700M $37M/km
SR57 in utilizing an existing 4 lanes existing channel, the Not
California channel, as a rest is along other Commenced
congestion reliever freeways
Sydney New tunnel, 2,280m, Eight 120m-long RC A$750M A$330M/km
Harbour Bypass of an existing 4 lanes immersed tube tunnels, (360M) ($160M/km)
Tunnel bridge 1,260m land tunnels 60,000vs./d.
DBFO Include both new 21-122 Varies between 8 £9.4-214 E.18-7.4M/km
roads in constructions and km, ave. projects M ($0.26
U.K. improvements 72km (13-303M) -10.5M/km)
Kanamachi New co-generation 7,000 V25.3B Government
Co-generati system in a water kW - (200M) pays for the
on Plant purification plant power service.
Kanagawa New college 40,000m2  Y21.5B BTO,
Prefectural construction and floor area - (170M) Installment
College operation lease
Delivery systems JR East and TEPCO employ are introduced without specific description of a project.
*1 Numbers in parentheses are U.S. dollar amounts converted at the exchange rates in Appendix A.
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4.3.1. Project Structure and MCF's Initiative
Comparison of Organization Structures
In privatized toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, the organizational structures are
mostly the same except for the toll collection systems. Namely, the government gives the
project company the concession to design, construct, finance, and operate the project; the
project company, led by an MCF, seeks financial institutions to provide the necessary
funds; the sponsors of the project company contribute nominal equity to the project; the
project company contracts with design firms, construction firms, and operation and
maintenance firms, for the respective works; both the government and the project company
employ financial, legal, (and technical) advisors; and the financing institutions try to have a
direct agreement with the government. Financial schemes and toll collection methods vary
as compared in the following subsection.
In traditional Japanese delivery system, as seen in the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge
case, the organizational structure of the project was quite different. HSBA, the public
agency for the project, acted directly with each of the participants as if it had been
Almighty. In other words, the public agency behaves both as the project company in a
privatized project and as the public owner. It would acquire the right of way, finance, and
obtain permissions better than the private sector because of the experiences in the
prospective Japanese PFI scheme.
Similarly, in most privatized projects in Japan, such as Japan Railways' projects
and electric power projects, the private owners have strong incentives and considerable
responsibilities for the projects like the public agencies in public works. Although a chart
of the project structure is not provided in the subsection in question, the structure may be
exactly the same as that of the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge case. In some cases, for example
in cases described in Section 4.2.10, partial differences can exist with regard to the package
of the main contract (e.g., design-build contract).
There is no difference except in revenue structure between PFI toll road/bridge/
tunnel projects and other PFI projects such as pioneer Japanese PFI projects.
MCFs' Initiative
Every project company, which is the main player in a privatized project, includes
an MCF as a sponsor, and an MCF leads the project company in the Confederation Bridge
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project, Sydney Harbour Tunnel project, and many of the DBFO projects. MCFs'
initiative is quite large, compared to design companies and operation companies.
Nonetheless, the governments play the most important role in encouraging the private
sector to be involved in the projects. Even in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel case, where the
two MCF sponsors had the strong initiative to develop the project and aggressively
proposed the project plan, the government sent them a clear signal to express the necessity
of another crossing in the harbor. In sum, provided that the government is committed to
developing a project, MCFs should have strong incentive to participate in the project and
even lead a prospective project company, whatever the delivery system is, or whether the
project is procured publicly or privately.
4.3.2. Financial Schemes and MCFs' Contribution
A sound financial scheme is indispensable for private toll roads. For example, in
the Confederation Bridge case, when SCDI, the project company, was finally awarded both
by the overall proposal and by negotiation with the government, the key issue that effected
on the final award decision was the soundness of the consortium's financing structure of
the project. Studies have shown that even under pessimistic assumptions, the NPV of the
project is still positive.48
Financial schemes employed in cases studied are summarized in Table 4-32.
48 J-KICKS (1999). "Project Evaluation of the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project," Course Project at
MIT
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Table 4-32 Financial Schemes of the Cases Studied (Toll Roads)
Total Total Total Debt/ Government Financial
Project Debt Equity Capital Equity Support
Kurushima Y218B*1  Y62B*' V280B (Financed by the governments)
Bridge ($1 ,730M) ($490M) ($2,220M) (78/22) More than half of debt is fromTreasury Investment & Loan
T y 1,176B Y90B 1,266B Only a third of the equity isTokyo Bay ($,376B O9 ) (1,266B 93/7 provided by the private sector.
Aqua-Line ($9,320M) ($71OM) ($10,030M) 18% of the debt is from Private.
Confederation *$ * Subsidy to repay the bonds,
Bridge, C$7560M C$84M C$840M 90/10 Minimum floor level setting,
Canada ($477M) ($53M) ($530M) Non-competition clause
Highway 407 _ C$1,000M C$1,000M 0/100) (Financed by the governments)
in Toronto ($640M) ($640M)
SR91 in $107M $19M $126M 85/15 $7 million in debt from Orange
California __County
A$223 million non-interest
Sydney A$686M A$47M A$750M bearing loan from the gov't,
Harbour ($333M) ($23M) ($360M) 94/6 Revenue transfer from Bridge,
Minimum revenue guarantee
DBFO roads E9.4-214M vary* 3  Shadow toll payment (not
in U.K. ($13-303M) vary necessarily "Support")
*' Debt and Equity are approximated from the statement of HSBA's total budget.
*2 Figures are assumed from the information available. Equity portion was only for the contingency.
*3 Equity proportion is not significant in part because early transfer of the assets may be prioritized in
U.K.
Tolls and Toll Collection
In toll road projects, toll revenue is usually the only source available to repay the
debt and to give return to the equity investors. As such the sound toll collection system is
key to the success of the project. Restrictions regarding toll rates or toll revenues vary
among the projects. In the Confederation Bridge, the agreement includes the minimum
floor level of the toll revenue, which is indexed by the CPI, and the project company is
allowed to raise the toll rates if the previous year's toll revenue falls below the floor level.
The government of NSW guarantees the minimum toll revenue in the Sydney Harbour
Tunnel case, which is also indexed to the CPI and is more favorable scheme for the project
company to transfer the demand risk, though the ceiling is also established above which all
the surplus is transferred to the government. In the SR91 project, instead of minimum
guarantees, the project company is allowed to earn up to certain rate of return. This works
as a toll revenue ceiling despite no minimum guarantees. In British DBFO roads, shadow
toll rates, which the government pays tolls on behalf of the drivers, are the selection criteria
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for the project companies. Therefore, neither minimum guarantees nor a ceiling exists,
while the four-band toll rating system, employed with the shadow toll system, may work as
such a buffer both for the project company and for the government.
Sophisticated electronic toll collection systems are adopted in the Highway 407 and
SR91 projects. The two projects also employ a congestion pricing system for more
efficient toll collection.
Investment (Equity)
All toll road case studies procured by the private sector show the investment rates
of less than 15%. In general, the project company provides equity for up to twenty percent
of the necessary financing, depending on the magnitude of the risks involved. 49 However,
the proportion of MCFs' contribution is not usually dependent on the risks they can best
control, rather, MCFs are forced to provide equity due to the huge magnitude of the
contract amount and because MCFs need to commence the work earlier than others
(operation or financing firms). Moreover, MCFs see their position in very competitive
environment and feel pressed to the contribution to make the project profitable. 50
In the cases studied, MCFs are successful in minimizing their equity investment
positions in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel, the Confederation Bridge, and Highway 407
(eventually zero equity investment) cases. Because toll road projects bear considerable
risks, especially in the traffic volume, the project companies try to reduce risks as much as
they can by avoiding equity contribution or obtaining some revenue guarantees, and they
seem to have succeeded in doing so. However, the MCFs might have lost the opportunity
to get more profits from the successful long-term projects even though the success has
come from the contributions of paramount importance, such as innovative construction or
operation technologies. An equity contribution strategy for the MCF participating in the
project is examined in Chapter 6.
Incentives
The agreements about financing structure between SCDI and the government,
described in the Confederation Bridge case subsection, are very reasonable, giving SCDI
9 For example, Fisher and Babbar (1996): "Private Financing of Toll Roads," RMC Discussion Paper Series
117, World Bank
50 Madono, Satoru (2000): "Paradigm Changes and the Japanese Companies," Journal of the Japan Society of
Civil Engineers, Vol.85, October 2000, JSCE
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incentives to work efficiently, and give the government multiple levels of security against
potential problems related to the contractor. This financing structure convinces relevant
parties that the overall pricing, or toll rates, are reasonable and the concession is awarded
well.
Government Supports
Government financial supports may be available in various ways. They include,
from higher level of governments' financial exposure, equity guarantees, debt guarantees,
exchange rate guarantees, grants, subordinated loans, minimum traffic or revenue
guarantees, shadow tolls, revenue enhancements, and concession extensions. The
following exemplify explicit government supports.
California: Orange County's financial supports;
Sydney: The minimum traffic volume guarantee and raising of the Harbour
Bridge's tolls before the commencement of the Tunnel to give the project
company a fund;
HW407: Government financed project;
DBFO Roads: Shadow tolls (similar concept: KPC and other Kanagawa-type PFI,
namely, the private sector initially finance the project, which is leased
back from the Prefecture to the project company)
Other Financial Instrument
Some toll road projects, such as the Confederation Bridge and the Sydney Harbour
Tunnel, develop innovative financing instruments, i.e., real rate revenue bonds in the
former and CPI indexed bonds in the latter. Both of them were the crucial developments
contributing to the success of the project. By adopting the PFI framework, such a
development in the financing field is expected.
4.3.3. Risk Allocation
The risk allocation of the cases studied in this chapter is summarized in Table 4-33.
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Table 4-33 Risk Allocation of the Cases Studied
Project Preconst- Comple- Demand Force Political Financial
ruction tion majeure
Kurushima 0 0(0) 0 0 0 0
Bridge*'
Tokyo Bay 0
Aqua-Line* _ (*very little)
Confederatio
n Bridge, 00 S 0(0) 0(0) O(5)
Canada
Highway 407
in Toronto*'
SR91 in
California
Sydney Har- 0(0) 0 (S) 041) 0(0)
bour Tunnel
DBFO roads 0(6) 0 Q(6) 0
in U.K.
Kanamachi
Co-generatio 05 0 0 0(0) 0(9) 40(0)
n Plant
Kanagawa
Prefectural 0 0 0 0 (0) 0(0) 9(0)
College I II 
_I
Risk allocation of privatized infrastructure projects, such as JR East and TEPCO's
Others projects, is basically the same as public sector projects, such as the Kurushima Bridgeproject, except for that the private owners, instead of the public sector, are responsible
for almost all risks involved.
0: Public sector's main responsibility, 0: Private sector's main responsibility,
(In parentheses): Partial responsibility
* Kurushima, Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line, and HW407 are NOT private project.
From the table above, a quite clear distinction as to the risk allocation is observed
between the public sector and private sector projects, and between Japan's or non-toll road
PFI projects and foreign private toll road projects. By privatizing a toll road/bridge/tunnel
project, the private sector needs to own more responsibilities for every risk involved in the
project. In particular, completion and financial risks are transferred to the private sector
almost completely. In return, the private sector obtains the opportunity to develop the
design and construction means that enable the consortium to make full use of their
technical and managerial capabilities, as well as for arranging the most appropriate
financing scheme for the project. It is, of course, essential that the private project company
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assess the risks and mitigate them within the consortium, or in relationships with other
private entities, such as financial institutions or insurance companies.
Demand risks may be the most important for toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, and
must be managed well. All pioneer Japanese PFI projects are "services sold to the public
sector" projects and the public sector is responsible for the demand risks, as in the
Kanamachi Plant and the Kanagawa College projects. This shows the difficulty in
implementing a toll road project as the PFI because of the complexity of analyzing and
transferring the demand risk. The fact that only the public sector has been soundly
managing toll roads in Japan for a long time is also one reason both sectors hesitate to take
firm actions to implement toll road projects as the PFI.
Experiences of the risk allocation in these cases are referred to in Chapter 5 when a
framework of the Japanese PFI for the toll road/bridge/tunnel project is developed.
4.3.4. MCFs' Roles and Contributions
Most project companies in the Case Studies are led by an MCF, and MCFs play
crucial roles in the project, especially new road/bridge/tunnel construction projects such as
in the Confederation Bridge, Sydney Harbour Tunnel, and U.K.'s some DBFO roads
projects. Table 4-34 summarizes main roles the MCFs played in the projects studied in
their development or construction stages.
Although identifying figures by which MCFs' contributions reduced the total
project cost cannot be attained, it is obvious from the table below that some technically
complicated projects would not have been realized had the MCFs not played crucial roles
in developing the projects. More importantly, in some foreign private toll road/bridge/
tunnel cases, such as the Confederation Bridge, the Sydney Harbour Tunnel, and SR57, the
MCFs overcame the strict limitation of the governments' financial supports with original
technologies or equipment. The MCFs therefore deserve a substantial portion of the
benefits the projects generate.
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Table 4-34 Main Roles the MCFs Played in the Projects Studied
Project Main Roles Played and their Effects
Kajima, Development of sound, innovative construction means, which madeKumagai, the project technically feasible (Installation of huge underwaterKurushima Kdma' foundation, Development of non-segregating underwater concrete,
Bridge* and many etc.) MCFs obtained good returns on the investment from the
others construction contract.
Kajima, Development of the world's largest shield tunneling method with
Tokyo Bay Taisei, and full-automated system, underground docking, and other innovative
AquayLine*' many technologies, which made the project technically feasible; MCFs
others obtained good returns on the investment from the construction
contract.
Morrison Responsibility for every aspect of the project, including financing
Confederation Knudsen, scheme structuring (Real rate bonds issuance, Environmental
Bridge, GTM, Permission, etc.); Development of innovative construction means
Canada Ballast (Precast segment method, Utilization of "Svanen", etc.); They made
Nedam the project technically, economically, and politically feasible.
SR91 in Kiewit, MCFs contributed to evaluate over 75 projects.
California Granite
SR57 in Kiewit The consortium was considering innovative methods for building
California Pacific the viaducts that might significantly reduce construction costs.
Responsibility for every aspect of the project, including financing
scheme structuring (CPI bonds issuance, etc.); Development of
Sydney Har- Transfield, innovative construction means (Efficient construction and
bour Tunnel Kumagai installation immersed tube tunnels, Environmental problem solving,
etc.); They made the project technically, economically, and
politically feasible
DBFO roads In some of the eight DBFO projects, MCFs led the consortium to
in U.K. Many design and structure the financial scheme.
Kanamachi Responsibility for the construction of the emergency tank, the
Co-generation Shimizu foundations, pipes, etc.
Plant
Kanagawa Responsibility for every aspect of the project, including financing
Prefectural Obayashi scheme structuring
College I II
*1 Kurushima, Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line, and HW407 are NOT private project.
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Chapter 5. The Japanese PFI and
Toll Road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects
Most people in Japan doubt the Japanese PFI will obtain popularity and be widely
disseminated. Nevertheless, the PFI has tremendous potential to become the most
important factor of the reformation of Japan's administrative and financial structure,
which almost every economic expert claims is imperative for the Japanese economy to
revive.
Chapter 5 first addresses expectations about the Japanese PFI in the context of
both the construction industry, as a delivery system, and the economy in Japan. From the
second section on, the scope is narrowed to toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in order to
build a PFI framework for a specific type of project because the current delivery system
and risk profiles are substantially different among various project types. The chapter then
speculates about the feasibility of the introduction of the PFI framework for toll
road/bridge/ tunnel projects of each project type. Analyses of the framework's
characteristics follow by examining its similarity with and difference from many other
PPP (public-private partnership) projects discussed in Chapter 4, both in Japan and
abroad. Finally, after identifying most feasible types of projects, the chapter develops a
desirable framework for the toll road/bridge/tunnel projects as the PFI with focus on risk
allocation/mitigation and finance structuring.
5. 1. PFI in Japan's Construction Industry - How the PFt Works
The Japanese PFI was first introduced as a means to encourage the stagnant
Japanese economy in late 1997 and actually enacted in 1999, as described in Chapter 3.
In the circumstance of the fiscal deficit of the national and local governments and the
economic recession, the PFI was expected to work as a novel scheme, by which public
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facilities would be developed and the government financial structure would be
streamlined.
The PFI originated in the U.K., following its trend of the financial reorganization
by means of privatization, deregulation, and outsourcing. In the U.K., the PFI has now
become an established method of delivering many public services. The investment
amount in PFI projects had grown steadily form 1993 to 1998, when the public
expenditure for the PFI reached E3.0 billion', and from that time on, the annual
expenditure has remained at the same level, which is some 10% of the total public
expenditure. 2
Advocates estimate that the Japanese PFI will also grow rapidly in the coming
several years as was the case in the U.K., with the expectation that it will restructure both
the construction industry and Japan's economy.
5.1.1. Industry Perspective
While the PFI Act was originally intended to encourage the stagnant Japanese
economy, it has huge potential to improve most problems in the Japanese construction
industry mentioned in Chapter 2. As described in Chapter 3, the official objectives
include providing inexpensive and quality public facilities to the public, utilizing the
private sector's resources, reforming the national government's financial and economic
structures as well as local ones, creating packaged delivery systems, and sharing roles
and responsibilities for the projects more explicitly. The Act consequently requires the
construction industry, public and private, to be efficient, productive, transparent, fair,
competitive, innovative, and driven by the market principle. To meet these requirements,
the PFI contains functions novel to the Japanese system as listed below.
(1) The Private Sector's Initiative
The PFI scheme allows and expects the private sector to take initiative, whereas
with the traditional Japanese delivery system, the public sector plans and initiates public
utilities projects and solicits bids from private firms. A private firm could propose a plan
1 For the convenience purpose, US$1 = EO.7061=Y 126.25 = EUR1.1494 as of March 31, 2001. See
Appendix A for a cross rate chart.
2 HM Treasury, U.K. (2000): Budget 2001
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that is profitable enough to the firm, and, in return, beneficial to the public by using
proper technology, equipment, or ideas.
In practice, however, the private sector, with few exceptions, awaits plans as
before which the public sector intends to implement as a PFI project. So far, this seems
to be reasonable because the uncertainty about whether a particular public agency is
willing to hear from the private sector who proposes a potential public facility as a PFI
project is quite large. Even though the number of projects that local governments have
already initiated in a range of stages is significantly growing (more than 45 as of March
2001, see Chapter 3), this represents a mere 1.5% of the total number of Japan's some
3,000 municipalities. To take advantage of the private sector's initiative, it is essential
for both the public and private sectors that the government informs the public of the
implementation policy of public facilities and shows eagerness to adopt the PFI
framework if desirable.
For example, Australia's Government of NSW in Australia repeatedly announced
the ideas for the prospective next Sydney Harbour crossing and showed the necessity and
desire of a feasible project. Transfield and Kumagai Gumi proposed an attractive,
feasible idea to the government, knowing that the proposal might be adopted as a private
project.
(2) Elaborate Contract Documents
In Japan, as long-term credibility is heavily pressed on for the relationship with
clients or customers, public or private, and in construction and other industries, tacit
agreement may be regarded as part of the Japanese national character. Too strict or
detailed contracts are thus difficult to establish. For instance, describing and regulating
treatments in case of defaults on either side reflects the idea that one cannot completely
put trust in the other, so some Japanese tend to avoid such a prescription.
However, elaborate contract documents are imperative to the PFI. Contract
documents in Japan are often criticized for their vague language, which allows for
deferral of decision or agreement when unexpected circumstances arise. This sometimes
causes excessive public expenditure because the public sector tends to pay directly for
relatively large costs resulting from an uncertainty and also indirectly for relatively small
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costs, which private firms add to their bid prices in the form of risk premiums. The
establishment of elaborate contract documents may result in either increase or decrease of
the construction cost. Either way, it must result in better, clearer risk allocation, which is
definitely desirable.
Arguments about the contract often involve the issue of the capability of the local
governments. Statistics about Japanese public utilities projects show the importance of
the local governments' projects by high proportion within all domestic projects and
relatively high needs for personnel and financial resources.3 Independent advisers could
and should help them, but the independence of the advisers becomes a difficult issue to
address.
The difficulty of completing a contract document for a PFI project is one of the
most serious disadvantages of the PFI, compared to the traditional delivery system.
Some preliminary surveys all indicate that most local officials hesitate to implement a
PFI scheme due to the complexity of the documents required as mentioned in Section
3.3.2. In addition, The Guideline for the Implementation Process of the PFI Project
suggests the great demand for templates of standard PFI contract forms.
For example, in Kanamachi Co-generation Plant and Kanagawa Prefectural
College projects, the first two major projects procured with the Japanese PFI scheme,
numerous negotiations with legal advisors for both parties were necessary for the first
time in Japan's construction contract development. Similarly, in California's projects
studied in Chapter 4, ten legal advisors were hired for one consortium.
(3) Fair and Transparent Competitions
Fair and transparent competition is also indispensable for the PFI. Many studies4
indicate that the competition is the most important and essential factor for the
privatization or the PPP to be efficient, cost-effective, and acceptable to the public. (The
PFI is one kind of privatization or PPP.) Without a fair and transparent competition, as
is so far the case in Japan as introduced in Chapter 2, either VFM (value for money) or
the public satisfaction cannot be achieved.
3 Some 80% of public works are local governments' projects in Japan. See Sections 2.1.1 and 3.3.2.
4 For example, Liddle, Brantley (1993). "Sustainable Development, Infrastructure and environmental
Investment, and the Privatization Decision," MS Thesis, MIT
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In the curTent dull economic environment in Japan, the general public assumes
that the construction industry is given unfair preferences by both the national and local
governments in.the name of fiscal policy thanks to the industry's political power.
Furthermore, media repeatedly announce that the governments have been spending taxes
for useless public facilities such as rural agricultural highways and inactive fishery ports
in order only to let construction firms survive. As a result, "Dango," a sort of collusion,
has been reportedly preserved in areas, and the extraordinary number of construction-
related firms remains at 600,000 level, or even grows, without restructuring or
streamlining of the industry. Even "dead" companies with hundreds of billions of yen of
interest-bearing debts, which almost equal to the companies' annual revenues, could
survive by requesting debt forgiveness from their affiliate banks in the non-competitive
economic structure, including the construction industry.
In the PFI scheme, only capable companies would succeed in the PFI market
because the market must objectively select really profitable project companies. As a
matter of fact, some major construction companies have already made alliances with
foreign consulting firms that have ample experiences in PFI or similar projects so as to
receive the credibility in the PFI business from investors and to survive the competitive
industry in the future.
(4) The Government's Roles
The government's roles should be reformed in several ways with the PFI. This is
one of the three objectives clearly stated in the Basic Policy of the PFI (See Chapter 3).
The government, especially the national government, has controlled the construction
industry through the laws, regulations, and many other authorities to permissions,
approvals, and designations. Public agencies, on behalf of the government, have had the
same absolute power as the national or local government over the private sector. Both
public agencies and governments have implicitly had superior rights in construction
contracts such as unilateral evaluation of contractors, which influences future designation
for bids, and one-sided opportunity to initiate some business. It has been quite common
for a public agency or a government to ask the contractor for cooperation in preparing the
documents for the audit without compensation.
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The government, or the MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport), in
turn, sometimes supports the industry so that any construction firms can make at least
nominal profits regardless of their efforts to streamline the firm structure. No major
merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy has occurred in the recent severely shrinking
construction industry in Japan. This is one of the reasons the construction industry in
Japan remains inefficient.5
With detailed contracts, the relationship between the government and the private
entity must be changed toward a more reasonable direction, which foreign markets must
welcome. The PFI will play a significant role in this regard because it strictly requires
the proper, complete risk allocation. For example, in a traditional public contract or a
third sector project like the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line project, if a cost overrun occurs, the
excessive cost would be assumed by the public sector with devised reasons. If the public
sector, in turn, delays the acquisition of the right-of-way for the project, the contractor
would recover the delay by facilitating the remaining work without compensation. These
unaccountable, opaque relationships will be, and must be, reformed with the PFI.
Deregulation, taxation, and government subsidies are also central issues for the
government with regard to the PFI.
(5) Risk Allocation
Risk allocation, or risk sharing, is probably the most difficult, important, and
controversial problem in the project development among major parties: the government,
local or national, financial institutions, and the potential developers, and sometimes the
citizens. As noted earlier, since tacit agreement is favored in Japan, risk allocation has
never been established in project contracts except those of a few recent PFI projects.
When unfavorable events ensue, such as construction cost overruns and delay of the
acquisition of right-of-way, either party or both the owner and the contractor assume the
incurred costs as a result of negotiations in good faith. However, this manner is
obviously inefficient because the risk is not necessarily allocated to the best party who
can manage it, and hence, neither party prepares, or both parties prepare too much,
5 As a measure of the Emergency Economic Plan, MLIT announced a new regulation in April 2001 that
encourages mergers and acquisitions in the construction industry by giving the merged company more
opportunity to participate in competitive bids for the public works.
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against the risks. Furthermore, needless to say, proceeding with a project without clear
definition of risk allocation is not acceptable in the international open market.
Risk allocation requires parties to take a number of measures to mitigate or
transfer the risks: full-turnkey, lump sum contract, or design-build for completion risks;
government supports or financial institutions' investments for various stages; insurance
claims for force majeure; and so on. In the PFI, all of these arrangements must be
regulated in the contract and most of them are transparent and open to the public.
Anticipating the full-scale introduction of the PFI in Japan, local governments
have been eager to apply the PFI to various projects. Several cases, including Kanamachi
Co-generation System project (Tokyo Metropolitan Government) and Kanagawa Hoken-
Iryo-Fukushi Daigaku (Kanagawa Prefectural College, KPC) introduced in Chapter 4,
have already been contracted ds model cases of the Japanese PFI.
All of the local governments have been trying to disclose as much information as
they can, and implementation policies and generic contract terms and conditions are also
released on their web sites. Anyone who was interested could make their proposals based
on the level playing field without any type of cooperation with the governments
beforehand. There is no fiscal budget/consumption ruling as is usually the case of public
works in Japan mentioned in Chapter 2.
Those aspects described above are the very improvement of the problems within
the construction industry in Japan. Therefore, it is hopeful for the industry that PFI will
be diffused throughout the country and will improve the industry structure so that
technologically and managerially healthy firms can survive well in the future.
5.1.2. Economic Perspective
The PFI should work not only for the improvement of the attitude of the industry,
but also both for Japan's economy by creating new business practices such as project
financing and for MCFs 6 by giving them opportunities to be more involved in the project
itself rather than only in construction. This subsection views the PFI as an instrument of
6 MCF, or "Major Construction Firm" is defined in Section 2.2.1.
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an economic policy from different aspects, while strategies for MCFs are proposed and
applied to a prospective project in Chapter 6.
(1) Administrative and Financial Issues in the Construction Industry
As observed in the foregoing subsection, the enactment of the Japanese PFI has a
considerable potential for the improvement of the construction industry. However, it is
also true that the PFI Act itself cannot solve problems belonging to the industry. For
example, many construction firms that hold too much debt would not be able to establish
an SPC (special purpose company) with any partners for a PFI project.7 Also, many local
governments would fail to exploit the opportunity because they wish to stick to the
traditional systems to defend their territories or just because they do not try to adopt new
systems. Furthermore, as a bureaucrat pointed out in an interview, there may be few
prospective projects in the large-scale infrastructure area, including roads and bridges, to
suit the PFI. Although the Act defines numerous kinds of facilities as public facilities,8
many of those that have sufficient profitability for the private sector have already been
privatized like railroads, telecommunication facilities, and energy plants. Remaining
potential projects are relatively small or less profitable, and therefore difficult for the
prospective consortia. Also, both the PFI Act and the Basic Policies are indifferent in
terms of the international competitiveness. the expansion of the domestic construction
market, or the relief of the industry's financial crisis. The PFI may be simply reflecting
the trends of the Japanese economic and financial reformation, rather than trying to
reform the construction industry itself.
(2) Fiscal Restructuring
Long-term outstanding debt of the national and local governments combined will
have reached V666 trillion9 , which is surprisingly 1.3 times the GDP (Gross Domestic
7 President of Kumagai Gumi, suffering from heavy burden of interest-bearing loans and growing distrust
from the market, recently revealed a plan to tackle PFI projects with Kajima Corporation in an interview
with Chief Editor of Nikkei Construction.
8 The Act defines the following as public facilities: 1) roads, railways, ports, airports, rivers, parks, and
utilities; 2) governmental office buildings and dormitories; 3) public housings, public schools, waste
disposal facilities, public hospitals, social welfare facilities, prisons and rehabilitation facilities, public
parking, and underground streets; and 4) telecommunication network facilities, energy plants, recycling
facilities, sightseeing spots, and research laboratories.
9 For the convenience purpose, US$1 =Y 126 as of March 31, 2001.
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Product) in FY2001. Japan's economy has not yet been able to recover from the
"Trauma of the Bubble" that began in the early 1990s when the bubble economy
collapsed. Japanese financial institutions are all struggling with massive non-performing
loans and scared of movements of foreign institutions. During the depression, Fiscal
Structural Reform Law was renewed in 1997 in order to restructure the public finance so
that the nation's fiscal deficit would be reduced from 4.5% to 3% and the issuance of the
deficit-covering bond would be halted until 2003. The importance of the fiscal
restructuring remains the same even though the Law has been revised in the name of
"boosting the economy" such that the following additional expenditure could be
accepted:
- FY1998 Urgent Economic Stimulus Package: total budget of Y17 trillion,
- FY1999 Economic New Birth Measures: total budget of Y17 trillion, and
- FY2000 Rebirth of Japan Plan: total budget of Y1 1 trillion.
The PFI is attractive from the standpoint of financial restructuring because not
only is the expenditure stream of the PFI considerably different from that of the
traditional system but also the total costs may be substantially lower than by the
traditional system as shown in Figure 5-1.
Traditional PFI
0 0
inanci cost
Time Time
Figure 5-1 Expenditure Comparison between Traditional and PFI Procurements
However, since Japanese banks are all struggling with massive non-performing
loans as mentioned earlier, it may be also difficult to raise the initial cost from private
finance as indicated in the right diagram of Figure 5-1.
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(3) Administrative Reform
The central government ministries and agencies were reorganized from 22 to 13
in January 2001 in Japan. The administrative system has been growing all the time and
caused the overspending of the national budget. Policy planning divisions and policy
implementation divisions will be divided, and the functions of the latter will be
transferred to the private sector in order to streamline the administrative organizations.
Public officials will be reduced in number and efficiency will be sought.
In reviewing the roles and responsibilities of the public officials in the trend of the
administrative reform, the PFI as well as outsourcing and privatization is one of the
striking measures to implement the policy. The government roles would be limited to the
policy establishment and the implementation review, and the role of the implementation
itself should be transferred to the private sector. Moreover, the needs of infrastructure
development in Japan have not yet declined in a rapidly aging society. The Japanese PFI
is therefore expected from perspectives of both administrative reform and financial
restructuring.
(4) Local Economy
With few exceptions, local governments have the same reformation needs as the
national government, financially and administratively. Nonetheless, as there are more
than 3,000 local governments throughout the country, the sense of urgency and the
energy of execution vary dramatically. Generally speaking, the larger the scale of
economy of the municipality, the more eagerly the local government tries to reform its
administrative and financial structure, and consequently, it recognizes the necessity of the
PFI implementation.
For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government implemented the Kanamachi
project as a PFI in order to take advantage of the lower initial investment cost along with
its environmental and disaster-prevention policies. The government officials have shifted
their responsibilities from the implementation of the operation services to the policy
planning and the management of service purchasing. Kanagawa Prefecture, the second
most populated prefecture in Japan, has achieved a similar objective by implementing the
KPC project as a PFI. Both Tokyo and Kanagawa governments are sophisticated, large
150
Chapter 5. The Japanese PFI and Toll Road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects
governments, and drastically reduce the needs of public officials for operation of the
projects by the partnership with private project companies, who will presumably achieve
more efficient operation than the public sector would.
(5) Types of PFI Projects
A variety of types are given as potential projects in the PFI Act and the MLIT's
Guideline. However, currently planned projects are mostly "box-types," that is buildings
for people to gather in. Public infrastructure, such as toll roads and bridges, is rarely
investigated as PFI projects for several reasons even though PPP projects in other
countries (e.g., U.K. and developing countries) substantially include such types of
projects.
From the next section on, the scope is narrowed to one of public infrastructure
types of projects, that is, toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in order to examine more
specific characteristics of the Japanese PFI and to establish a PFI framework regarding
the toll road/bridge/tunnel project, referring to the experiences studied in Chapter 4.
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5.2. Feasibility of Toll road/bridge/tunnel Projects
as Japanese PFI
5.2.1. Current Toll road System and Projects in Japan
(1) Toll Road Planning System
A toll road network has been established based on National Comprehensive
Development Plans and Five-year Road Improvement Plans, which have so far
contributed 6,615 km (as of December 1, 1998) of toll roads and addresses establishment
of the 11,500 km of toll roads, together with other 2,500 km of high-performance tolled
highways, by early in the 21 't century (See Figure 5-2). National expressways are mostly
run by Japan Highway Public Corporation (JH) and high-performance tolled highways
are run by Metropolitan Expressway Public Corlporation, Hanshin Expressway Public
Corporation, Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority, and Urban Expressway Public
Corporations. The national government has developed the road development plans,
although they are heavily influenced by politicians throughout the process. Current status
of the completed and planned toll road network is depicted in Figure 5-3.
The first developed Tomei Expressway has the heaviest traffic volume and others
in metropolitan areas also have more than adequate volume for profitability. On the other
hand, roads in rural areas, such as northeast Japan and areas along the northern shoreline,
have much less traffic volume due to the incompleteness of the network or high cost-
generating terrain as well as their low population.
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(2) Toll Road Financing System
The toll road financing system is described in Figure 5-4. Toll roads in Japan are
constructed with debt (road bond etc.) and national expenditures. Debt is repaid after the
commencement of the service of the roads, using tolls collected from users: the collected
tolls are also used for road maintenance and the repayment of interest. Toll rates are
determined to balance the summation of construction cost (for new roads and facilities),
maintenance cost, and financial cost (i.e., interest on debt and principal repayment).
Japan's toll road system uses a nationwide toll pooling system, by which JH, for example,
enables later developed, less popular toll roads financed by surplus toll revenues from
former developed popular toll roads such as Tomei Expressway.
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Figure 5-4 Flow of Expressway Construction Funds (Source: MLIT, JH)
JH's balance sheet as of March 31, 2000 is shown in Table 5-1. Most of the
assets have been financed by several bonds, in particular, funds issued by the Treasury
Investment and Loan Program (TILP)'0 accounts for 57.4% of the total assets (81.7% of
the fixed liabilities). 23.1% of the total assets have been recouped with toll revenues' by
4 Japan's Ministry of Finance calls the same program FILP (Fiscal Investment and Loan Program).
" According to the special laws for toll road operating agencies, the accounting format is made differently
from those of commercial companies. Consequently, toll revenues are added to "Reserves" under the
liabilities category without depreciation.
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the end of FY1999. Financing resources of the JH are depicted in Figure 5-5, with the
FY1999 budget. In the FY1999 budget, Y2.11 trillion, out of Y2.95 trillion debt, came
from the Treasury Investment and Loan Program run by the national government. Y288
billion came from the national budget, which accounts for only 16% of the total national
budget for road improvement projects.
Table 5-1 JH's Balance Sheet as of March 31, 2000 (Source: JH)
in V billion
Assets
Current assets 122 0.3%
Fixed assets, Motorways 32,284 86.3%
Motorways, construction in progress 4,423 11.8%
Other fixed assets 489 1.3%
Deferred assets 104 0.3%
Total 37,422 100%
Liabilities and Capital
Liabilities
Current liabilities 389 1.0%
Fixed liabilities
Publicly offered bonds (Gov't Guarantees) 1,531 *4.1%
Bonds placed to Government Funds 18,866 50.4%*
Privately laced bonds 1,093 2.9%
Foreign currency bonds 477 1.3%
Government loans 1,080 2.9%*
Private loans 1,836 4.9%
Others 1,395 3.7%
Subtotal 26,295 70.3%
Reserves under special laws
Reserves for recoupmnt 8,635 .1%
Others 300 0.8%
Subtotal 8,935 23.9%
Total Liabilities 35,619 95.2%
Capital
Government investment 1,773 4.7%
Surplus 31 0.1%
Total Capital 1,803 4.8%
Total 37,422 100%
* From TILP, total 57.4% (81.7% of the fixed liabilities)
12 A fiscal year (FY) starts April 1 of the said year and ends March 31 of the next year in Japan. Therefore,
the end of FY1999 is March 31, 2000.
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Govemient Numbers are FY1999 Budget in V billion.
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Figure 5-5 Sources of Fund for Japan Highway Public Corporation (Source: JH)
Statement of profit and loss for the year ended March 31, 2000 is shown in Table
5-2. Revenues of V2,3 18 billion, including Y2, 116 operating revenues, was mostly spent
for recoupment (V921 billion, 39.7%), for interest on bonds and borrowings (Vf865 billion,
37.3%), and for operating and administrative expenses (V327+106 billion, 18.7%) in
FYI 999. The other sources not shown in Table 5-2 but shown in Figure 5-5, such as
Government Equity (V94 billion) and Bonds (Vi2,954 billion) were mostly used for new
construction (some I,300 billion) and amortization (some e,500 billion).'
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Table 5-2 JH's Income Statement for the Year Ended March 31, 2000
in V billion
Revenues
Operating revenues 2,116 91.3%
Subsidies from Government 194 8.4%
Others 8 0.3%
Total 2,318 100%
Expenses
Operating expenses 327 14.1%
General administrative expenses 106 4.6%
Provision of reserves for:
Recoupment 921 39.7%
Others 36 1.6%
Non-operating expenses
Interest on bonds and borrowings 865 37.3%
Others 62 2.7%
Net profit for the year 1 0.0%
Total 2,318 100%
(3) Toll Road Status in Japan
Current toll road status and its prospects may be summarized as follows, in
addition to the descriptions introduced in Chapter 4.
1) Profitability of the current toll road system in Japan varies, and it seems not
necessarily too infeasible. A substantial portion of the revenues has been spent for the
recoupment, that is, bonds and loans have been amortized steadily, but at the same time,
JH has been receiving additional bonds and loans every year for both the amortization of
debt and the construction of new roads, so the recoupment ratio has grown slowly.
Therefore, it is doubtful whether the national toll road network will be open to the public
for free in the future.
2) Governmental supports are currently minimal for toll roads, although the
government-issued bonds are dominating the sources of funds, because of the policy to
use the tolls to repay the debts for the toll road construction cost. The government has
spent its road improvement budget mostly for non-tolled general roads. Nevertheless, JH
depends for its financing resources on governmental programs, such as the TILP.14
1 The government will have established the "Reduction and Streamlining of the Special Companies Plan"
by March 2002, from the viewpoint of the public-private partnership, by means of closing, privatizing, or
independence-giving. Since the abolishment of special companies is likely to facilitate the privatization of
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3) Prospects for future toll road projects are getting worse due to the prospective
higher construction costs in the mountainous or complicated terrains and lower traffic
demand in the rural areas. The construction cost per kilometer, together with the right-of-
way acquisition cost, has grown rapidly. MLIT, as well as Ministry of Finance, is eager
to apply taxes of the amount equal to the construction costs of the new roads to encourage
the construction of future non-profitable expressways, which otherwise could not redeem
the debt.' 5
4) There are some potential projects that cannot be initiated due to prospectively
extreme construction cost instead of high traffic demand, such as congestion relieving
roads in urban areas, and bridges and tunnels for relieving congestion or connecting
actively working areas. These types of projects may be the target projects the private
sector may have the opportunity to develop as Japanese PFI projects.
5.2.2. Types of Potential Toll Road Project
Potential project types of private toll roads can be categorized by contract type, by
network circumstance, or by function. Feasibility, characteristics, and availability of
tolling system or private operation largely depend on the type of the project.
Contract type contains new construction, rebuilding or expanding, and operation
and maintenance only. New construction projects may include the entire delivery
package such as design, construction, financing, and operation and maintenance. This
type of project generally requires complicated work for permissions and acquisitions of
right-of-way, needs high-cost construction work, involves uncertainties in various areas,
faces the difficulties in forecasting future traffic volume, and therefore demands higher
return on investment whether public or private. Operation and maintenance only projects,
on the contrary, have much less uncertainty in the business conditions. Right-of-way
issues do not exist in most cases, maintenance level and costs are usually predictable, and
the postal savings system, the level of the reformation will demonstrate the execution power of the brand-
new Koizumi Administration.
1s Y1 billion budget for this for FY2001 was withdrawn on the final stage because of severe objections of
JH, which protected itself from restructuring. (Newspapers. Asahi, 12/05/00 and Nikkei, 12/10/00)
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traffic volume can be estimated on the basis of actual experience. Rebuilding or
expanding projects should be positioned somewhere in between.
Network circumstance represents the relation of the project with other connecting
road system(s). The project may be a segment of an already planned network, where the
completion of the project (if the project is new construction) would contribute to the
ultimate efficiency and the goal of the planned network, but in other words, the
completion of only a portion of the network would not generate sufficient traffic volume,
or revenue stream. This project type also has another meaning in Japan, a political road,
because, as mentioned earlier, some politicians have inappropriately large authority to
make decisions as to the alignment of the network. The project may be a bypass route of
a congested trunk road, tolled or non-tolled, that will be a tough competitor of the project
road. Another likely possibility is an independent, eventually captive project such as
bridges and tunnels. Bridges and tunnels also need connecting roads that conveniently
flow the traffic from and to the bridges/tunnels. For expansion or rebuilding projects, the
circumstance can be further segmented into free roads and toll roads with respect to the
original road.
Categorization by project function may be similar, if not identical, to that by the
connection circumstance. A toll road project may function as a congestion reliever,
which often applies to a bypass route, as a development road, often applying to a planned
network road, or as a crossing of a barrier such as river crossing like bridges and tunnels.
A congestion reliever or a bypass route may be inexpensive because it tends to be short,
but may be expensive because it often requires expensive right-of-way. Development
roads are often speculative from the economic viewpoint, and bridges and tunnels usually
cost so much that they demand heavy traffic volume to be feasible. Table 5-3 shows the
types of toll road projects described in Chapter 4.
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Table 5-3 Types of Toll Road Projects
Contract Type
New Rebuilding or O&M only
construction expanding* 2
Tolled Free
Planned network Current major DBFO DBFO
*e projects in roads in roads in
Japan, HW407 U.K. U.K.
Brand-new route SR57* , SR91
p competing with free DBFO roads in
route (Bypass route) U.K.
Independent new bridge Confederation,
O or tunnel (water Sydney Harbour,
crossing, etc.) HSBA, Tokyo
Bay Aqua-Line
* Every project listed in the table can fall into the congestion relievers category. But
some may be development roads (Confederation, DBFO, TTB), and of course, the
Confederation and the Sydney Harbour are crossings as well as Japan's Tokyo Bay
Aqua-Line and HSBA projects.
*2 Rebuilding or expanding projects can be divided into two segments dependent on
whether the original road is tolled or free.
*3 The SR57 project was actually planned as an expanding project, but as the alignment
was not relevant to the existing one, it is put in the new construction cell.
5.2.3. The Prospects for Private Toll Road System
Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer'6 raise four factors on which the feasibility of toll road
systems depends: 1) prospective toll road builders must find a situation where the public
will accept tolls, 2) the revenue from the road must be sufficient to cover all or most of
the construction and operating costs, 3) the environmental and other external costs the
road imposes on neighboring communities must be acceptable or reasonable, and 4) the
question of market or monopoly power and its effects on economic viability and political
acceptance must be well resolved. Although they focus on toll roads in the U.S., the
factors are applicable to anywhere else.
16 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1991): "Private Toll Roads in the United States, The Early Experience of
Virginia and California," Harvard University Report
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Fisher and Babbar17 assess ten international private toll road projects by analyzing
their functions, physical characteristics and project costs, market demands, concession
policy and process environments, economic and political contexts, and local capital
markets. While prospective PFI toll road projects in Japan would be indeed different
from international ones in a range of aspects, the foregoing aspects should be considered
in developing a private toll road framework.
This subsection examines the prospects for a private toll road system using the
PFI scheme in Japan with the following four thresholds: 1) necessity and policy
environment, 2) political and economic viability, 3) financial feasibility, and 4)
environmental and social viability.
(1) Necessity and Policy Environment in Japan
Highway infrastructure has been traditiona!ly funded by the public sector both in
Japan and in other countries often through earmarked taxes such as gasoline tax and
motor vehicle tax. As the country grew and developed, the publicly funded free
highways have suffered from excess traffic volume and the necessity of other financing
schemes to develop a more sophisticated highway network. Following these trends,
many countries, Japan included, have adopted the toll road system, public or private.
However, the toll road system alone has not been sufficient in a growing economy even
though the construction costs financed by debts have been repaid by tolls the users pay.
The private toll road system has thus been expected to facilitate the growing demand,
together with government deficits to finance toll road projects on both the national and
local levels. Other factors in favor of the private tolling system are: the worldwide trend
toward commercialization and privatization of publicly owned enterprises; the success of
public toll roads in raising capital; and advances in tolling technology, making tolling
more efficient and convenient.
The standpoint of continuity, not of short-term boosting, should be considered in
evaluating potential project developments. In the Japanese PFI, as in other nations or
other public facilities, successful establishment in preliminary toll road projects is quite
important to continuously implement toll road projects with the PFI scheme. Fortunately
17 Fisher and Babbar (1996): "Private Financing of Toll Roads," RMC Discussion Paper Series 117, World
Bank
161
for PFI toll road facilitators, Japanese PFI projects have already been launched in other
areas such as public colleges, offices, waste treatment plants, and so on. These
experiences can serve as lessons for implementing PFI toll road projects. Although the
government, or MLIT, has been cautious about implementing any type of projects, should
it once initiate a PFI scheme, the model would serve as a template for future projects.
However, the overall policy environment in Japan is not favorable enough to
convince policy makers that a PFI toll road scheme can be introduced without difficulties.
Compared to California's AB680, for example, Japan has no private toll-road-specific
legislation or any other experiences, or reasonable evaluation criteria for the concession,
either. These potential problems must be solved with strong incentives of the
government in implementing private toll road projects.
(2) Political and Economic Viability
Potential Opposition from Citizens. Environmentalists, community activists and
others may strongly oppose any types of road projects, which need a physically long
piece of land for the alignment. There are actually a number of suspended road plans in
Japan, which cannot be advanced due to such strong opposition and the government's
reluctance to exercise eminent domain. If a project is planned in the sea, as is the case of
a bridge or tunnel project, such as Honshu-Shikoku Bridges and Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line,
fishing rights become another difficult issue. The local fishermen's association almost
always has strong contrary emotions and require more than equitable compensations.
Right-of-way acquisition or fishing rights compensation may be the most crucial factor
for toll road implementation, whether or not implemented as a Japanese PFI, which must
be resolved by partnership between the public and private sectors. That is to say, the
public sector can provide the protestors with credibility not to walk away in any event,
while the private sector generally has much stronger incentives for early solution of
problems to commence the operation earlier to generate a revenue stream.
Capital Market in Japan. Capital Market in Japan is one of the most stable and
sophisticated markets in the world, and therefore, the government can easily, and with
favorable terms and conditions, raise initial funds from the capital markets, for instance,
by issuing construction government bonds or some other forms despite the extraordinary
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amount of debt outstanding attributed to the national and local governments combined:
V666 trillion in 2001, which would be 1.3 times as large as its Gross Domestic Product.
Recent interest rates in Japan are significantly low compared to other nations, and
represented as follows: 1.1-1.9% for 10-year term government bonds, 2.1-2.5% for 20-
year term government bonds, and 2.4-2.9% for 30-year term government bonds.
However, when considering private financing, the Japanese capital market is not
necessarily favorable for a private project company because of the lack of individuals'
appetite of investment. Financial aspects for the desirable PFI toll road scheme are
suggested in the last section of this chapter.
Monopoly, Competition and Regulation. Protecting the private operator from
excessive competition with other free or tolled roads (so that producing profits is
possible) and protecting the public from the potential abuses of a monopoly franchise (in
the form of high toll rates or limits on capacity) must be balanced. If the public agency
protects the private sector excessively, a monopoly situation of the private entity may
occur. If the public agency oversees the private sector too intensely, the private entity
may not produce sufficient profits because it may have the aftereffects of the severe
competition experience at the beginning of the project. Well-balanced public-private
partnership may be requested, but moreover, the appropriate government's incentive
would be necessary for this issue.
The government and the private project company can establish a scheme that
takes the issue into account. For example, California's Department of Transportation
(Caltrans) set equitable rates-of-return of 17-21.5% plus incentives on the four AB680
projects. Toll rate range was the main determinant in British DBFO road projects,
while in the Confederation Bridge case and the Sydney Harbour Tunnel case, the
maximum toll rates were bound to the CPI indexes. In most of the cases studied, safety
and performance level of the road are constantly monitored or overseen by the
government. Finally, exclusivity, or a non-competitive clause, is included in California
cases, in the Confederation Bridge case, and in others.
18 Also, Virginia DOT set 14% as maximum rate-of-return for Dulles Toll Road Extension project.
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(3) Financial Feasibility
Factors for Financial Feasibility
Factors to consider for the financial feasibility of a project are pre-construction
cost, design and construction cost, operation and maintenance cost, financing cost, and
the cost to assume the risks involved. Pre-construction cost includes proposal documents
preparation cost, investigation cost for the site condition and specification requirements,
consultant fees for legal, financial, and technical advisors, permission and approval
processing fees, administrative costs, and so on. Characteristic features in this stage are
that the traffic study affects so much of the project economics that the study is crucial and
that the site investigation is very costly because of the lengthy alignment for a toll road or
the construction difficulty for a bridge or tunnel. Design and construction cost is
obviously for the design and construction of the project. For a complicated project with
complicated site conditions such as restricted construction wrork space or time in a
congested urban area or uncertain soil profile under water for a bridge project, design and
construction cost can increase or decrease significantly. Operation and maintenance cost
depends on the system design and the initial specifications for the construction. More
and more importance has been put on life-cycle engineering in Japan, as well as other
industrial countries, justifying heavier initial investment to reduce later, recurring burdens.
ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems) such as ETC (Electric Toll Collection) may also
greatly influence the cost. Financing cost pertains to who lends the money and to whom
or which project. Public financing such as bond issuance needs the investment rate of the
project or the project company, or the sponsor, to determine the risk premium, which can
be assumed as the exact financing cost. Financial institutions examine the risk profile
and the profitability of the project in most cases when private financing is applicable.
Private project companies must pay much more for the financing than the public sector.
The cost to assume the risks is in large part included in the financing cost, but other forms
of the cost may be paying insurance premiums and investing in a capital market such as
derivatives to hedge financial and economic risks.
Project Function and Financial Feasibility.
Project function is one of the key factors that influence the financial feasibility of
a toll road/bridge/tunnel project. "Congestion relieving road" projects are likely to
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involve high land prices and compensation costs for the existing pertinent communities
that would be deteriorated by the project and face competition with the existing network,
which was built on the least costly alignments by public agencies, such as Japan Highway
or Metropolitan Express Public Corporation. But the most important factor, toll revenue
stream, is likely to be favorable for congestion relievers. "Development roads" have the
disadvantage of facing a slow and uncertain traffic build-up and the advantage of less
costly alignment in general. In Japan, however, alignments of development roads are
likely to be in mountainous or narrow shoreline terrains and thus expensive tunnels and
bridges would be necessary. "Crossings," or bridges and tunnels, require very expensive
construction cost, but the toll revenue may be sufficient to reimburse the cost. If an MCF
can achieve the innovation in construction and attain drastic design and construction cost
reduction, which is most possible in bridge/tunnel projects, financial feasibility could be
attained.
Government Assistance.
Government assistance is a crucial issue for the success of toll road/bridge/tunnel
projects in Japan, where, like other nations, relatively profitable projects have already
been done by the public sector. Government assistance can be accepted in a variety of
forms in almost every stage of the project, and sometimes the assistance is essential to
implement the project. For example, in order to give concession rights, the government
may have to first establish or amend some laws or ordinances, which may not suppose
any types of potential projects. The PFI Act in Japan is the striking example of this
movement and is reportedly regarded sufficient to release a private toll road project. The
government may give a project company financial assistance directly or indirectly. The
shadow toll system adopted in the U.K. and subsidies as in the Confederation Bridge
project are examples of direct government assistance, while guarantees and government
risk sharing are examples of indirect assistance. Government financial supports are
described and suggested in Section 5.4 in detail.
Private Sector's Efficiency.
Even if a private entity finds an equitable project as a toll road, it can be procured
by the public sector as well with the traditional DBB delivery method, so the PFI requires
the private sector's victory over the public sector, where efficiencies of the project should
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be measured and achieved by the private procurement. It is generally recognized that the
private sector is more efficient than the public sector because of the profit-seeking feature
of the private sector. For instance, the U.K.'s Highway Agency estimated 15% cost
savings compared to the public sector comparators, although the National Audit Office
claimed that the figure (15%) was Qyerstated in part. (See Section 4.2.8.) A number of
privatization experiences in various engineering/construction fields also show proof of
the private sector's efficiency. On the other hand, Japan's public sector, represented by
its bureaucratic system with enormous authority, is also changing its culture and moving
toward efficient operations and works. For example, public involvement and
accountability have been respected more than ever, and the Information Disclosure Law,
by which the government must disclose substantial information and data to the public,
has become effective since April 1, 2001. Personnel evaluation based on the bureaucrat's
capability and achievement, rather than the conventional seniority systefn, is being
considered as a "reform of civil service system" plan even in the public sector, where the
strict seniority system has been effective. If this reform works, the public sector should
have much more efficiency in the near future, which might become a threat for the
private sector, who must compete with them.
(4) Environmental and Social Viability
Public Acceptance of Tolls.
Public acceptance of a toll road project implies that people expect both the toll
and process for determining government funding priorities, if any, to be fair (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer, 1991). In addition, many assume that collecting tolls as well as
levying earmarked fuel and other vehicle excise taxes represents "double taxation."
Japan's cases are favorable in this regard because the toll road system has been widely
disseminated for almost forty years, and there are also some small-scale private toll roads
for sightseeing businesses, so toll road users are used to paying tolls without hesitation.
Externalities: The Environment, Growth Management, and Eminent Domain.
Toll roads, of any types or functions, are surrounded by externalities such as
environmental, growth management, and eminent domain issues, which the project
company cannot solve by itself. For example, growth management needs the perspective
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of regional development, which relates to spin-off effects of the project. The private
sector may or may not handle the matters well because private companies have flexibility
and incentive not to delay, while they are more sensitive to the costs. Citizens are likely
to suspect that the private company may cut corners for profits. In terms of eminent
domain, the private sector would avoid situations of eminent domain as much as possible
with a different reason from that of the public sector. The private sector would simply try
to shorten the total duration from the pre-construction to the commencement because they
know the effect of the time and try to do better scheduling management. On the other
hand, the governments may hesitate to exercise the eminent domain because most of
them assume it is the last alternative, which should be avoided not to seriously conflict
with pertinent parties. However, the consequence is that countless projects are suspended
thanks to the opposition parties along the alignment.
Externalities are relevant to the function of the toll road project. Environmental
concerns, for instance, ensue most often in development roads, although the other types
may also face the issue, while in crossing projects, growth management is significant and
eminent domain has less impact than development roads or congestion relievers.
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5.3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the PFI
for Toll roads/bridges/tunnels
If Japanese PFI toll roads are feasible, does the private procurement really have
the advantage over the public? This section examines characteristics of the Japanese PFI
applied to toll road/bridge/tunnel projects by comparing them with other projects,
focusing on public versus private and the MCF's workplace. Because there is no direct
comparison project in Japan delivered by the Japanese PFI scheme, it is essential to look
at the prospective framework for the Japanese toll roads projects from the standpoints of
several other projects that have common conditions in most regards: traditional public-
managing toll road projects in Japan; privatized public infrastructure projects other than
toll roads in Japan, such as railroad and power projects; pioneer Japanese PFI projects,
such as buildings and power plants; and BOT or DBFO toll road projects overseas, all of
which are examined in Chapter 4.
5.3.1. Advantages of the PFI Scheme
(1) Necessity of Private Finance
If the public has sufficient sources of funds to construct and maintain toll roads,
for instance, earmarked taxes or Treasury Loans and Investments (funded by government
operating businesses such as Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance), the public toll
roads may have advantages for financing costs. If not, there is the necessity of private
finance if a toll road project is feasible. Japan's current economic environment has been
changing from the public finance initiative to restraints on spending public money,
especially for public works, even though the fiscal reformation policy has been given a
grace period for these three years or so. Without private financing, not only planned
highway networks but also other necessary potential toll roads, such as congestion
relievers and crossing projects, would undoubtedly slow down. The Japanese PFI was
introduced in this circumstance in part because less initial financial burden to the public
sector was necessary. This necessity is the greatest advantage of private financing.
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(2) Efficiency Advantages over the Public Alternatives
Section 5.2.3 mentions efficiency to be as a factor of the feasibility of a PFI toll
road project, and the private sector is assumed more efficient because of its profit-seeking
feature. Here are more concrete evidences of the private sector's efficiency.
Involvement in planning and design stages
Private sector involvement in planning and design stages gives both the public
and private sectors great opportunities to achieve better value for money. As shown in JR
and TEPCO cases in Chapter 4, where MCFs often propose more efficient or less
expensive design and construction alternatives with good incentives, the private owners
take advantage of private sector efficiencies. Since Japanese MCFs have competitive
technologies and expertise in a wide range of areas, including materials, environmental
regulations, advanced design technique, operational knowledge, various construction
equipment, and numerous experiences, when they are given broader and flexible scope, it
is likely to achieve more efficient construction and operation. 19 All of the foreign toll
road examples studied in Chapter 4, including California's extreme cases, sought to
cultivate this private sector's (the MCFs') advantage, and, in general, have succeeded.
Efficient Management
As opposed to public personnel, who are expected to deliver a public facility
without problems but with limited responsibilities during their short-term position,
private personnel are encouraged to manage the project efficiently for profits. This
difference gives the private sector the advantage of efficiency. Life cycle engineering,
scale merit, and cost and time reductions are among the examples of this benefit.
Life cycle engineering considers the overall efficiency throughout the facility's
lifetime, usually more than the concession period such as thirty years in toll
road/bridge/tunnel cases. As is the case of Japan's public procurement, if design,
construction, and operation are delivered separately, construction cost should be
minimized because it is the first crucial cost factor of the project within a narrow scope,
and life cycle cost cannot be assessed.
19 MLIT is curTently examining the viability of "Design-Build Package" in a special committee and has
found its effectiveness.
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Scale merit represents the capability of efficient management that stems from the
larger scale or scope of the project, such as utilization of technical skills, personnel,
materials, and resources and innovation encouragement. For example, a major public
project in Japan such as the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge or Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line has been
divided into dozens of construction contracts even if many of the contractors may use the
same sub-contractors or techniques in large portions. On the contrary, in every foreign
example shown in Chapter 4 delivered by the private sector, the contracts went to a single
consortium, and the consortium has exercised its best efficiencies. The PFI is the only
delivery system for now in Japan to best utilize the private sector's scale merit.
Cost and time reductions are widely recognized as the private sector's advantage.
With the PFI, the project company must generate a revenue stream by tolls from the road
users as early as possible and must minimize the construction cost so that the company
can repay the debts in full and generate net profits as early as possible. These incentives
work less for the public sector, and potentials for early operation are enormous for the
private sector. For instance, in the Confederation Bridge project, the MCFs completed
the construction work in only 42 months, whereas the bridge portion of the Tokyo Bay
Aqua-Line took more than 7 years for a similar structure of much shorter length; and in
the Route 3 North project in the suburban Boston, although not described in Chapter 4,
the project company is supposed to finish the construction also in 42 months with design-
build utilization, while the public-planned original schedule indicated that it would take
some two years more.
Less Political Restraint
There are a variety of political restraints for the public sector procurement,
explicitly or implicitly, in each stage of the delivery. In use of labor and equipment, for
example, the government intervenes in the selection process of a pure private company to
reflect a politician's power related to a specific subcontractor or an equipment supplier.
Even among the trend towards the performance specification, the public sector may have
to stick to a traditional, obsolete specification, which some industry-related political
power insists on retaining. The private sector can be released from these political
restraints and therefore has the advantage over the public sector. As for the operation,
moreover, more innovative facility designs or operating schemes can be adopted; for
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instance, the private sector may design for the exclusive use of lightweight vehicles to
reduce the surcharge requirement, which drastically influences the overall structure, and
costs, of roads/bridges/tunnels.
Overall Evaluation Competitive Bidding System (Utilization of MCF's capability)
The Japanese PFI assumes "the Overall Evaluation Competitive Bidding System"
as a standard. Experiences described in Chapter 4, the JR and TEPCO cases, show its
advantages. The MLIT, at the national level, has actually started to try adopting "the
Overall Evaluation Competitive Bidding System" for only two projects so far and
recognized its effectiveness; however, the move is slow because it requires special
legislation for each single project.
(3) Technological Innovation as the Outcome of the PFI
Some would argue that in the PFI, because the investors would avoid risks arising
from the adoption of a technological innovation and thus they would like safe techniques,
technological innovation, which must bear more expensive risk premiums, is not likely to
occur. This may be true if the risk is transferred to the investors to a substantial extent, or
if the improvement by the innovation is not considerable enough. Experiences, however,
show different views.
"PFI is the perfect framework for the introduction of the innovation," claimed
Michael Perry, former official advisor to both Australian and British PFI projects. 20 It is
important to understand that the government does not have the role to prescribe the
means to achieve a project, financially, commercially, or technically, but only outcomes
of the project. There are plenty of cases where technological innovations were
introduced. For example, HW407 adopted an elaborate Electric Toll Collection system,
the Sydney Harbour Tunnel solved the difficult issue of how to ventilate the exhaust gas,
and an innovative foundation structure was designed for the Confederation Bridge.
Even though a tremendous number of innovations have been accomplished with
the traditional delivery system in Japan, as in the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge projects and
Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line projects2, those types of innovation procedures, i.e., without
2 Japan Project-Industry Council (1998): Eikoku oyobi Osutoraria no PFI jigvo ni okeru Seifu to Minkan
Jigyosha tono Kankei ni tsuite (Public-Private Relationship in British and Australian PFI Projects), JAPIC
21 See Chapters 2 & 4.
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equitable compensation for the cooperation of MCFs, may not be justified in the future
Japanese construction industry, where transparent, accountable public-private
collaboration is required.
(4) Value for Money by the Japanese PFI
Value for money (VFM) is the ultimate objective of the PFI, but contains various
elements that cannot be measured directly or easily into cost or benefit figures. The
following items are among such elements.
Evaluation of externality. "Externality" here means external economic effects
produced by the PFI project, such as development benefits for the neighboring
communities and economies. If externality can be evaluated as a benefit of the PFI
project, and if eventually the project company can take into account the benefit as the
revenue of the project, VFM of the PFI project would improve. For example, most of the
Japanese private railway companies run the development business along their alignment,
which is an important revenue source of the groups. However, since the PFI intends to
promote public facilities implementation, indirect development should be strictly
separated so that the risks involved in the development project would be allocated to
neither the project company nor the public. It is expected that if the project has
substantial potential to produce development benefits, especially for the general public,
some subsidy equitable for the benefits will be established.
Valuation of services. The service level can be improved by the PFI if it is fairly
valuated so that the project company has enough incentives to improve the services, such
as maintenance frequency, overall congestion level, availability of the emergency
services, and the comfort level of the roads. Caltrans has given the project company the
incentive in a form of additional rates of return the company could earn from the project
according to the level of safety and availability of the road in the SR91 project.
Reasonable and Fair Risk-Return allocation. When the project company seeks
the most profitable scheme of the risk allocation and the public agency seeks the best
VFM of the project, risks involved in the project must be allocated to whomever could
manage them best because otherwise the project bears the risk premium for the risk.
Although risks may tend to transfer to the private sector in the PFI as in U.K.'s DBFO
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roads, Japan's PFI Basic Policies strictly encourage that the implementation policy of
each potential project should include the description of the risk allocation plan. Both the
public agency and the prospective private company shall begin the negotiation with the
provided plan and try to minimize the project costs for both. It is better for citizens, who
have been used to looking at their taxes spent for something they do not have
opportunities to check the outcome of, at least to see the rules of when and for what the
taxes would be spent.
Additional Investment Opportunity. According to the articles from several
Japanese newspapers, there are Y1,200 trillion worth of private entities' financial assets,
which tend to be invested in foreign capital market, and Y1,400 trillion worth of personal
financial assets, which cannot be invested in any financial market, in Japan. Private
entities are seeking for proper investment opportunities, while individuals do not have
incentives to invest, in part because Japanese are pessimistic about their future as the
social security system does not seem stable with the rapidly aging population, and in part
because Japan's structural reformation is not proceeding. The PFI project may be one in
which financial institutions, for example, have the opportunity to invest to diverse their
portfolios, or to mitigate their corporate risks. Issuing revenue bonds for a toll
road/bridge/tunnel project to neighboring individuals or institutions who await the project,
for instance, may be a good idea to stimulate necessary investments.
Early Operation Effects. If the construction duration is shortened, relevant
economic activities such as development projects along the alignment would begin earlier,
and then the synergy effect would bring about better value for money of the PFI project,
in addition to the direct effect to the profitability of the project. However, the right-of-
way problem often arises in implementing the road-type project. It is desirable to
establish some measures to facilitate the acquisition of the right-of-way, as well as to
standardize the forms of the PFI contract documents.
Encouragement. The main contribution of potential PFI toll roads is probably
their willingness to be more innovative, or the PFI is more willing to explore new
technologies and techniques. What is important behind these contributions is that the PFI
22 Miyamoto, Kazuaki (1999): "Prospects and Concerns of the Introduction of the Japanese PFI," Journal
of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Vol.84
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encourages more efficient, innovative alternative procurement of the public sector, or the
national and local government agencies.
5.3.2. Disadvantages of the PFI Scheme
Private Company's Profit
The private project company needs profits, or return on investment, from the
revenue of the toll road/bridge/tunnel project by definition, while the public sector does
not. Therefore, the public sector would have the advantage of less expensive
procurement of the project over the private sector, other things being equal. For example,
if the required rate of return on investment of the project company is 20% and if the
company's debt-to-equity ratio is 4.0, then the project company needs profit margin of
4% (=1/ (1+4.0)*20%) of the total assets for the investors every year, while in the public
sector project, the profit amount might go to some public funds, be used to lower the tolls,
or have already reduced the project cost with less initial use of the taxes if any, other
things being equal. The private sector should overcome this disadvantage by structuring
more efficient project scheme.
Expensive Financing Cost
Financing costs are no doubt more expensive for the private project company than
for the public agencies. Financing costs, for long-term, large amount financing,
represents the interest the borrower has to repay with the capital, which reflects the level
of risks or uncertainties involved in the project and the risk allocation structure.
Financing for a PFI project is assumed "project financing," which is meant investment in
the project, not in a company, with collateral of only the assets and the cash flow stream
of the project. Therefore, in project financing, there needs to be plenty of information
and sound evaluation of the project feasibility and profitability as well as of
organizational structure and the capability of the consortia to pursue the project.
Financing issue is a complicated in part because project finance has been introduced only
for two years in Japan and because long-term financing, such as more than 15-year term,
is rare in the financial market.
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When the experiences accumulate and the long-term financing market is
developed, the emergence of a PFI bond market may be plausible. Mezzanine capital, for
instance, is desirable for the financially standing-alone projects to reduce the financial
burden of the sponsors and to share the demand risks in the future. It may drastically
encourage potential sponsors' incentives to be involved in PFI projects, and accordingly,
stimulate the PFI market further. In the meantime, however, financing with loans is
likely to be the main source of PFI projects, with the financial institutions' oversights.
Needs of Government Supports
Types of supports, availability, and experiences are discussed in Section 5.4.2 (4)
"Government's Financial Supports" for a framework as to needs of government supports.
This is one of the most complicated and crucial issue to implement PFI toll road project
in Japan, and the necessity of government supports is literally a disadvantage to the
private sector.
Long-term Incentive Issue
It is essential for both the public agency and the private undertaker to keep their
motivation for a long term of 20 to 30 years. For the public sector procurement, long-
term governmental needs should be tested, rather than adopting the project merely
because of a positive VFM. If the long-term necessity is not sufficient, and if the project
appears to be no more necessary in the short run, the public agency may be tempted to
terminate early. Even if the agreement includes the government's long-term payment
permission (e.g., in the case of Shadow Toll scheme), the private undertaker and the
financer would not be relieved. This is especially true when the public agency is a local
agency with less flexibility in terms of financial capacity.
For the private, the MCF's incentive to participate in the project is greatest before
and during the construction phase. The contractor's motivation is to minimize the equity
contribution not to be exposed to operation, traffic volume, or financial risks, which are
extremely large for the contractor, and to maximize the construction profits. Therefore,
once the contractor completes the project, it gains the incentive to walk away from the
project to abandon its risk exposure. To reduce the risk of losing the contractor's
incentive, requirement of the guarantee from the sponsor, shorter term of the loan than
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the concession period, and the financial scheme that regulates late payment from the
project may be considered.
Contract Issue (Transparency, Fairness, Complexity, Remaining Uncertainties)
The Public Competitive Bidding system must be adopted in PFI. The Public
Competitive Bidding means that the public agency is required to provide precise, final
contract documents by the public offering. However, hearing from the private sector for
the sophisticated contract documents and making the process transparent and fair seem to
be difficult because neither the public nor private sector is yet familiar with construction
sites or the contract itself.
Possibility of the Project Company's Default
If the private project company cannot repay the predetermined debt services, the
company falls into default, or goes bankrupt, whereas no one generally recognizes that
the public company would go bankrupt. In the case of the project company's default, as
the project is worth nothing unless someone operates it, the lenders should make the best
effort to cooperate with sponsor companies and to keep the toll road open so that the road
generates some cash flow. To make this effort possible, it is required in the Basic
Policies of the Japanese PFI that the project agreement stipulate that the financial
institutions can take over the project, with direct agreement between the public agency
and the financial institution. Nonetheless, the default risk remains for PFI projects and
the possibility is a disadvantage to the PFI.
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5.4. A PFI Framework for Toll road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects
To establish a framework proposal for PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, this
section first summarize the advantages and disadvantages for each type of toll road
project, regarding the discussions in foregoing sections of this chapter. Then, the
proposal refers to a prospective organizational structure and several elements the
framework should cover.
5.4.1. Viable Types for Successful PFI Toll road Projects
(1) Advantages and Disadvantages for Each Type of Toll road Project
The advantages and disadvantages for each type of toll road project, regarding the
discussions in foregoing sections of this chapter, can be summarized in Table 5-3,
although the evaluations in the table include some ambiguity and should vary from
project to project to a substantial extent even if some projects fall into the same column.
In this table, "feasibility" evaluations are based on the perspective of a toll road project,
whether public or private, while "advantages" and "disadvantages" are evaluated by the
comparison between the public procurement and the private development, or the Japanese
FI as well as by the comparison between the project types. Favorable projects as a PFI,
rather than unfavorable ones, are assumed in each evaluation. The factors to be evaluated
are arranged from the foregoing sections.
A new construction project of bridges/tunnels, for instance, which is usually
complicated and large, has moderate advantages in some of the feasibility factors and
larger potential advantages, compared to the others, in advantage factors such as
"efficient planning and design" which would bring about huge construction cost
reduction. However, financial feasibility, in particular, depends largely on the potential
project, that is, predicted traffic volume and the certainty of the prediction as well as
other factors such as completeness of the connecting network with the bridge/tunnel.
Therefore, despite the evaluation of "somewhat advantageous" in financial feasibility,
some potential projects may fall into "not feasible at all."
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Table 5-4 Types of Projects and their Potential Feasibility as Toll roads and (Dis)Advantages as a PFI
Contract Type New Construction Rebuilding O&M
Function B/T*' By ass Develop B/T, Bypass Develop Develop B/T, B
Technical Compli- Compli- NormalCompl./ Compli- Compl./ NoComi.rC li-Normal Coa ora
Complicatedness cated cated Normal cated Normal
Assumed Large > > > Moderate > > > Small
Project Scale
Necessity and
Policy Environ't
>,Political and
Economic
Financial
Feasibility
Environmental,
Social Viability
Necessity of
Private Finance 0 0 0 A A AA
f9fficient Plann
ing and DesigA
Scale Merit 0 0 0 A A A A
Less political 0
restraint
Technological
Innovation 0
External
Effects 0_______ 0 A
Reasonable A
Risk Allocation
Additional 0 0 A A
Investment
Jarly Operatioi
Effect 0 0 0 A A
Private Co.'s A
Profit A A A A A A
Expensive A A A A A
e Financing Cost
C Needs of Gov't
Supports
Long-term A A A
Q Incentive
Contract Issues A A A A A A A
Overall 
0Advantage
* 0: Feasible/Advantageous, A: Somewhat F/A, 0: Infeasible/Disadvantageous, A: Somewhat I/D
Bolded, gray rows represent high priority.
Evaluations are assumed for favorable projects as a PFI (against public procurement).
See the text for more explanation.
*1 B/T: Bridges/Tunnels
*2 Financial feasibility is largely dependent on predicted traffic volume and the certainty of the prediction.
*3 Needless to say, overall evaluations must vary project-to-project and depend on future changes in
governmental policies, political, economic, and social environment.
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Development road projects, on one hand, may have some problems in feasibility
such as potential opposition from citizens due to the lack of profitability, the right-of-way
acquisition problem with its lengthy alignment, and in policy environment because Japan
Highway Public Corporation (JH) has been exclusively developing and operating Japan's
highway network, which consists most of the development roads in Japan. On the other
hand, since JH's development highways are currently highly regulated, the PFI scheme
would realize the advantages of the private sector: political restraints reduction and
external effects.
Bypass road projects and rebuilding projects are likely to have the intermediate
characteristics between the new construction projects of bridges/tunnels and development
roads. It should be noted that technical complicatedness of bridge/tunnel or bypass
projects greatly affects both feasibility as a toll road and advantageousness as a PFI over
the public procurement. For instance, technically complicated projects would have the
serious disadvantage regarding the profitability of the project due to heavy initial
investment, whereas the very difficulty would generate huge potential to improve the
project in planning, design, and construction with private MCF's capabilities. Although
not shown in the table, location of the bypass road project also influences significantly its
characteristics with regard to the feasibility and PFI's advantageousness.
Operation and maintenance only projects have advantages in feasibility, but less
advantages as the PFI than other types of projects. If efficiency of a project is improved
significantly by means of a technological innovation, for example, like ITS utilization,
PFI for O&M may be viable.
To evaluate overall advantage, the factors of "efficient planning and design" and
''early operation effect" are given higher priority because they influence the overall project
profitability more than the others and MCFs can play crucial roles for these factors.
As a result, technically complicated new construction projects of bridges/tunnels
or bypasses have great potential to be feasible as Japanese PFI toll road projects.
However, the applicability must be limited to the particular cases in which the traffic
volume is predictable for reasonably certain and sufficient to overcome larger
disadvantages in the company's profits and financing costs, with complete connecting
network necessary to generate the traffic on the project route. In addition, they may need
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some government supports exemplified in the Section 5.4.2 (4) as elements of the
proposed framework. Bridge/tunnel or bypass projects with less technical
complicatedness may have the opportunity to be implemented by PFI only when they
have some significant advantages over the public procurement. If policy environment
changes and considerable government subsidies are likely, a new construction project of
a development road, or network highway, may be possible in some cases. Operation and
maintenance only projects are less attractive to MCFs.
(2) Types of PFI Toll road/bridge/tunnel Projects for the Framework
Accordingly, from the perspective of the MCF that would manage a PFI project,
viable project types are limited to those summarized below: 2 3
1) Bridges/Tunnels that require complicated technology so that MCF's innovative
approaches would contribute largely to viability of the project,
2) Bypass roads with sufficient toll revenues, and
3) Some network roads under the conditions that governments' financial supports
such as utilization of "shadow tolls" are sufficient to the feasibility, policy
environment of the toll road system changes, and so on.
Bridges and tunnels tend to be very expensive because of severe challenges in
engineering necessary to construct structures in the water or with constraints of
geographic or physical barriers. This in return gives MCFs considerable opportunity to
challenge the public sector procurement with their capabilities to introduce innovative
technologies and integrated creativities. Private financing of major bridges and tunnels
appears to be more practicable undoubtedly because the traffic is largely captive, and
hence there can be more confidence in the traffic projections. Although involvement of
the private sector in concessions for road maintenance and operation has generally been
more successful, compared with construction, this thesis will not go further with such
projects because the focus is from an MCF's viewpoint. Bypass roads may or may not
have quite different profiles, including risk features, and network roads do have different
profiles, from bridges/tunnels.
23 This list does not mean that every potential project falling into one of the three categories is viable as a
PFI project.
2 Malone, Patrick (1999): "Overview of World Experience in Private Financing in the Road Sector: some
principal cases," The World Bank Working Paper Series
180
Chapter 5. The Japanese PFI and Toll Road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects
Figure 5-6 shows a basic concept of the viability of PFI projects, compared to the
PSC (Public Sector Comparator), which represents the cost of the project if the public
sector procures for a certain level of the project value. To be feasible as a PFI, a
prospective project should significantly improve the project value by better risk sharing,
innovation, and so on or significantly reduce the cost in spite of higher bidding, financing,.
and "for profit" costs with the PFI scheme.
Value
With PFI,
- Better risk sharing Not Good
- Innovation as PFI
- Competition
- Flexibility
- Investment Public Procurement
Opportunity
Cost
With PFI,
- Profit need for Private
- Cost for Bidding
- Finance cost
Figure 5-6 Value for Money by PFI
5.4.2. A PFI Framework for Toll roads/Bridges/Tunnels Projects
(1) Organization Framework
Prospective organizational structure may vary, depending on how the project
relates to governments and existing operation companies such as Japan Highway Public
Corporation (JH) and Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation (MEPC). Typical
organization structures may be as shown in Figure 5-7.
In Figure 5-7, dashed lines represent an alternative flow of tolls in the case of a
project consisting a portion of the network that JH currently manages, where toll
revenues should be pooled with other network roads in JH's toll pooling system
described in Subsection 5.2.1. In such a case, tolls paid by the users are collected into
JH's account, which is used to repay the loans of the construction of the entire network
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system, and the project company receives the payment from JH according to the
concession agreement with JH or the national government.
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Figure 5-7 Prospective Organization Structure for a PFI Toll road/bridge/tunnel Project
For most independent bridge/tunnel, or bypass projects, tolls can be directly paid
to the project company and become the dominant source of the repayment of the loans
and bonds the company have borrowed and issued. If the project is profitable enough,
and when all the debts are repaid, toll revenues will be used for dividend payments to the
investors and sponsors, presumably including MCFs.
Like experiences studied in Chapter 4, the government, national or local level,
sponsors, often led by a MCF, and financial institutions are other participants. Financial
institutions may be willing to take part as sponsor companies in the project so as to take
project risks more aggressively, seeking more return, and control and monitor the project.
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The government also plays important roles in various ways discussed shortly, and local
community or developers may want to participate in order for their interests.
(2) Project and Undertaker Selections ,
A PFI toll road project would begin with identifying potential projects. Although
the PFI Act encourages the private sector to propose suitable projects as the PFI, it is
desirable that the government announces which projects are on their mind as PFI projects
so that private entities become more attracted and can focus more on those specific
projects. The announcements would also build fair, competitive environment, which is
imperative for the PFI. The government should define a narrow enough and broad
enough scope so that potential project companies may not waste time and efforts to
narrow the possibilities of the project and can exercise their best efforts to utilize the
capabilities in developing the project. For instance, the government should provide a
couple of alternative alignments and basic performance specifications such as number of
lanes and design vehicle speed, but not provide detail specifications such as type of the
structures, precise location of foundations (in the cases of bridges), and so on. In the
process of the Confederation Bridge project, proposed structures included both bridges
and tunnels in the first stage of proposals. This is a good example where the government
tried to bring in the private sector's creativity and originality. Caltrans' case, however,
seems to have failed to effectively provide a competitive environment because it did not
define even the general location of the project, and as a result, potential project
companies competed with one another in different playing fields, proposing different
projects throughout the state. Consequently, three of the four selected projects have not
yet commenced.
In selecting an appropriate PFI project and its private undertaker under the
Japanese PFI scheme, it is reasonable to give the private sector the equal opportunity to
compete with the public sector, including representing agency such as JH or MEPC. If
the competing public agency would have some financial assistance from the government
for the sake of social welfare, potential developers could also obtain the same assistance
such as government subsidies, access to the public investment funds, and tax exemptions
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in the PFI scheme without interfering with management flexibility. The PFI is intended
to utilize the private sector's ingenuities and concepts.
In calculating the NPV (Net Present Value) of a PFI project, the discount rate is
determined by adding the risk margin to the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is based on
the rate of the governmental long-term bonds, and 2% of the benchmark rate is adopted
as the risk margin in many countries that utilizes PFI schemes. The risk margin ideally
should be set dependent on the risk profile of the project, but it is too complicated in
practice. The discount rate shall be the same between for the PFI model and for the
public model (as the public sector comparator) in the project selection stage.
(3) Government's Responsibility
"The extent to which new high performance road developments will be done as
private activities depends on the extent to which acceptable public-private partnership
can be designed and implemented." (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1991) Generally
acknowledged responsibilities of the government, in part sharing with the private sector,
are scope establishment of the project, project and the undertaker selection, right-of-way
acquisition, preliminary studies and legislation if needed, project monitoring, and
financial support to whatever extent. Government's proactive participation is essential in
any successful piojects. Government participation, however, involves some tradeoffs:
transparency & competitiveness versus flexibility & innovation. The more the
government participates, the more transparent and competitive the project structure
would be, but the less flexibility and innovativeness the private sector could enjoy in the
project development.
Scope Establishment, Project and Undertaker Selection
As noted above, government participation in "precise" scope establishment is
important. If the defined scope is narrowed, the potential project would become more
attractive to the private, and narrowed scope is necessary for more efficient, competitive
project seeking, but on the other hand, the private sector would become less flexible to
identify an innovative project with more developmental risks. In the targeted projects in
this section, bridge/tunnel projects need more flexibility for the private sector to exploit
25 Japan Project-Industry Council (1998). Eikoku ovobi Osutoraria no PFI jigyo ni okeru Seifu to Minkan
Jigyosha tono Kankei ni tsuite (Public-Private Relationship in British and Australian PFI Projects), JAPIC
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innovative proposals, while network road projects would have narrower scope to be
consistent with the network road system. The concept is shown in Figure 5-8.
With the traditional delivery system in Japan, the competitive bidding was limited
to the construction of strictly defined works with various regulatory frameworks, such as
designated bidding system, joint venture requirements, over-divided scopes, designated
construction means, and prioritizing local contractors, described mostly in Chapter 2.
The PFI induces the developer not only to design and build but also to maintain and
operate the project. This overall scope in a flexible, spontaneous proposal can bring
about more efficiency, or operational risk reduction, of the project. Therefore, in
implementing a PFI toll road project in Japan, stress should be put more on broader
scopes rather than narrow ones.
LargeAL
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Figure 5-8 Project Type and Government Scope
Preliminary Studies and Legislation
Government assistance during development stage should be considered to
demonstrate government commitment and attract potential private entities.
Environmental assessment, revenue and traffic study, and local permits and agreement
are the areas of preliminary studies. These studies should be cooperatively pursued with
the partnership between the public and private sectors. The public sector is likely to have
more and better access to resources and information of those issues, while the private
sector has more willingness to complete these studies earlier and more accurately. Hence,
the joint participation would generate synergy effects for the studies. This process is
185
usually the key of early operation as seen in most of the cases introduced in the previous
chapter.
Legislation, however, cannot be the matter of the private sector, even though it
would critically effect the implementation of the project. The government is solely in
charge of legislation establishment that facilitates the implementation of the PFI toll road
projects, and the government encouragement is definitely necessary for efficient
competitions and implementations, although there is no legal obstacle to overcome in
order to implement a PFI toll road project.
Right-of-way Acquisition
Responsibility for the right-of-way acquisition should be assumed mainly by the
public because they have long, ample experiences of this business, but in part assumed by
the private sector. The public sector should pay the acquisition costs, but delay costs
should be shared in half between the public and private sectors. So, the private, in nature,
try to resolve the right-of-way problems in earnest and it is important. Also, the people in
concern expect the public sector's participation to this issue, because the public officials
are more credible (for the public sector will not walk away after any events in general).
In case of bridge projects, this discussion would apply to the fishing rights of
local fishermen's union.
Project Monitoring
Project monitoring is necessary to protect taxpayers and road users from default
of the project company and abuse of the monopoly situation. The project company's
performance and activities should be monitored according to the predetermined
procedure in the agreement, and the financial status is also confirmed periodically.
However, too much regulation of continuing oversight of the private business may
not be necessary, or even worsen, for a toll road project unless the project falls in a
serious problem because the regulations may discourage innovation or improvement
efforts for more efficient performance.
(4) Governments' Financial Supports
As mentioned earlier, government assistance is a crucial issue for the success of
toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in Japan, where, like other nations, relatively profitable
186
Chapter 5. The Japanese PFI and Toll Road/Bridge/Tunnel Projects
projects have been already done by the public sector or are under management of special
public agencies such as JH and MEPC. The Japanese PFI Act specifies some features
about direct and indirect government supports. Making full use of the opportunity is
desirable for the PFI implementation from the viewpoint of potential project companies
such as MCFs. Relevant clauses include the following:
- Debt Payment of the National Government: The national government may pay
for debt of a project for no more than 30 years. (Intended to apply to "services
sold to the public sector" and "joint ventures" type projects 26, Can be used for
shadow tolls or availability fees)
- Non-interest Lending: The national government may lend money with no
interest from the budget. It may utilize a governmental financial institution
such as the Development Bank of Japan.
- Reservation of Funds and Consideration of Local Bonds
- Use of Public Land for Free of Charge: The national or local government may
lend public land for free or at a lower price than the market price.
- Consideration of Acquisition
- Other Supports: The national and the local governments shall provide the
legal and taxation support and the financial and monetary assistance as needed.
Levels of supports depend on the project profitability and the public necessity as
social welfare. For example, 11,500 km network roads are intended to provide any local
citizens with the proximity to a highway, or a trunk road of the network. In these projects,
for the public interest, governments' financial supports may be applied to a substantial
extent.
Nevertheless, governments' financial supports should be limited such that the
supports would make the project most efficient from the viewpoint of the public sector,
or taxpayers. Governments' financial supports include equity investment, guarantees,
subordinated loans, subsidies (grants), shadow tolls, minimum traffic or revenue
guarantee, and other minor supports such as concession extension and exclusivity
agreement.
26 The PFI is divided into three types: services sold to the public sector, financially free standing projects,
and joint ventures. See Section 2.3.3.
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Equity investment means that the project is "the third sector" project as in the
Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line project, in which the public sector contributes equity to the project
company and gains return on investment just like the private sponsors. The PFI does not
intend to establish this type of public-private partnership, and equity investment is not
specified in the Act because this financial instrument not only expose the public sector to
the entire project risk but also significantly reduces the incentives of the private sector.
Guarantees include equity guarantees, debt guarantees, and, if financed with
foreign currencies, exchange rate guarantees. When the project falls into arrears in its
debt service (in the cases of debt guarantees) or falls to the minimum return on
investment (in the cases of equity guarantees), the government must furnish the payment
to the lenders under the term of this financial support. Government guarantees are the
most attractive for the project finance because the project risk is all transferred to the
governmer:t, and lenders can finance the project with almost no risk. However,
governments' financial exposure to risks is the highest in turn among the instruments, and
the incentives of the private sector would be reduced. This is why the PFI Act does not
suppose government guarantees as well as equity investment.
Subordinated loans are almost always desirable for PFI projects when there is an
important gap between senior loans and equity in the project's financial structure. They
provide the impact of ability to raise finance of the project without substantial exposure
of the government to the project risks. Moreover, since subordinated loans will be repaid
before returns on equity if the project turns out to be feasible, they will not only furnish
the return to the public but also remain incentives of the project company.
Grants, shadow tolls, and minimum traffic or revenue guarantee, also called
subsidies, are all financial instruments that do not require repayment. They vary on when
and what basis the subsidies will be paid. Grants are one-time, up-front payment
instruments, which have larger impact on attracting finance than others, while shadow
tolls will be paid periodically (such as monthly) according to the actual traffic volume;
and with a minimum traffic or revenue guarantee scheme, the government will subsidize
the project only when the actual cash flow falls below a predetermined minimum floor
level. The subsidy adopted in the Confederation Bridge project is the fixed annual
payment, indexed to the CPI (consumer price index).
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Shadow tolls have been adopted in DBFO roads in the U.K. without "real" tolls.
The shadow tolls are set such that the more the actual traffic volume, the less the
marginal tolls, so the scheme protects the government from the exposure to unlimited
obligation if the project is more than successful. Shadow tolls arrangement is useful to
support a project's feasibility without heavy financial burden to the government upfront.
However, it may not efficiently work if the traffic volume is lower than expected since
the lower the traffic volume, the less the amount of the financial support. Therefore, this
instrument should be utilized for the projects that are expected to yeild at least medium
level of traffic volume such a bridges/tunnels and bypass roads, or coupled with other
instruments such as grants and subordinate loans in cases of network roads.
Minimum traffic or revenue guarantee is an attractive means for MCFs in
particular if the MCFs want to hedge traffic volume risk as shown in Figure 5-9. It is
reasonable to set the ceiling together, or the maximum traffic or revenue level, to
compensate for the government's risk sharing. This instrument should not be used as a
financing tool but as an optional tool only for a risk allocation.
Profit for
Private A No Risk Sharing
= All for Priv*eProject
Company Public Benefit
Ceiling Setting
Probability
Minimum Probability Distribution of
Guarantee istribution Toll Revenue
by Gov't
Public Sup[ ort
Expected
Toll Revenue Toll Revenue
Figure 5-9 Toll Revenue Risk Allocation Example
There are many other forms of governments' financial supports. For instance, the
Confederation Bridge and the California's projects had provisions of exclusivity
agreement to protect the project company from competitions for a considerable duration.
In the Sydney Harbour case, as well as British Dartford Bridge case, although not studied
in Chapter 4, the project company was allowed to raise construction costs by the revenues
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from the existing tunnels. In Japan, redemption period extensions, similar to the
mechanism of the concession extension, are now popular among toll roads managed by
the public sector agencies, although they are public in nature.
Government financial supports used in the cases studied are summarized in Table
5-5, together with desirable instruments for the prospective PFI toll road projects,
explained shortly.
Table 5-5 Government Financial Supports Used in the Cases Studied and Desirable Instruments for
the Prospective PFI Toll Road Projects
Cases/ B Guaran- Subor- Revenue Shadow Ohr
Project Types Equity tee dinate Grants Guaran- tolls OthersLoans tee
Kurushima* 0 0 0 0 - - Redemption
TB Aqua-Line* 0 O 0 0 - - ' Extension
Confederation 0 Ferry 0 Min. Non
- 0 - fare floor - CompetitionBridge Equiv't. level Clause
HW407* 0 Q Q - -
SR91 SR57 - - 0 _ _ Exclusivity
(Local) No Right-of-way
Sydney __ 0 See 0 Min. _ Revenue from
Harbour Bridge 'Others' traffic Bridge fair
DBFO roads
in UK
Kanamachi & Service Sold to
Japn -i the Public Type
Bridge Tax credit
/Tunnel Other crossings
0 6,Bypass roads 0 (0) 0 (A) Tax credit
Tax credit,Network 0 10 0 1 A Concession
* 0: Used for cases, Effective or recommended for proposals,
recommended, A: Somewhat effective, (A): Sometimes
Kurushima, TTB, and HW407 are non-private projects.
(0): Sometimes effective or
somewhat effective
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Figure 5-10 Types of Government Supports and Application for PFI Toll Road Projects
(Source: Fisher and Babbar, 1996, Added)
Figure 5-10 illustrates the types of government supports and desirable
applications for potential Japanese PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel projects. In the traditional
toll road projects, including Kurushima and Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line projects, since the
government raises all necessary finance with national expenditure and guarantees,
financial exposure of the government to project risks is very high (See the rightmost
circle). By utilizing the PFI scheme and project financing for a toll road/bridge/tunnel
project as a private project, the government literally supports the project by means of less
risky financing tools or by just giving the project company some accounting benefits,
such as tax exemptions.
Desirable combinations of the types of government supports should be chosen
according to the feasibility and the risk profile of the project. For instance, minimum
revenue guarantees would be effective and desirable for bypass roads that have sufficient
traffic volume with high probability, but not effective for network roads because the
guarantees might reduce private sector's incentive. Subordinated loans would always be
effective for the private sector project company and might benefit the citizens if the
project turns out to be successful. Grants, on the other hand, may not be effective from
the perspective of the taxpayers for the projects with enough profitability. Bridges and
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tunnels may need other revenue enhancements, such as concession rights of operating the
existing crossing and an exclusivity clause in the agreement.
(5) Tolling System
Toll Collection System
Japan's expressway system has in earnest started adopting the ETC system since
April 2001, and the ETC is expected to gain popularity in a few years. The widespread
availability of the ETC system involves tremendous potentials in the operation of the toll
road project.
HW407 project, for example, utilizes most advanced measures for the toll
collection with the contemplated AVI/ETC system (See Section 4.2.5). Amazingly, the
system does not require any tollbooth, any speed reduction, or even transponders,
although cars with a transponderare charged discounted tolls. In addition, the toll
collection system is capable of accurately detecting and identifying vehicles under all
operating conditions with an accuracy of 99.995% according to the Request for Proposals.
The system is adopting congestion pricing and various pricing dependent on the payment
method, by which users with a transponder can enjoy the cheapest rates.
Potentials of the ETC include various promotion programs coupled with ancillary
facilities such as restaurants and accommodations in the service areas or community
businesses such as leisure parks, golf courses, conference complexes, and so on. Japan's
ETC system has adopted double equipped system, which requires both a personal
electronic card to charge the tolls and on-board transponder to detect the car, so that not
only the user may drive more than one car, including a rental car, but also go shopping to
the allied stores, for example, with the card.
A well-known episode about early operation of HW407 may suggest something to
Japan's projects that cannot attract road users as expected, such as Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line
and Honshu-Shikoku Bridges. When the scheduled commencement day came, the ETC
system was still subject to verification. Hence, the expressway opened for free for a
while. The users who had already used to enjoying a non-congested "free" route, even
with enough information of the breakthrough toll collection technology, could not return
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to the real free route from the congestion-free toll route even after they began to be tolled,
in part because nothing had changed thanks to the non-tollbooth, freeway-like system.
Combination pricing
Combination pricing of real tolls, shadow tolls, and availability fees should be
considered for bridge/tunnel projects, which may need governments' financial supports to
cover the expensive construction cost, being consistent with the public policy.
Combination pricing, rather than higher rates of real toll only, must attract drivers to use
the bridge/tunnel, and as a result, the economy of the both sides of the bridge/tunnel
would be boosted as the policy expected. Although the combination pricing has not been
experienced in any of the cases, since the government furnishes both equity and debt
guarantees for current toll road projects (See Figure 5-10), providing shadow tolls and
availability fees of proper levels, instead of equity and guarantees, entails reducing
government exposure to the project risk.
(6) Another Financing Scheme - Utilization of the Capital Market
Financing Arrangement. An elaborate financing arrangement can be a means of
the financial risk mitigation. The PFI also induces the developer or financial institutions
to create innovative financial instruments as an example of new business creation, which
is one of the objectives of the Japanese PFI. For instance, in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel
project, a CPI indexed bond was developed and issued as a crucial financing instrument.
Among the cases studied in Chapter 4, the Confederation Bridge, Sydney Harbour
Bridge, and some of the DBFO roads in the U.K. projects issued different types of bonds
to attract third party investors, while none of Japan's primary PFI projects did. The
revenue bond, often utilized in the U.S., such as in the plan of the SR57 project, is
27
another alternative to stimulate investment. Given that bond issuance can be an
effective financing tool, it is important to consider the utilization of the capital market to
finance toll road/bridge/tunnel projects with the Japanese PFI scheme as an enhancement
of financial resources, although financing by loans from financial institutions would
remain the most important position.
27 If a revenue bond is issued to build a bridge, the tolls collected from motorists using the bridge are
committed for paying off the bond. Unless otherwise specified in the indenture, holders of these bonds
have no claims on the issuer's other resources. (Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 1998)
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The political movement is currently favorable in this regard. The ruling parties
have established a tax reformation plan that exempts individuals from taxation on certain
income by the sales of stock, for example. It should be noted, however, that the goal of
investment stimulation can be best achieved through actions that will reduce market
uncertainty (i.e., indemnification) and future risks, rather than through more commonly
used measures like tax incentives. (Liddle, 1993)
Significance of the Utilization of the Capital Market. If the capital market is
utilized for the project finance of PFI projects, the capital structure of the project
company would become as the right-hand side of Figure 5-11.
Financial
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Figure 5-11 Significance of the Utilization of the Capital Market for PFI Project Finance (Source:
JAPIC, "Report for the PFI Projects")
The main significances of the utilization of the capital market are the following
three. First, if the project can attract third party investors, the financing costs of the
project company may be reduced. Institutional and other investors have a variety of
investment needs that are different from those of the financial institutions (lenders such
as banks), depending on their portfolio structure. Some investors such as life insurance
companies are likely to be interested in the long-term feature of the project finance of PFI
projects. Secondly, if the equity portion is attractive as an investment and the project
company can issue the preferred stocks to investors, then the project company could draw
loans with more favorable terms because financial institutions would be delightful with
more equity as risk buffer. Third, revenue bonds may be sold to individuals, especially in
the neighboring communities because not only the project would contribute to the
community development, but also the investment would get return if the project is
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successful. There are Y1,400 trillion individual financial savings in Japan; these should
be utilized for something like the PFI projects as investment, 28 as well as for helping to
boost overall Japanese economy.
5.4.3. Issues Surrounding PFI Toll roads/Bridges/Tunnels Projects
A desirable framework has been developed in this chapter for the specific types of
toll road/bridge/tunnel projects that have a potential to be feasible as a Japanese PFI
project. Subsequently, more concrete examples and the application of the framework are
tested in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it is imperative that some obstacles surrounding
prospective PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, in addition to more general issues raised
in Section 3.5, be overcome.
Considering the circumstance of the implementation of the Japanese PFI, on one
hand, that of potential PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel project has many favorable trends.
Privatization trends, the structural reformation of financial and administrative systems,
ITS systems developments, the capital market innovation, growing experiences of other
types of the Japanese PFI, public involvement trends, little public resistance towards toll
roads thanks to past experiences and little low-income citizens, and changes in business
culture are among those, as discussed in this chapter.
On the other hand, the financial strength of both major banks and MCFs is
currently under rehabilitation. Even though the both players may have the willingness to
invest in a PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel, since such a project require the heavy initial
investment, it would be difficult under the current economic situation in Japan. Moreover,
the secure development of a network that smoothly connects the target project to another
complete network is crucial for a toll road/bridge/tunnel project; however, the private
sector cannot control the network issue in principle. Other inhibiting factors include the
complexity of the scheme, policy and politic issues, arguably failure experiences, e.g.,
Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line and Honshu-Shikoku Bridges, limited probabilities for profitable
projects, bureaucrats' hesitation to changes, the absolute power of the public sector, and
Japanese MCFs' few experiences in BOT projects for infrastructures.
2S Japan Project-Industry Council (1999): Jisedai Minkatsu Jigyo (PFI) ni kansuru Hokokusho (Report on
the PFI Projects -For the Realization of Project Finance-)
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Joint efforts and initiatives of the public and private sectors with eagerness to
implement the Japanese PFI, is essential to the development of projects such as the toll
road/bridge/tunnel project. The framework developed in this chapter, which contains
viable project types, organizational structures, project selections, scope establishments,
governments' financial supports, tolling systems, and the utilization of the capital market,
should help the development.
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Chapter 6. Generic Strategies for the Japanese
Major Construction Firm
Chapter 6 proposes strategies for the Japanese MCF in the PFI context. Chapter 4
demonstrates that MCFs need to play a central role within the projects and to contribute
significantly to technical problem solving, financing, and risk assumption; hence, MCFs
should get returns for those contributions. From the perspective of the traditional
business style of Japanese MCFs, it seems likely that the MCF tries to be involved in PFI
projects just as a contractor, which obtains a construction contract and get profits from
the construction work. However, with the PFI scheme, the MCF must contribute to
preliminary works, such as planning and design, must prepare complicated, detailed
documents for the PFI procedure, and must make the project profitable as the project
company, while making the project company profitable conflicts with the MCF's interest,
which is to earn more from the consortium. These additional burdens and strains,
compared to the traditional contracts, must substantially lower the profit margin of the
MCF in the PFI scheme despite foregoing contributions found in the cases. In order for
the MCF to get returns equivalent to the contributions, the MCF should establish the
strategies, which contain differentiation and equity contribution as demonstrated in this
chapter.
In addition to the MCF's strategies in the Japanese PFI scheme, this thesis
previously proposes a framework for prospective PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel projects in
Chapter 5. In the latter half of this chapter, simulations for prospective Japanese PFI
projects are presented to demonstrate the viabilities of the framework and strategies
developed in Chapter 5 and proposed in the first half of this chapter, respectively.
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6.1. Generic Strategies for the Japanese MCF
In order for the MCF to get returns with its strong potential for gaining better
efficiency in a PFI project, this section addresses four strategies for the MCF:
differentiation, equity contribution, both of which contain several elements to achieve.
6.1.1. Differentiation
Differentiation is one of three generic strategies to survive in the competitive
marketplace, which Porter maintained in his "Competitive Advantage" in 1985.1
Introduction of the PFI scheme has enabled the Japanese MCF to get equitable valuation
for its capabilities, such as proper technologies and equipment, for the public sector
projects in Japan cannot currently utilize those company-specific capabilities. For
instance, the public sector cannot design any public facility that only single construction
firm may have the designed construction means or have the specific equipment to
complete the structure under the traditional Design-Bid-Build system. Although the
MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) has been developing improved
delivery systems, the PFI would play a more aggressive role in changing the industry.
Some questions then follow the change: How can the MCF differentiate itself in
the initial stage in a project? In other words, what kind of projects should the MCF
initiate or aim for? When can the MCF strategically and effectively negotiate for the
superior position in the consortium? How can the MCF attract potential partners like
joint venture construction companies, top operation companies, and financial institutions?
Key factors for the differentiation are differentiated resources, such as robust financial
status, specialized talent and experiences, differentiated technologies and patent, and
proper equipment. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the differentiation does not
always allow the construction company to raise its price in bidding in this industry.
Namely, the MCFs usually need both differentiation and cost advantage by the
differentiation.
Porter, Michael E. (1985). Competitive Advantage - Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance
The other two are cost leadership and focus ("focus," or narrow scope, can be divided into cost focus and
differentiation focus).
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(1) Robust Financial Status
Robustness of sponsor companies' financial status is often put importance in
evaluating and selecting the undertaker of a PFI or similar privatized project. As in the
cases of California's AB680 projects, the Confederation Bridge, the Kanagawa
Prefectural College (KPC) project, and also in the Guideline of the Japanese PFI, for
example, the government agencies include the financial robustness of the member
companies of the potential consortium as an important factor in the evaluation criteria. In
particular, in the KPC project, the financial robustness of the winning company
(Obayashi Corporation, an MCF) was significantly stressed in the final evaluation.2
Not only because financial robustness may be an important criterion in selecting a
PFI undertaker, but financial robustness can be a great factor of differentiation of a MCF
because it must be attractive to the investors or the lenders and the attractiveness entails
lower financial costs, such as interest rates on the loans. For example, AAA-rafed
corporate bonds may be issued at lower yields by some 100-150 basis points, depending
on the economic circumstance, than BBB-rated corporate bonds. 3 Even if the
government furnishes low or non-interest loans to the prospective project company, the
project company is always exposed to more or less default risk that all of the government,
financing companies, and consortium partners would like to minimize. Therefore, MCFs,
such as Kajima, Obayashi, and Shimizu, should consider financial robustness as a
differentiation factor.4
(2) Special Experiences and Talent
In the Sydney Harbour Tunnel project, ample experiences of Kumagai Gumi in
immersed tube tunnels were the crucial factor for the selection of the consortium. Not
only did the experiences help them propose the complicated tunnel structure and the
construction means but also the government could appreciate their overall proposal,
which offered surprisingly low cost, with credit because of the experiences. Those who
experienced the previous BOT project in Australia also greatly influenced both the
2 Although no relative weights of the factors of the criteria existed, the final announcement of the
evaluation committee clearly stated that the creditability of the company was one of three crucial factors by
which the company differentiated itself from the other consortia.
3 Grinblatt and Titman (1998). Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy
4 See Section 2.2.1 for Japanese MCFs' financial data.
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selection and the subsequent negotiation with the public client. Kumagai's project
manager and some others had a previous experience in another BOT project with
Transfield, the partner in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company. This experience,
together with other experiences in Hong Kong, let the talent work with prospective
partners and led to the successful proposal.
The consortium for the Confederation Bridge contained four international MCFs,
all of which had useful experiences in different areas of expertise for the construction of
the bridge. Northern Construction Co. Ltd. is the Canadian subsidiary of Morison
Knudsen Corporation, which built the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, the world's longest
cable-stayed concrete bridge completed in 1987 spanning the Tampa Bay. The Sunshine
Skyway Bridge is 29,040 feet (8.85 km) in total length with longest single span of 1,200
feet (366 meter), and more than 300 precast concrete segments are linked together.
Experiences in this previous project, which had similar features, such as super-long
structure and numerous precast concrete segments, helped the consortium in developing
the Confederation Bridge project. Ballast Nedarn Canada Inc. is the Canadian subsidiary
of a Holland based MCF, Ballast Nedam International B.V., which took part in the Great
Belt West Bridge project. In the West Bridge project, the company utilized its heavy lift
vessel "Svanen" to install heavy precast concrete segments as done in the Confederation
Bridge project. The experience as well as the proper equipment was one of the crucial
factors in the project. GTMI (Canada) is the Canadian subsidiary of France-based GTM
International. GTM participated in the concessionaire of the Second Severn Crossing
project, one of the first privately financed projects in the U.K. There it gained experience
in private packaging, including design, construction, financing, and operation and
maintenance, which was similar contract structure to the Confederation Bridge project.
Strait Crossing Inc. is only construction company with the 100% Canadian capital and
had a reputation in Canada.
MCFs with special experiences or a combination of experienced firms and staffs
therefore have a tremendous potential to create an exceptionally efficient project. MCFs
should tap into their own experiences and talent.
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(3) Differentiated Technologies and Patent
A differentiated, innovative technology can be the sole determinant of being
rewarded. In the Highway 407 case, two consortia submitted a proposal, responding to
the Request for Proposals, in which the government stipulated that the project be
delivered by DBFO scheme by the selected consortium. After evaluating the two
proposals, however, the government surprisingly dismantled the two consortia and
decided to change the procurement rules so that the government would take the
responsibility for the financing and the two consortia would "design and build" and
"operate and maintenance" separately. The state-of-the-art toll collection system,
proposed by the losing consortium as a design-builder, was such a valuable function that
the government could not help select the technology, which would have been abandoned
unless the government had made this abnormal decision.
JR East, a privatized railway company in Japan, took advantage of a differentiated
technology of a MCF in the Numakunai Bridge project, as briefly described in Chapter 4.
Kajima, a Japanese MCF, contributed to the 10% overall cost reduction of the project
with its differentiated technologies, such as high-performance light-weight concrete and
the external cable system. While Japan's traditional delivery system, Design-Bid-Build
method, cannot allow the public agencies to adopt a differentiated technology that only
single company owns, the public agencies may aggressively seek effective advanced
technologies in future PFI projects. Consequently, developing and protecting original
technologies as patents have become more and more important than ever in the Japanese
construction industry.
(4) Equipment Proper to the MCF
Equipment proper to a consortium or an MCF can be the best differentiation in the
competition. The heavy lift vessel, "Svanen," with the world's largest lifting capacity,
was the solution of the construction of the Confederation Bridge under the extremely
severe site conditions and environmental and time constraints. As introduced in Chapter
4, components of the bridge structure needed to be segmented in large pieces and precast
in land to avoid operating in the difficult conditions of the strait as much as possible. To
that end, utilizing the world's hugest vessel was the only possible alternative for the
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project. (See Figure 4-10 for a picture.) In fact, every other competitor failed in
complying with the government's requirement regarding the amount of the government
subsidy.
Although not mentioned in the case description in Chapter 4, Kajima's unique
self-elevating platform (SEP), "KAJIMA" (Figure 6-1), was also used for differentiation
to bid the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge project. Without this "vessel," it would have been
virtually impossible, at the point in the middle of the strait where the current was very
strong, to build a 44m-long, 2.0m-diameter pile, which the specification required the
contractor to set as a guide for the quick, accurate installation of the prefabricated caisson
during a short lull period of the current. SEP "KAJIMA" has the competent capacity for
standing-alone in the middle of some 30m-deep strait, which flows at maximum velocity
of 10-knot current, with a 100-ton crane on the deck. The H-shape deck was also an
important factor for "KAJIMA" because, on completion, the guide pile could be left
behind the "vessel" through the open edge of the deck.
Figure 6-1 SEP "KAJIMA"
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6.1.2. MCF's Equity Contribution
How can the MCF's differentiations be favorably priced in the competitive PFI
market? It seems to be almost impossible that the MCF could obtain favorably priced
construction contracts as a contractor in the PFI market because the private client is likely
to require the contractors to bid more competitive price than the public agency would,
even though additional costs, such as for preliminary planning, may grow significantly
with the PFI scheme. However, the competitive advantage of the MCF with the
differentiations, compared to other participants of the project, such as the financial
institutions, should be rewarded by some means. One of the strategies for the MCF to
achieve the goal may be the equity contribution, hopefully with some device to get early
returns.
(1) Debt to Equity Ratio and Project Profitability
In implementing a PFI project, participating private companies need to establish
an SPC. The SPC should be funded by both equity and debt, which would be used for the
preliminary studies, conceptual and detailed designs, construction, and usually operation,
and repaid from either the government or the users of the PFI public facility, for example,
from tolls in the case of toll road project. Debt is sometimes repaid in full at the
beginning of the operation stage, and the SPC, or the project company, must borrow the
money for the repayment from any other investors, but usually, one supposes that debt is
long-term financing and equity from the sponsors is retained for the lifetime of the
project. In this thesis, "sponsors" are assumed to include MCFs.
Equity contribution ratio, or equity to asset ratio (E/A), signifies the sponsors'
willingness and responsibility to take risks. Sponsors usually try to maximize the return
on equity (ROE). As the less the equity, the better the ROE in general, sponsors are
likely to try to reduce the investment amount and raise loans with better terms from the
financial institutions. On the other hand, lenders (financial institutions) want to
maximize the Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), which is the ratio between the
accumulated present value of annual cash flows before debt service and the total amount
of the loan principal of the project. The more the DSCR is, the more profitable revenue
stream the project will have during its lifetime, although the stableness of the revenue
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stream depends on the risk profile of the project. Hence, other things being equal, the
lenders usually seek as small a loan provision as possible, so that the lenders can secure
the DSCR of 1.4 to 2.0.5
With regard to project profitability indexes, such as Net Present Value (NPV) and
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), since debt bears interest while equity does not, higher
equity ratio indicates better profitability of the project. In other words, financing with
debt costs more than financing with equity. Therefore, larger equity portion is more
desirable from the perspective of the project or the project company, although the
sponsors must have a different perspective. 6
Also important to consider is the structure of project revenue distribution in the
PFI scheme, so-called "cash waterfalls" as illustrated in Figure 6-2.7 If a PFI project,
financed by "project finance," generates a revenue stream, such as tolls from a toll road,
the revenue must be first spent for operating costs, including maintenance of the facility,
general, administrative expenses, and tax payments. Next, the net income from operation
must be spent for the debt service according to the priority of each debt, that is, from
interest and amortization of senior loans, then debt service reserve accounts and general
reserve accounts, to interest and amortization of subordinated loans. And finally, if the
project is profitable enough, the remaining profits can be distributed to the investors and
sponsors as dividends and retained for future investments to run the project.
As one can understand from the figure, the smaller each basin of a waterfall is
(i.e., the smaller the debt burden is), the earlier and the more the profit flow would fall
into the final basin, or into sponsors' pocket, other things (volume and speed of the water
flow, or revenue stream) being equal.
5 Ohara, Katsuma (1997). Project Finance
6 In actuality, debt financing has advantageous features, such as tax deduction benefits, over equity
financing.
7 Buijevich and Park (1999). Project Financing and the International Financial Markets
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Figure 6-2 Cash Waterfalls of Revenue Distribution of a Project
(2) Equity Position for MCFs
As seen in Chapter 4, MCFs in the world have played important roles in
privatized toll road projects and in other types of projects in Japan. Nevertheless, it may
not always be the case that the MCF has received sufficient return, which is equitable to
the contribution it made in the preliminary and construction stages, from the privatized
project in foreign cases. On the contrary, the MCFs and GCs that participated in the
Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge and Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line projects had considerably
profitable contracts in the traditional public-finance system even though the projects
themselves have been as yet far from profitable. When the MCF takes the PFI scheme
ito consideration, some strategies to retain sufficient profits would be needed.
The competitive advantage of the MCF with the differentiations, compared to
other participants of the project, such as the financial institutions and operation
companies as well as competitors in construction, should be rewarded by some means in
the Japanese PFI scheme. This can be achieved only by taking calculated risks, that is,
by seeking opportunities to get more return on investment with deliberate strategies.
205
From the standpoint of the consortium and the investors of the project, if the bid price is
critical to the MCF for being awarded the project, the lower the price, the more profitable
the project should be. But this is not true from the standpoint of the MCF. The increased
profit from lowering the price goes to those who take risks by contributing equity for the
project and to the financial institutions that take smaller risks by lending money for the
project, as well as to the citizens, or the taxpayers, without any compensation to the
contractor that offered the lower bid price but not contributed equity.
In addition to the MCF's incentives for being involved in the equity position for
profits, the necessity of the MCF's involvement exists. In the competitive market as in
the PFI, an owner or the project company tries to squeeze the construction cost.
Therefore, the MCF is unlikely to get a profitable contract on a traditional lump sum plus
contingency basis; rather, the project company would require the MCF to accept a more
severe GMP-base contract.8 The PFI thus cannot benefit the MCF without MCF's equity
contribution. MCF's equity contribution is also attractive to the project company because
additional equity position of the MCF would replace the money borrowed from banks
with expensive interest.
Equity contribution, however, exposes the MCF to the overall project risk to a
substantial extent. If the project fails for any reason, the MCF contributing equity to the
project company would lose the source to repay the investment and might face a financial
problem as a sponsor company or at least reduce the net worth of the company. Hence, it
is essential to be careful about to which projects and under which conditions the strategy
shall be applied. The following deals with this issue.
(3) When to Apply the Equity Contribution Strategy
Under the Japanese PFI scheme, where private investment is strongly encouraged
like other areas of business, the most valuable opportunities may come with a great deal
of uncertainty, which entails substantial risk. The MCF should take the risk to cultivate
the opportunity under certain conditions. Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4, as well as the
discussion in Chapter 4, may help understand the risk profile of a toll road project and the
relation between a specific risk and its influences on return.
8 "GMP" stands for the Guaranteed Maximum Price contract, under which the construction cost will not
exceed the set maximum price in any circumstance except truly extreme occasions.
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Although this figure demonstrates the conceptual relation between risks and
returns, the quantitative level is intended to be meaningful (Actual simulations are
presented later in this chapter. See Section 6.2). As the figure shows, construction cost
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difference, if some 10% variance is assumed, would moderately deteriorate the profits of
equity holders (Lower ROE), while lower traffic volume than expected would never give
return if 30% variance is assumed (zero ROE). If the construction cost is reduced by
30%, for example, as may be expected in a bridge/tunnel project, earlier and more return
to the sponsors would achievable,. while the 30% traffic volume increase case would
produce further more profits to the sponsors in this model. Changes in equity
contribution ratio (from 20% to 40% in equity) may have significant effects on when the
sponsors get returned, and the possible loss would double if the project fails, whereas the
original case (20% equity) would limit the maximum loss of the sponsors up to at the less
equity level.
Having estimated the relation between risk and return of a toll road project and
the potential of an MCF to improve the project risk profile, as studied in Chapter 4,
especially in the design and construction stages, the MCF should take the risk to cultivate
the most valuable opportunity when most of the following conditions are met. In other
words, however, if none of the following conditions applies to the potential project, the
MCF shall never take the risk by the equity contribution strategy.
a. All risks except the completion risk should be well mitigated or transferred.
This is almost a mandatory condition. The MCF could mitigate the demand risk, the
political risk, and the regulatory risk with the organizational framework, proposed in
Chapter 5, which utilizes an existing public corporation in expressway development
projects. The MCF could also transfer the financial risks to the financial institutions and
the operational risks to the operating companies to a substantial extent. If, by this risk
allocation, only the completion risk, or the construction risk, is the greatest concern to the
MCF, it should assume the risk, seeking the most possible benefit. For example, in the
Sydney Harbour Tunnel project, the project company comprised of two MCFs, Transfield
and Kumagai (i.e., only the two MCFs raised equity), transferred the traffic volume risk
to the government, economic risks to the users and financiers by means of CPI related
tolls and bonds, and operational risks to the operation company. Although the equity-to-
asset ratio (E/A) is minimal and the surplus from the excessive traffic volume has
benefited the government, the MCFs have enjoyed high ROE from the successful project.
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b. The project may include a large potential to develop innovative construction
means. The project might become much more profitable than it originally seems to be if
the construction cost can be reduced by efficiently designing and developing innovative
construction means. The cost of risks, or risk premium, is inexpensive if the risks can be
managed well, and accordingly, the MCF's risk premium against the risks of the project
related to its construction must be the least expensive among the participants. Since the
improved profitability is almost always attributed to the MCF, the MCF should be
rewarded for this by being given the opportunity to assume inexpensive risks with
expectation for larger return, rather than giving the opportunity to the financial
institutions, which would assume the risks by requiring expensive compensation. For
instance, if an MCF faces a technically complicated project that has a reasonable
profitability and if the most influential risk is the completion risk in conjunction with the
technological difficulties, which the MCF assumes resolvable with significant cost
reduction by means of a new technology, as was the case in JR East's Numakunai Bridge
project, the MCF should invest in the project even through waiving the profit margin
earned by the cost reduction because the project must be worth investing, should it have
little completion risk.
c. The MCF has the capability of Life-Cycle-Engineering that is essential to the
project. The MCF would be expected to efficiently design and construct a public
infrastructure facility so that the life cycle cost will be minimized. Maintenance costs of
the existent facilities have rapidly grown in recent years, and thus major MCFs have set
specific divisions for maintenance in Japan. They have improved and developed various
durable repairing methods and materials, which can be adapted for new construction.
Therefore, the MCF should bear, at least in part, the risks in the O&M stage. Some of the
DBFO roads in the U.K. and the SR91 project required the project company to have the
capability to manage the project especially in the operation stage. The Life-Cycle-
Engineering function and the knowledge of the operation are indispensable for the MCF
to invest in the project to a substantial extent.
d. The MCF has the know-how of the whole project development. If the MCF has
divisions or subsidiaries that include developing or operating capacities for the project, as
is the case in the Japanese construction industry, the MCF could control most of the risks
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related to the project, i.e., almost all of its internal risks. Such a case places more
emphasis on the importance of the involvement of the MCF in the equity position.
(4) Equity Contribution Example - "GMP and SO" Contract
By taking the superior position in equity, even though this means exposing itself to
risks, the MCF could negotiate with partners within the consortium (the project company)
for the advantageous risk sharing or financing position, such as options, preferred stocks,
and other financial scheme exclusive to the MCF. A financing arrangement involving the
MCF also can be a resource to reduce the cost of the project from the project company's
standpoint. If, by some means, the MCF invests in the project more than a nominal
portion as a sponsor and, at the same time, if the MCF has incentives to lower the
construction cost more than usual as a contractor, the project could be more efficient.
The following, "GMP and SO (guaranteed maximum price and stock option)" contract
with the consortium, is one proposal of such means to be considered.
With the "GMP only" contract, a GC (General Contractor, not necessarily MCF)
guarantees the maximum price it will require the owner (the project company) to pay for
the construction under a certain condition even if the actual construction cost exceeds the
guaranteed price. The GC usually has some incentive in this contract; if the actual
construction cost is lower than the guaranteed price, half of the cost reduction, for
example, is paid back to the GC.
On the basis of the "GMP and SO" contract, the MCF will obtain a stock options,
whose amount equals to the cash amount, which would be reimbursed with the GMP
(only) contract, as explained in Figure 6-5, if the cost reduction takes place. The stock
option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy the project company's stock for the
predetermined fixed price, which is likely to become below the market price when the
construction is successfully done. With the "GMP and SO" contract, the MCF would
have more incentive to work efficiently in order to reduce the construction cost because
the more it reduce the cost, the more stock it could obtain; and the stock value would
significantly increase because the completion risk, which is usually substantial among
project risks, would turn out to have been avoided and because the surplus budget for the
9 "Stock Option" used here is not necessarily same as that generally used in the current business practice.
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construction would be used to repay the debt earlier than scheduled. Figure 6-6
illustrates the process and effectiveness.
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The GMP contract with the stock option as an incentive for the MCF is good for the
project company, too. If the construction cost becomes less than the GMP, as is likely the
case, it would decrease the amount of the debt and improve the DSCR, or the debt
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soundness, of the project on the early repayment of a portion of the debt. Accordingly, as
this improvement attracts investors or other project sponsors, the value of the stock would
increase. Moreover, if the MCF exercises the stock option and obtain additional stock,
substituting the debt in most part (as right-most chart of Figure 6-6), the overall financing
structure of the project would become still more favorable for the project company.
The MCF is encouraged to exercise the option and this is likely the case if the
improvement of the project profitability becomes apparent when the project successfully
completes with the MCF's tremendous contribution. The MCF, if it is not willing to bear
the risks in the operation phase, could sell the obtained stock to the operation company or
other investors at the market price (or discounted price, but higher than the purchased
price).
This measure is reasonable because the MCF could earn the equitable benefit
when it contributes to the project profitability improvement. A numerical example and
the effect of the concept are demonstrated in Section 6.2. However, GMP itself needs to
be competitive price to win the project, so the MCF needs either competitive
differentiation advantage to involve a sufficient margin or extra efforts for extreme
efficiency to reduce the cost from the competitive GMP price.
(5) Utility Function Concept
Utility function concept, as well as portfolio management described shortly, also
should be considered for the MCF's financial management in adopting the equity
contribution strategy.
What the Utility Function is
Every individual or entity has different preferences for taking risks, or gambling.
For example, some are eager to gamble slot machines while others never. Even the same
person, who used to gambling slot machine, may reject to gamble roulette even if the
roulette has much better expected return. Assume that a person (M) is willing to pay up
to $4 to get an opportunity to take a lottery (A) whose outcome is $10 with a probability
of 50% or nothing with a probability of 50% (The expected outcome of the lottery (A) is
$5), but that he (M) would pay up to only $10 for another lottery (B) that has 50% chance
for obtaining $100 and 50% for nothing even though the expected mean value of the
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lottery (B) is $50. Also assume that another person (W) is willing to pay up to $5 to get
an opportunity to take the former lottery (A) in the previous assumed example, and that
she (W) would pay up to $35 for the latter lottery (B). As we can see in these realistic
cases, the more the deviation, the more risk-averse people would become (Both M and W
pay less amount compared to the expected return for the lottery (B), which is more
fluctuated), and the tendencies of these risk preferences are different from person to
person, depending largely on their asset level (We can reasonably suppose that W has
more assets than M, and thus she is less risk-averse).
Utilityfunction expresses a person's relative preferences among a set of
consequences (often defined over a continuous range). Utility function can be defined as
U (C) as follows. For each Ci, a decision maker can specify a number U (Ci), with 0<=U
(Ci)<=1, such that the decision maker is indifferent between "possessing Ci with
certainty" and "the lottery L (Cmax, Cmin; U (Ci), 1-U (Ci))."
where, L is a lottery with two outcomes, Cmax, Cmin, which have the probability
of U (Ci), 1-U (Ci), respectively.
In the assumed example, his (M's) certainty equivalent (CE), Ci in the definition
equation, for the lottery (A) is $4 and for the lottery (B) is $10, while her (W's) certainty
equivalent for the lottery (A) is $5 and for the lottery (B) is $35.
Risk premium (RP) is defined as the difference between a person's certainty
equivalent for a lottery and its expected mean value (EMV). Therefore, since the EMV
of the lottery (A) is $5 and the EMV of the lottery (B) is $50, M's RP on the lottery (A) is
$1 and on the lottery (B) is $40, while W's RPs are $0 and $15 respectively. Obviously,
W is more risk favorable than M. (The more risk premium, the more risk-averse.)
How to apply the Utility Function Concept
In making a decision on an investment in a project, the utility function of the
project manager and that of the senior management may be very different. Because the
senior management is responsible for the whole balance sheet of the company, while the
project manager is responsible for that of only the project, the senior management can see
the project as only a small part of his or her responsibility. This never means that the
project is not important for the senior management, but that the utility function of the
senior management must be more favorable for the project than that of the project
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manager, who is generally risk-averse, just as Bill Gates would not care about gambling
$1 million for even a little expected return, though the average person care and cannot
gamble. The utility function concept is illustrated in Figure 6-7.
It is important for the project manager to know the difference and to dare to
propose his or her established project scheme to the senior management as long as
involved risks are thoroughly examined and properly mitigated and allocated. In
competitive biddings in Japan, the larger a project, the more likely a major GC gets
awarded, even though the project can be achievable for mid-size GCs and mid-size GCs
have the advantage in terms of their less costly administrative and general costs. This
fact may be the evidence that the larger firms have more advantageous utility function
because of their larger total assets.
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Provided that the utility curves are given as above and, to simplify the situation, that a project has the
possible outcomes of $-1.5 million, $1.0 million, and $2.0 million, with 1/3 probability each, CEs of
the project for the project manager and for the senior management are calculated as follows.
For the project manager, U(CE)= (0.18+0.83+1.0)/3= 0.67. Thus, CE(PM)= $0.20 million.
For the senior management, U(CE)= (0.13+0.77+1.0)/3= 0.633. Thus, CE(PM)= $0.40 million.
Therefore, the project is worth $0.20 million for the project manager, whereas it is worth $0.40 million
for the senior management. (Note that the expected mean value of the project is $0.50 million.)
Figure 6-7 Utility Function Concept
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Risks for MCFs and Probability Distribution
An MCF has numerous (thousands of) projects, with the largest one of 2-3% of its
annual revenue, which takes several years. But, the profit margin is quite small, and
operating income and net income are very small compared to the revenue or assets
magnitude (for example, compared to its annual revenue of VI.1 trillion and the assets of
Y2.0 trillion, Kajima's operating income was Y39 billion (4% of revenue) and net income
was Y7.6 billion (0.7% of revenue) in FY1999). Thus, huge loss in a single project could
affect much on the company's total financial status. This feature should also be included
in the utility function of both the project manager and the senior management.
Nevertheless, this would not change the concept of the discussion above.
(6) Portfolio Management
A company must diversify its financial structure so as to best allocate financial
risks and to achieve best returns. Diversifications are necessary in size of debt, durations,
interest rates, types of risks, and investment types and products.
Portfolio management is a similar concept to utility function in considering the
firm's total assets, but different in that portfolio management is more objective and it
requires a definition of the statistical feature of the target project. As in the application of
the utility function concept, the project manager needs to have a company-wide
standpoint to finally evaluate the project. Portfolio management is important when
management makes decision on whether to go for a project, regarding involved risks and
returns of its all projects both on going and in the future. The best mix of the projects, or
the risk allocation, is the way to generate profits most. Moreover, management could
take the calculated risks by considering overall assets of the company, which makes its
utility function stronger than when considering a single project.
If the expected return of the project and that of the company's portfolio have a
negative or low enough positive correlation coefficient, the project would reduce the
variance of the company's total portfolio, keeping its expected return at the same level or
increasing it (Figure 6-8 illustrates this concept). In the current industry situation in
Japan, since the expected return of the portfolio is largely affected by the decreasing
volume of the public works, while the expected return of a PFI project would be mostly
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influenced by the financing structure itself, or the risk allocation only, the covariance of
the two might be nearly zero. Thus, an addition of a PFI project generally has positive
effects from the perspective of the portfolio management as long as the project has a
substantial expected return.
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Figure 6-8 Portfolio Management Concept
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6.2. Application of the Framework and Strategies
This thesis proposes a framework for prospective PFI toll road/bridge/tunnel
projects in Chapter 5 and the MCF's strategies in the Japanese PFI scheme in Chapter 6
(the foregoing section). This section presents simulations for a prospective Japanese PFI
project, based on the framework and strategies developed in Chapters 5 and 6 to
demonstrate their viabilities.
Factors of the framework to test are: 1) the influence of the private sector's
efficiency with construction cost reduction, 2) the advantage of utilizing the
governmental bank (the Development Bank of Japan) to bring in a low rate of a
subordinated loan, 3) the effectiveness of hedging the traffic volume risk by setting a
minimum floor level or adopting a shadow toll system, and 4) the merit of introducing a
public capital market to attract general investors. Overall financing scheme or the project
structure may become favorable to the financial institution (the loan lender) and entail a
lower interest rate of the loans and bonds issued. The effect of lowering the interest rate
is also presented.
Factors of the MCF's strategies to test are: 1) the potential an MCF has in a PFI
project implementation along with the MCF's competitive differentiation that brings
about significant cost reduction in the construction stage, 2) the effectiveness of the
equity contribution strategy and the potential of the "GMP and SO" contract.
6.2.1. A Bridge Project Simulation
(1) Outline of the Project
In Chapter 5, a bridge/tunnel project or a congestion reliever project with
technical complicatedness and a sufficient traffic volume projection is suggested as the
most prospective type of PFI toll road project in Japan. Among prospective bridge/tunnel
projects in Japan, this section studies the SK Bridge project and tries to demonstrate the
viability of the framework and the strategies developed earlier in this thesis.
The SK Bridge is an actual project currently in the planning stage, and the
descriptions and the simulations in this section are based on a preliminary study report.
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However, names of the location and figures of the original calculation are altered without
sacrificing the reality of the project, to protect the confidentiality of the source or to
simplify and focus on target issues.
The SK Bridge will be a portion of a toll road with four lanes and the speed limit
of 80 km/h, and the length of the bridge-is planned to be about 2.5 km. The project will
connect two major metropolitan areas in the region in order to benefit the residential
communities of the both sides, to relieve the congestion of the existing two other crossing
roads, to develop the business of the both areas, and to provide a redundancy of the traffic
networks. The project is expected to provide more than V200 billion economic effects
and 17,000 job opportunities. Pertinent road networks and the location of the bridge are
illustrated in Figure 6-9.
Planned 0
S HighwaXo Existing
SK Bridge Expressw
Strait xistmgrZ
2 Crossings (tolled)
Figure 6-9 The SK Bridge and the Pertinent Network
(2) Assumptions for the Simulation
Assumptions for the simulation are primarily based on the preliminary report and
as outlined in Table 6-1.
In the report, on which this simulation is based, the government subsidy of 20%
of the construction cost is considered as well as the corporate tax. This simulation,
however, ignores both the direct subsidy and the tax, for the two cancel out each other in
present values according to the report.
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Table 6-1 Assumptions for the Simulation of the SK Bridge Project
Items Assumptions Remarks
Bridge Portion: The Private Sector (PFI)Project Scope Access Roads Portion: The Public Sector
Total: V104 billion
PFI: V80 billion construction cost Construction cost is for
Project Cost Pre-Construction Cost: 5% of the Base Case
construction cost
Construction Period 4 years
Construction Cost Ratio 20%, 30%, 30%, 20%
for Each Year
Concession Term 30 years, including 4-year constructionperiod
22,500 vehicle/day, V600 for a passenger
Traffic Volume and Toll car, at Commencement, Revenue of
Revenue Y5,000 million in the first year, 3.5%
annual increase
Operation and According to the JH Standard
Maintenance Costs 2.7% annual increase in cost
Equity Ratio 20% of the PFI portion Base Case
Project Finance: 15-year term, From Commencement
Senior Debt 5.1% interest, 15-year amortization
Reserve Funds Twice as much as the annuity of the bond With 4% interest bearing
Subordinated Debt Project Finance: 26-year term, 6% interest Subordinated to Senior
_________________ ____________________________debts and Reserve Funds
As the policy of the
Corporate Tax Exempted equal footing or as a
governmental subsidy
Negligible because it is
Depreciation Neglected not necessary to
calculate the taxes
Dividends Distribution After the completion of the debt service
Discount Rate 4%
6.2.2. Application of the PFI Toll Bridge Framework
(1) Potential Feasibility
The SK Bridge project has a considerable potential with regard to the feasibility
as a PFI project. Although the uncertainty of the traffic volume affects the financial
feasibility and residential objection may occur, potential advantages predominate, such as
efficient planning and design and early operation. For example, since the bridge will
span a strait that has strong currents, in which the foundations must be set, the private
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sector's know-how and experiences are essential for the secure construction work of one
of the largest, most complicated bridge projects in Japan. Eventually, technical studies
are in progress with the goal of 30% cost-reduction of the project from the present
estimation. Challenges involved in the project in cost and time reduction supposedly lead
technological innovations and scale merits. The scale of the project is quite large and
requires huge finance to implement the project. This entails the necessity of private
finance, another potential to favor the PFI.
(2) Organization Structure and Government's Responsibility
The organizational structure for the SK Bridge project is presumably as shown in
Figure 6-10, which is basically the same as the one suggested in Chapter 5. The national
government will establish an authorized agency that is responsible for defining the scope,
establishing the PFI scheme, evaluating the private consortia's proposals, issuing
permissions and agreements, and overseeing the operation. In defining the scope, the
government should not specify details; rather, it should give the private sector a broad
flexibility so that the private sector can make the most of their creativity and the potential
(See Figure 5-8). For instance, the precise alignment should be left flexible and so
should other structural specifications, so that the private sector may seek the most
efficient combination of the structure and the alignment to take advantage of their
differentiated technologies or equipment. Furthermore, the private sector may adopt the
best mix of project's performance and its cost in order to maximize the profitability of the
project and the benefits to the public.
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Figure 6-10 Prospective Organizational Structure for the SK Bridge Project
(3) Cash Flow Simulation of the Project
In order to test the framework with respect to: 1) the influence of the private
sector's efficiency with construction cost reduction, 2) the advantage of utilizing the
governmental bank to bring in a low rate of a subordinated loan, 3) the effectiveness of
hedging the traffic volume risk by setting a minimum floor level or adopting a shadow
toll system, and 4) the merit of introducing a public capital market to attract general
investors, cash flow simulations were executed based on the general assumptions shown
earlier in Table 6-1 and other case-specific assumptions described in Table 6-2.
"Original Case" is most largely based on the preliminary report of the project with
altering some numbers and subsidy/tax features. Case 1 is intended to demonstrate the
effectiveness of private sector's efficiency and of the utilization of low interest (3%)
subordinated debt borrowed from the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ, a
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governmental bank).' 0 Cases 2 and 3 look at the sensitivity of the construction cost and
the traffic volume, respectively, to the overall profitability of the project. Larger equity
in Case 4 means either the availability of the public investment in the project or the
sponsors' willingness to be more involved in the project.
The results of the simulations are summarized in Table 6-2. In addition, an
example of the spreadsheet to produce the cash flows and the graphs of financial results
of each case are presented in Appendix B. The profitability of the project and the
availability of the loans are evaluated with the numbers of Equity IRR (ROE), DSCR
(loan life), and NPV. The thresholds of these numbers for the successful implementation
of the SK Bridge project are 6% (recommendation of the preliminary report, considering
current financial environment in Japan), 1.5 (generally recognized as sufficient in Japan,
depending on the risk profile), and positive (by definition), respectively. Minimum
annual DSCR is also shown as arf additional index, which must be more than 1.0,
considered in the whole revenue stream of the project.
10 Current interest rates of 20-year loans with a 3-year deferment period are set at 1.8-2.1% in the case of
the annuity repayment method. A little higher rate is set in this simulation because of the subordinated
feature.
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Table 6-2 Summary of the Simulations of the PFI Framework
Original Case 1Ca Base C Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Case Base Case
Conditions 11.1% Following 25% 20% Lower Larger
Higher the suggested Construction Traffic Equity (40%,
Construction PFI Cost Overrun Volume Base: 20%)
Cost and Framework,
6.0% Interest Utilize DBJ's
on 3%
Subordinate Subordinate
Debt Loan
Construction Y80,000 V72,000 Y90,000 V72,000 V72,000
Cost (Y million)
Senior Loan
(ratio, amount 40% 40% 32% 40% 30%
in Y million, V32,000 Y28,800 Y28,800 V28,800 Y21,600
interest rate) 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1%
Subordinate
Loan (ratio,
amount in 40% 40% 32% 40% 30%
Y million, V32,000 Y28,000 Y28,000 V28,000 V21,600
interest rate) 600% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Equity (ratio,
amount in 20% 20% 36% 20% 40%
V million) Y16,000 Y14,400 Y32,400 Y14,400 Y28,800
Same as Same as 80% of Same as
Toll Revenue Base Case Base Case Base Case. Base Case
Main Results
Equity IRR Negative 6.90% 3.51% 2.36% 5.77%
(Loan-life) 1.50 1.70 1.72 1.28 2.29
DSCR
Min. Annual 1.13 1.28 1.30 0.96 1.74
DSCR
NPV -Y11,764 Y13,793 -Y3,496 -Y5,083 Y12,841
(in Y millions)
Comments The original Compared to Since the Even severer Financing
report shows the Original contractor traffic conditions
a positive Case, this assumes the volume should be
IRR of 6% case risk of problem may more
with 20% demonstrates construction ensue. favorable
government the viability cost overrun, Demand risk because of
subsidy and of the this does not is the most better DSCR.
40% tax suggested affect DSCR crucial risk in
payment. PFI but affects this project.
framework. ROE much.
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(4) Roles of the Government and the Private Sector
Case 1 assumes a construction cost reduction of 11.1 % (from original Y80,000
million to Y72,000 million)" by making use of private sector's efficiency, together with
the scale and the complexity of the project, which make the private sector's efficiency
more likely. This case also assumes the availability of the low rate subordinated loan
issued by the DBJ. As the preliminary report encourages setting the threshold of 6% for
the Equity IRR (ROE), these improvements would make the project profitable enough.
Also, the significant improvement of the DSCR (from 1.50 to 1.70) makes the project
enable to finance and feasible. Therefore, a nominal financial support (providing low-
rate subordinate loan) is, at least, essential to the implementation of the SK Bridge project.
The construction cost reduction is the responsibility of the MCF that participates
in the PFI project to win the concession. This is a responsibility but not the additional
(extra) contribution for which the MCF can ask compensation Lo the consortium.
(5) Other Government Supports - Risk Allocation
Cases 2 and 3 contrast the sensitivity of two risk factors: the construction cost
overrun and the traffic volume. While a construction cost overrun would affect the
profitability (E-IRR) of the project only when the cost significantly exceeds the estimated
figure (25% excess in Case 2, which is well above the prospective cost overrun in Japan),
low traffic volume would affect both the profitability of the project and the stableness of
the financing (DSCR) in a likely situation (20% lower than the estimation, which actually
occurred in many projects, such as Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line project) much more than the
cost overrun would. The traffic volume risk is thus crucial in the SK Bridge project, and
some risk mitigation measures are necessary for the project company.
Minimum traffic or revenue guarantee, shadow tolls, and revenue enhancements
(such as availability fees, exclusivity guarantees, and utilization of the revenue from the
other crossings) can be the alternative measures for the risk allocation according to the
framework suggested in Chapter 5. Although the influences of these alternatives are not
simulated here, the necessity and the effectiveness are obvious, regarding the high
" This figure (11.1% reduction) is reasonable enough, considering that an ongoing technical study is aimed
at achieving 30% cost reduction, as noted earlier, and that experiences show the potential of construction
cost reduction if the project is large and technically complicated. For example, Section 4.2.10 shows 10%
cost reduction case for much smaller scale project.
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sensitivity of the traffic volume risk. Moreover, these alternatives should be acceptable
to the government as well. For example, a minimum revenue guarantee contract,
combined with the ceiling setting suggested in the framework, may benefit the
government if the traffic exceeds the ceiling level with the same level of the probability
of losing money for the guarantee, provided that the traffic projection is reasonable. The
combination pricing of shadow tolls and real tolls may work as a sensitivity absorber
because the shadow tolls are paid relatively more in the worse scenarios. An exclusivity
guarantee and the utilization of the revenue from the other crossings should be also
considered so that the competitive routes would not deteriorate the proposed project.
(6) Utilization of the Capital Market
In order to simulate the effects of the utilization of the capital market, which is
also suggested in Chapter 5, Case 4 raises the ratio of the equity to finance the project.
The case assumes that the stock of the project company is exchanged in the public capital
market and that the company obtains more stockholders from the market, so the debt
burden would be reduced. The result shows the significant improvement in the DSCR
from 1.70 in Case 1 to 2.29 in Case 4, while the E-IRR loses 1.13% (from 6.90% to
5.77%) due to the heavy investment although net profits to the project company become
iarger and earlier.
Investors, in actuality, prefer bonds or preferred stocks, from which coupons or
dividends proceed earlier and more securely, rather than the common stock, which may
be difficult to trade in the early stage of the operation in the cases of long-life
infrastructure projects such as toll roads (See Figure 5-11). Therefore, the result of Case
4 should be viewed from the lenders' perspective (such as DSCR) rather than the
investors' (such as E-IRR). By the utilization of the public capital market, as the
financial institutions can reduce the magnitude of the loans to the project, the DSCR
would be improved and thus the financial institutions could offer more favorable, or
lower, interest rates on the senior loans or bonds. Taking into account the additional
effects and lowered equity ratio (substituted by preferred stocks), the profitability of the
project (E-IRR) would be also improved. The effectiveness of lowered interest rates is
demonstrated shortly in this section.
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6.2.3. Application of the MCF's Strategies
(1) Cash Flow Simulations for the SK Bridge Project
Following the previous simulations that demonstrate the viability of the PFI
framework for toll road/bridge/tunnel projects, the rest of the simulations analyze how
the MCF's strategies, developed in the former section in this chapter, work in the context
of the PFI toll bridge project with the example of the SK Bridge project. Cases in the
simulation and the summary of their results are shown in Table 6-3 and Appendix B.
Table 6-3 Summary of the Simulations of the MCF's Strategies
Case 1 Case 5 Case 6a Case 6bBase Case
Conditions Following the 1.5% Lower MCF's Cost MCF's Cost
suggested PFI Senior Bonds Reduction w/o Reduction with
Framework Interest Rate exercising S.O. exercising S.O.
Construction 068,000 Y68,000
Cost (Y million) 7, _ 72,_0 _ Q64,000-actual) (Y64,000-actual)
Senior Loan
(ratio, amount in 40% 40% 36.5% 36.5%+30.6%
Y million, Y28,800 Y28,800 Y24,800 Y24,800+Y20,800
interest rate) 5.1% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6%
Subordinate
Loan (ratio,
amount in 40% 40% 42.4% 42.4%
Y million, Y28,800 Y28,800 Y28,800 Y28,800
interest rate) 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Equity (ratio,
amount in 20% 20% 21.2% 21.2%+27.1%
Y million) Y14,400 Y14,400 V14,400 V14,400+Y18,400
Toll Revenue Base Case Same as Same as Same as
Base Case Base Case Base Case
Main Results
Equity IRR 6.90% 7.49% 7.76% the Sock Opt on
(Loan-life) 1.70 1.71 1.84 1.83
DSCR ____________
Min. Annual 1.28 1.44 1 67 1.96
DSCR ______
NPV Y13,793 Y17,017 VI8,571 Y1,951 -Value of
(in Y millions) the Stock Option
Comments Compared to the Lower interest The MCF The MCF's Stock
Original Case, this rate has a obtains V4,000 Option has a value
case demonstrates moderate impact million in cash of Y5,951 million
the viability of the on the at the end of (Y4,000 million in
suggested PFI profitability of Construction. cash plus the NPV
framework. the project. above).
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In Case 5, the interest rate of the senior loan is lowered to reflect more favorable
credit rating of the project company that has differentiated advantages, such as better
financial strength and better structural scheme of the project. Case 6a assumes that the
MCF utilizes their special technologies, patents, or equipment and succeeds in significant
cost reduction. Case 6a further assumes that the MCF does not exercise the stock option
in the "GMP and SO" contract proposed in Section 6.1.2 (4), while Case 6b considers
exercising the stock option (Note again that "stock option" here is not necessarily same as
that generally used in the current business practice).
(2) Effects of the Differentiation Strategy
The MCF's competitive differentiation strategy may have effects on the project
profitability in several ways. If the MCF differentiates itself by the robust financial status,
the financial institutions that issue the bonds or loans for 'the project company, which the
MCF sponsors for a substantial portion, may be willing to offer lower interest rates than
for other consortia or the project structured by other consortia. For instance, as noted
earlier, the financial institution would set 100-150 basis points lower interest rates for
AAA-rated company bonds, compared to BBB-rated company bonds.
If a technological advantage to the project or special equipment used for the
project is the differentiation of the MCF, the MCF should make the most use of the
differentiation by efficiently reducing the construction cost of the project. The credibility
of the MCF to complete the construction work backed by the technological advantage
also should reduce the risk premium, or the interest rates of the loans.
Case 5 in the simulation reflects these differentiation factors and adopts a 1.5%
lower interest rate on the senior bonds and loans. In the case of the SK Bridge project,
this improves Equity IRR by 0.59%, DSCR by 0.01 point, and minimum annual DSCR
by 0.16 point. If the differentiation makes possible the cost reduction of V4,000 million,
in addition to the V8,000 million reduction as a PFI project, Case 6a shows the effect of
the additional cost reduction. Namely, the cost reduction results in the improvement of
additional 0.27% Equity IRR, 0.13 point in DSCR, and 0.23 point in minimum annual
DSCR.
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(3) Effects of the Equity Contribution Strategy
As already seen in Case 4, larger equity has a significant effect on the DSCR
(from 1.70 in Base Case to 2.29 in Case 4), which may contribute to lowering the interest
rates of the debt. Although this figure may attract the third party investors as equity
holders, lowered Equity IRR due to the heavier equity amount would distract the MCF
from the equity contribution strategy. It is essential for the MCF to have an elaborate
strategy to benefit from its differentiated competitive advantages. For example, if
additional equity contribution is relatively small enough not to deteriorate the Equity IRR,
the equity contribution strategy may be reasonable, together with considering utility
function concept and portfolio management. "GMP and SO" contract is another
alternative to bring effect the equity contribution strategy.
(4) Effectiveness of "GMP and SO" Contract
One of the schemes for the MCF to take advantage of its competitive
differentiation is "GMP and SO" contract. Case 6a and Case 6b demonstrate the
effectiveness. Both cases assume that the MCF and the project company agree on a
"GMP and SO" contract and set the GMP of V72,000 million, which is the competitive
price as the PFI. The contract includes a provision that a half of the difference between
the GMP and the settlement price should go to the project company's account to
immediately repay the senior loans, provided the settlement price is lower than the GMP,
and that the MCF completes the construction work in V64,000 million, or with 11.1%
cost reduction, utilizing the MCF's competitive differentiation. Both cases use the same
interest rates on debt as Case 5. Case 6a illustrates the case in which a simple GMP
contract is adopted, or the MCF does not exercise the right to purchase the stock of the
project company, while Case 6b assumes the MCF does exercise the stock option and
replace the senior loans with the additional equity.
In Case 6a, not only does the project company earn the improved Equity IRR of
7.76% compared to Case 5 (7.49%), but also, and more importantly, the MCF earns
additional V4,000 million in cash at the completion of the construction, without
exercising the stock option. This feature, benefiting from the construction, is the very
business of the MCF, but it does not yet seem to be equitable enough to the MCF's
competitive differentiation, which reduces the construction cost by V8,000 million.
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Case 6b is the case in which further profits to the MCF is sought. If the MCF
exercises the stock option in full, which replaces a portion of the senior loans, the
additional profits to the project company (by the early repayment of the senior loans)
accounts for Y 1,951 million and the Equity IRR of the early repayment is 6.87%.
Minimum annual DSCR is also improved significantly. Moreover, the MCF may
exercise the stock option and sell the additional stock with the margin of Y1,951 million
or more if the net worth of the project company grows because of the successful
completion. This is likely the case if the completion risk is the crucial risk factor. The
MCF may retain the stock option partially if it prefer more cash, or may invest more
aggressively from the beginning of the project if it is confident enough for the successful
completion.
In sum, the equity contribution strategy, by way of GMP and SO contract, for
example, has a substantial potential to benefit the MCF. It should benoted, however, that
the MCF needs to have a competitive differentiation that makes the project more
profitable than the competitive level as the PFI.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
In order to identify the Japanese PFI framework and to develop the MCF's
strategies for the PFI through a specific type of project, i.e., a toll road/bridge/tunnel
project, this thesis examines the Japanese construction industry in Chapter 2 (and others)
and introduces the Japanese PFI in Chapter 3, as the background. Chapter 4 analyzes
some ten case studies relevant to the toll road/bridge/tunnel project or the Japanese PFI.
Based on the background and the findings from the case studies, Chapter 5 develops a
framework for prospective toll road/bridge/tunnel projects utilizing the Japanese PFI
scheme, with regard to the viable types of projects and desired project structure,
including governments' financial supports and risk sharing. Expectations of the
dissemination of the PFI are also addressed in Chapter 5 in the context of the Japanese
economy and the construction industry in Japan. Chapter 6 proposes two strategies for a
Japanese MCF to face the PFI: differentiation and equity contribution strategies. Finally,
simulations are applied to a prospective toll bridge project to test the viability of the
framework and the strategies developed in Chapter 5 and proposed in Chapter 6,
respectively. Through the process above, this thesis reached the following four main
conclusions.
Conclusion 1. The MCF's roles are important, and its potentials are huge in the
Japanese PFI
Most project companies in the case studies are led by an MCF. MCFs play
crucial roles in the projects, especially new road/bridge/tunnel construction projects such
as in the Kurushima Kaikyo Bridge, the Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line, the Confederation Bridge,
Sydney Harbour Tunnel, and some of U.K.'s DBFO road projects as observed in Chapter
4. Many technically complicated projects would not have been realized had the MCFs
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not played crucial roles in developing the projects. More importantly, in some foreign
private toll road/bridge/tunnel cases, such as the Confederation Bridge, the Sydney
Harbour Tunnel, and SR57, the MCFs overcame the strict limitation of the governments'
financial supports with original technologies or equipment.
Conclusion 2. A real public-private partnership to implement the Japanese PFI is
essential to the development of a toll road/bridge/tunnel project.
A real public-private partnership, which implies joint efforts and initiatives of the
public and private sectors with eagerness to implement the Japanese PFI, is essential to
the development of projects such as the toll road/bridge/tunnel project. Governments
play the most important roles in encouraging the private sector to be involved in the
projects, for example, by sending a clear signal to express the necessity of the project.
Provided that the government is committed to developing a project, the MCF should have
strong incentive to participate in the project and even lead a prospective project company.
This thesis develops a framework in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4), which suggests viable
project types and desirable project structures (organizational structures, project selections,
scope establishments, governments' financial supports, tolling systems, and the
utilization of the capital market). This framework should help the development of a
Japanese PFI project, specifically for a toll road/bridge/tunnel project, if the real public-
private partnership is established.
Conclusion 3. Having realized the importance and potential of its roles, the MCF
should think about investment and competition strategies for the
Japanese PFI.
As mentioned in Conclusion 1, MCFs often play the critical roles in developing
technically complicated projects. The MCFs therefore deserve a substantial portion of
the benefits the projects generate. From Japanese MCFs' standpoint, this thesis proposes
two generic strategies: differentiation and equity contribution, in Chapter 6 (Section 6.1).
Robust financial status, specialized talent and experiences, differentiated technologies
and patents, and proper equipment exemplify the competitive differentiation. Under
certain important conditions, for instance if all risks except the completion risk are well
232
Chapter 7. Conclusion
mitigated or transferred, or if the project includes a large potential to develop innovative
construction means, MCFs could manage the project risk to a substantial extent, and then,
should consider the investment strategy, namely, equity contribution. This thesis
proposes a reasonable method of investment, "a GMP and SO (stock option)" contract,
and provides simulations in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2) to show its viability among others.
The "GMP and SO" contract includes the potential of more profits for the MCF and a
more sound financial scheme for the project company and financiers.
Conclusion 4. The Japanese PFI has a substantial potential to improve the public
facilities procurement and MCFs should play important roles in it.
Coupled with the circumstance of the Japanese economy and the trends of the
Japanese construction industry, the Japanese PFI has substantial potential to improve the
public facilities and services procurement, and the expectation of its dissemination is
considerable as observed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1). MCFs should play important roles
in the new procurement system by exercising their potentials, by developing the
partnership with the governments, and by exploiting the strategies, as described in
Conclusions 1 through 3, respectively.
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Appendix A. Currency Rate Chart
The following currency rate chart, as of March 31, 2001, is provided for the
purpose of convenience only. In this chart, for example,
US$1 =Y 126.25 = EUR1.1494 = C$1.5761 = £0.7061 =A$2.0602.
Table A-1 Currency Rate Chart
As of March 31, 2001
V, US$ _EUR_ C$ X A
Japanese Yn, 100 0.7921 0.9104 1.2484 0.5593 1.6318
U.S.Dollar 126.25 1 1.1494 1.5761 0.7061 2.0602
Euro. 109.84 0.8700 1 1.3712 0.6143 1.7923
Canadian Dollar 80.103 0.6345 0.7293 1 0.4480 1.3071
British Pound 178.81 1.4163 1.6279 2.2322 1 2.9178
AustralianD 61.282 0.4854 0.5579 0.7650 0.3427 1Dollar I
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Appendix B. Simulation Worksheets
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI Case 1 (Base) On the Basis of Suggested Framework and Expectation
Year 5 6
Tol IRevenues Y5,000 V5 175
Cash Flows
Sources
Senior Bonds
Subordinate Debt
Equity
Toll Revenues
Interest on Rsrv Fd.
Total Sources
uses
Pre-constr. Costs
Bonds Issue Costs
Construction Costs
lntrt on Bond in Constr.
Intri on DBJ Ln in Constr
Total Uses In Constr
O&M Expense +VAT
Net Oprtn.Income
Bonds Annual Pay't
Bonds Outstanding
Reserve Funds
Reserve Funds -Cum.
DBJ Debt Service
DBJ Outstanding
DSCR (Proiect, All Loan!
V million
(Total)
V32,155
32,155
Yl 6,078
V206,566
V5,668
V292,622
V3,600
V643
V72,000
V2,6 10
V1,535
V80,388
V37,003
V175,230
V46,783
V6,238
V47,559
Discounted at 4.0%
1.70
7 8 9 10 11 12
V5,356 Y5,544 V5,738 Y5,938 V6,146 Y6,361
Year
(PV)
V29,287
29,287
V1 4,643
V100,670
V3,242
V176,658
V3,600
V643
V65,328
Y2,295
V1.350
Y73,217
V21,458
V99,553
V34,677
V5,492
V28,367
0 1 2 3
V1,697
V1,697
V849
VO
V5,815
V5,81 5
V2,907
V0
V8,883 V9,171 V6,588
V8,883 V9,171 V6,588
V4,442 V4,586 V3,294
V0 Vo VO
V4,243 V14,537 V22,208 V22,928 V16,471
V3,600
V643
414,400
V87
V51
V4,243 V14,537
V21,600 V21,600 V14,400
V383 V836 V1,304
V225 V492 V767
V22,208 V22,92B V16,471
Controls & Assumptions:
Senior Bonds and Loans 40%
Subordinate Debts 40%
Equity Contributions 20%
Toll Revenue in First Year V51000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Construction Cost of the Project 72,000
Pre-Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bonds issue Costs (of Total Bonds) 2%
O&M Expenses in the 1st year V1,000
Annual increase In O&M 2.7%
interest Rate on Bonds issued 5.1%
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing
with PSC or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,OOOM) and costs for access
roads (V1 8,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement& Renewals Fund Is negligible
(Y849) (V2,907) (V4,442) (V4,586) (V3,294)
EquIty IRR (ROE) 6.90%
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.28
13 14 16 7
V6,584 V6,B14 V7,053 V7,300 V7,555
Interest on Rsrv Fd 40 V35 V78 V128 V187 V250 V250 V250 V250 V250 V250 V250 4250
Total Sources Y5,000 V5,210 Y5,434 Y5,672 V5,925 V6,188 V6,396 V6,61 1 46,834 V7,064 47,303 V7,549 V7,805
O&M Expenses 1,000 V1,027 41,055 V1,083 V1,1 12 Y1,142 V1,173 41,205 V1,238 V1,271 41,305 V1,341 Y1,377
Net Oprt. Income V4,000 V4,183 V4,379 V4,589 44,812 V5,045 V5,222 15,406 V5,596 45,793 Y5,997 V6,209 V6,428
Bonds Annual Pay't V3,119 V3,119 43,119 Y3,119 V3,119 Y3,119 Y3,119 V3,119 Y3,119 Y3,119 Y3,119 U,119 43,119
Bonds Outstanding V30,676 V29,122 Y27,488 V25,771 V23,967 Y22,070 420,077 V17,982 Y15,780 Y13,466 V11,034 V8,478 V5,791
Reserve Funds V881 V1,064 V1,260 V1,470 V1,562 VO V0 YO yO VO V0 VO YO
Reserve Funds -Cum. V881 V1,945 Y3,206 V4,676 V6,238 V6,238 46,238 V6,238 46,238 46,238 Y6,238 Y6,238 Y6,238
DBJ Loan Debt 40 YO YO YO V131 Y1,927 V2,104 V2,287 42,477 V2,674 2,878 3,090 V3,309
DBJ Loan Outstanding V33,120 V34,113 Y35,137 V36,191 437,146 V36,333 V35,320 V34,092 V32,638 V30,943 V28,993 V26,773 V24,267
Equity Dividends V0 VO VO V0 YO YO V0 VO Vw 40 40 40 Vc
Minimumnnil. DSCR 1.28 1.34 1.40 1.47 1.54 1.62 1.67 1.73 179 1.86 .9 1.99 2.06
Year 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 25 29 30
Toll Revenues V7,820 V8,093 V8,377 V8,670 V8,973 V9,287 V9,613 V9,949 Y10,297 V10,658 V11,031 Y11,417 V11,816
Intereston RsrvFd V250 V250 V250 V250 V250 '250 V250 250 V250 V250 V250 V250 V250
Total Sources V8,069 V8,343 V8,626 V8,919 V9,223 V9,537 V9,862 V10,198 V10,547 V10,907 V11,280 V11,666 V12,066
O&MExpenses V1,414 Y1,452 Y1,491 V1,532 V1,573 V1,615 V1,659 V1,704 V1,750 V1,797 V1,846 V1,895 V1,947
Net Oprt. Income V6,655 V6,891 V7,135 V7,388 V7,650 V7,922 V8,202 V8,495 V8,797 V9,1 10 V9,435 V9,771 V10,1 19
Bonds Annual Pay't V3,119 V3,119
Bonds Outstanding V2,968 (YO) (VO) (VO) (VO) (YO) (VO) (YO) (VO) (YO) (YO) (YO) (VO)
Reserve Funds VO V0 VO Vo YO VO V0 VO YO VO V0 VO 40
Reserve Funds -Cum. V6,238 V6,238 V6,238 Y6,238 V6,238 V6,238 V6,238 W6,238 V6,238 Y6,238 V6,238 V6,238 V6,238
DBJ Loan Debt Y3,537 V3,772 V7,135 V7,388 V4,851 VO V0 V0 YO YO V0 V0 V0
DBJ Loan Outstanding V21,458 V18,330 V11,745 V4,709 V0 YO V0 V0 40 V0 40 VO V0
Equity Dividends V0 V0 VO VO V2,799 V7,922 V8,203 V8,495 V8,797 V9,110 V9,435 V9,771 V16,357
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V million
V1,697 V7,512 V16,396 25,567 3
V1,697 V7,512 V16,396 V25,567 V32,155
Equity Investments V64,810 JNPV V13,793 I
Minimum AnnI. DSCR 2.13 2.21
. . ,
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Original Case
V million
Controls & Assumptions:
Construction Cost of the Project 80,000
Pre-Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bonds Issue Costs (of Total Bonds) .2%
O&M Expenses in the 1st year V1,000
Annual Increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year V5,000
Annual Increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 40%
V32,000
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds Issued 5.1%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 40%
V32,000
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 6.0%
Equity Contributions 20%
V1 6,000
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(V18,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund Is negligible
Main Results
Equity IRR (ROE) #DIVIOf
DSCR (Project, All Loans) 1.50
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.13
NPV (V11,764)
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 1 (Base)
V m illio n
Controls & Assumptions:
Construction Cost of the Project
Pre-Construction Costs (c Construction)
Bonds issue Costs (of Total Bonds)
I&M Expenses in the 1st year
Annual increase in O&M
Toll Revenue in First Year
Armual Increase in Toll Revenue
Senior Bonds and Loans
Term of Bonds (year)
Interest Rate on Bonds issued
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity)
interest Earning on Reserve Funds
Subordinate Debts
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ
Equity Contributions
Discount Rate
V72,000
5%
2%
v 1,000
2.7%
V5,000
3.5%
40%
V28,800
15
5.1%
2.0
4.0%
40%
V 28,800
3.0%
20%
V 14,400
4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(V18,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund is negligible
Main Results
Equity IR R (ROE) 6.90%
MSOR (Project, Alt Loans) 1.70
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.28
LNPV V13,793
in millions
"onnon
v2s,ooo
V30,000
Vi5,000 -
VO 1.000
vioso00 -
Vo 
-
(V1000o
Expenses and Revenues
Reserve Fund
MTo1I Revenues
MO&M Expenses
(inc. VAT)
M Interest In
Construction on
Subordinates
Construction on
BondsOConstruction Costs
0 5 tO i5 00 25 3
Year
in millionsDe
*70,000
V60,000
V50,000
V40,000
*30,000
20,000
V10,000
in 0 5 10
Equity Invin millions
t Outstandings
ee
Year
estment and Dividends
V20,000
V 15,000
V 1.000
V5,oo
l Vi .. .0001.
(V 1 ) 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
In milons Expenses end Revenues
Veere-,,.stucton
T25,000 Costs
20.000 OConstruction Costs
- ElMinte rest during
V:0.:00 Construction
MO&M Expenses
- - - -- -(Inc.VA T)
OToll R avenues
. .. ... ..r
in millions
VO,000
V40,000
v30,000
V20,000
Vi 100 bi
0
Debt Outstandings
LBonds Outstanding
MDBJ Loan
Outstanding
iO 20 25 3o
Year
ii
in millions Equity investment and Dividends
V20,000
V15,000
V10,000-
vs.000
VS 000)
o 0 tO 15 20 25 30
Year
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Appendix B
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 2 (Construction Cost Overrun)
V million
Controls & Assumptions:
Construction Cost of the Project W90,000
Pre-Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bonds issue Costs (of Total Bonds) 2%
O&M Expenses in the 1st year V1,000
Annual increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year V5,000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 32%
V28,800
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 5.1%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 32%
V28,800
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 30%
Equity Contributions 36%
V32,400
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal tooting with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of W ay Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(V18,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund is negligible
Main R,1s Uits.
Equity IRR (ROE) 3.51%
DSCR (Project, All Loans) 1.72
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.30
NPV (V3,496)
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 3 (Low Traffice)
V million
Controls & Assumptions:
Construction Cost of the Project V72,000
Pre-Construction Costs (uf Construction) 5%
Bonds issue Costs (of Total Bonds) 2%
O&M E xpenses in the lst year V1,000
Annual increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year 44,000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 40%
V28,800
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 5.1%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 40%
V28 800
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Equity Contributions 20%
V14,400
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(V! 8,OGOM) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund is negligible
Main Results
Equity IRR (ROE) 2.36%
DSCR (Project, All Loans) 1.25
Minimum Annual DSCR 0.96
NPV (V5,083)
in m Illio n Expenses and Revenues
v~s~OP res-construction
v~o~ooo -Construction Costs
vis.000
Mitret during
"O& Expenses
DToll Revenues
0 5 to is 20 15 30
Year
in millions
ceo ooo
V40,000
V30,000
va,000
V0
Debt Outstandings
MIonds O utstanding
Ilij~j~~li j D J Loan
12tstand2ng
10 is 20 25 30
Year
in millions Equity Investm ant and Dividends
V20,000I
V15,000
V10,000
V5,oo
vo
0
in m 11lo
"0.000 
-1
5 10 is 20 25 30
Year
E xpenses and Revenues
CP re-construction
Costs
OConstruction Costs
*111iterest during
Construction
UO&M Expenses
(inc.V A T)
OToll Revenues
Paul
5 10 iY 20 25 30
Year
in millions
V50,000
V 400 00
v30,0 00
Vo o 5
0 5
in millions Equity 1
V20,000
V15,000
v 10.000
vsoo
I5*'000
(d010.000)
If
1L
Debt Outstandings
- - -- 8onds Outstanding
IDBJ LoanOutstanding
10 15 20 25 30
Year
nvestment and Dividends
11
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
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SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 4 (Larger Equity)
in mlil1ons Expenses and Revenues
"o" e,cons02c05onV 2 .000 C o s ts
V20,000 E3Construction Costs
Minterest during
V:0.000 Construction
vS,000 NO&M E xpenses
(Inc.VA T)
vo OToII Revenues
I million
Controls & Assumptions:
Construction Cost of the Project 172,000
Pre -Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bonds issue Costs (of Totat Bonds) 2%
O&M Expenses in the 1st year V1,000
Annual Increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year i5,000
Annual Increase In Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 30%1
V21 600
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 5.1%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0.
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 30%
V21 600
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Equity Contributions 428, 0
*n2,800
DiscountRate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal ooting with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(V18,00OM) are public responsibility.
R eplacem snt& Renewals Fund is negligible
Main Results
EquIty .IRR RO E) 5.7%
DSCR (Project, All Loans) 2.29
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.74
NPV .12,841
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 5 (Low Interest)
v million
Coitrols & Assumcitions:
Construction Cost of the Project 472,000
Pre-Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bonds Issue Costs (of TotalBonds) 2%.
O&M Expenses in the tst year V1,000
Annual increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year V5,000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 40%
V28,800
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 3.6%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 40%
V28,800
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Equity Contributions 20%V14,400
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (V6,000M) and costs for access roads
(118,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund is negligible
Main Results.
Equity IRR (ROE) 7.49%
DSCR.(ProjectAII Loans) 1.71
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.44
NPV V17,017
Year
in m illiot
V50'000
V40,000
V30,000
V2 0,000
V 10,000
Vs
Debt Outstandings
nis
MBonds Outstanding
MDBJ Loan
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
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V 10,000
V5,000
y o
(V10.
1r7
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Year
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""3.000
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V2 0.000 OConstruction Conis
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050-O&M E xpenses(in.VA Ti
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Eel
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Appendix B
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 6a (MCF's Strategy -1)
V million
Controls & Assum ptions:
Constructjon Cost of the Project *68,000
Pre-Construction Costs (of Construction) 5%.
Bonds Issue Costs (of Total Bonds) 2%
O&M Expenses in the lst year 1,000
Annual increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue in First Year *5S000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 36%
F24,800
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 3.6%
Reserve Funds (of Bonds annuity) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 42%
V28,800
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Equity Contributions 21%
F4,4400
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (*6,OEOM) and costs for access roads
(118,000M) are public responsibility.
Replacement&Renewals Fund is negligible
Equity IRR (ROE) 7.76%
DSCR (Prolect, All Loans) 1.94
Minim um Annual SC R 1.67
NPV 18,571
Additional Profit at the end of Constructior . 4,000
SK Bridge by Japanese PFI
Case 6b (M C F's Strategy -2)
Smillion
Contruls & Assumptions:
Const:uctlon Cost of the Projec! F 8,OS
P
0 e-Corstructon Costs (of Construction) 5%
Bondu Issue Costs (of Total Bonds) 2%
O&M Expenses in the l yst ea 1,000
Annuai Increase in O&M 2.7%
Toll Revenue In First Year V5,000
Annual increase in Toll Revenue 3.5%
Senior Bonds and Loans 36%
V24,a00
Term of Bonds (year) 15
Interest Rate on Bonds issued 3.6%
Reserve F unds (of Bonds ann uilty) 2.0
Interest Earning on Reserve Funds 4.0%
Subordinate Debts 42%
V28,800
Interest Rate on Subordinate Debt from DBJ 3.0%
Equity Contributions 21%
V14,400
Discount Rate 4.0%
Corporate Tax is exempted as an equal footing with PSC
or as an equivalent with a subsidy.
Righ of Way Cost (6,OOOM ) and costs for access roads
(Vl8,000M) are public responsibility.
Replace m ent&Renewals Fund is negligible
Main Results
MCF can Exercise the Stock Option
EquIty: IRR IROE) of Stock Option 6.97%
NPV of Exercising the Stock Option .1,951
DSCR (Project, All Loans) 1.83
Minimum Annual DSCR 1.96
Additional Value of M CF's Stock Option 5,951
in millions Expenses and Revenues
"OPre-consiruction
a2s.00 Costs
W20,a00 OConstruction Costs
Minterest during
V:0.: Construction
S.0aa -- MO&M Expenses
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